arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0

Commit 30d88c0e3ace upstream.

It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel
address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction
abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here,
it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening
in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling
an IRQ from EL0.

Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index ac7df45b296b88676a15b7aabfc7a386b8a2b314..93958d1341bbd7f2f54f970acf0a3465a3d8d7f0 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -821,6 +821,11 @@ el0_irq_naked:
 #endif
 
        ct_user_exit
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+       tbz     x22, #55, 1f
+       bl      do_el0_irq_bp_hardening
+1:
+#endif
        irq_handler
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 58992467ebb9d34eebee83db65a6b05edc77b3b4..5edb706aacb0dfc00d0ceae24a871a75e1edd1d1 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -751,6 +751,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
        arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr);
 }
 
+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
+{
+       /* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
+       arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
+}
+
 asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
                                                   unsigned int esr,
                                                   struct pt_regs *regs)