cifs: allow sec=none mounts to work against servers that don't support extended security

In the case of sec=none, we're not sending a username or password, so
there's little benefit to mandating NTLMSSP auth. Allow it to use
unencapsulated auth in that case.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 99eeaa17ee006956d37350cad00bfd854c8b5306..0a7fdc31f253b59e85137ecd39dd4c17cd10547a 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -1061,6 +1061,7 @@ static int cifs_parse_security_flavors(char *value,
 #endif
        case Opt_sec_none:
                vol->nullauth = 1;
+               vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM;
                break;
        default:
                cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security option: %s\n", value);