arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks
authorMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Thu, 12 Apr 2018 11:11:13 +0000 (12:11 +0100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 20 Apr 2018 06:20:44 +0000 (08:20 +0200)
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit 0f15adbb2861ce6f75ccfc5a92b19eae0ef327d0 upstream.

Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to
redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge
information from one context to another.

This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to
enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for
CPUs that are affected.

Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[v4.9: copy bp hardening cb via text mapping]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [v4.9 backport]
Tested-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/arm64/Kconfig
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S [new file with mode: 0644]
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
arch/arm64/mm/context.c
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c

index c8471cf46cbb5f2afd000220f0eb31c11c82cc2f..90e58bbbd858395283b622e6cb6f2a21e8e3f340 100644 (file)
@@ -745,6 +745,23 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 
          If unsure, say Y.
 
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+       bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
+       default y
+       help
+         Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
+         being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by
+         executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.  Such attacks
+         can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch
+         predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations.
+
+         This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the
+         branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific
+         instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system
+         firmware.
+
+         If unsure, say Y.
+
 menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
        bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
        depends on COMPAT
index 7ddf233f05bd681c4b914c54e100e784b5b9270d..ce67bf6a0886a3c786472df768c84883c164ad44 100644 (file)
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@
 #define ARM64_HYP_OFFSET_LOW                   14
 #define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_LINE_SIZE       15
 #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0              16
+#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR          17
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS                            17
+#define ARM64_NCAPS                            18
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
index a813edf28737bc9f11c0e69da0f167fcfeba8459..d51158a618922ef2985d4429a147512fd6baaf44 100644 (file)
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+
 typedef struct {
        atomic64_t      id;
        void            *vdso;
@@ -38,6 +40,43 @@ static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void)
               cpus_have_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0);
 }
 
+typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void);
+
+struct bp_hardening_data {
+       int                     hyp_vectors_slot;
+       bp_hardening_cb_t       fn;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start[], __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end[];
+
+DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
+
+static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
+{
+       return this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
+}
+
+static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)
+{
+       struct bp_hardening_data *d;
+
+       if (!cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
+               return;
+
+       d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
+       if (d->fn)
+               d->fn();
+}
+#else
+static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
+{
+       return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)      { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
+
 extern void paging_init(void);
 extern void bootmem_init(void);
 extern void __iomem *early_io_map(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long virt);
index 7cb7f7cdcfbc62c699fdfa8cc05737bf80597007..88bbe364b6ae005cbec57a7394b6198e6c2df19c 100644 (file)
 
 /* id_aa64pfr0 */
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT         60
+#define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT         56
+#define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT          32
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT          24
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT                20
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT           16
index 7d66bbaafc0c1c299cbf9ab109dedc1dbfdf9f7e..74b8fd8607149467a20e868706d2d4240cdf2759 100644 (file)
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION)              += hibernate.o hibernate-asm.o
 arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC)              += machine_kexec.o relocate_kernel.o    \
                                           cpu-reset.o
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_KVM),y)
+arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)    += bpi.o
+endif
+
 obj-y                                  += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/
 obj-m                                  += $(arm64-obj-m)
 head-y                                 := head.o
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..06a931e
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Contains CPU specific branch predictor invalidation sequences
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+
+.macro ventry target
+       .rept 31
+       nop
+       .endr
+       b       \target
+.endm
+
+.macro vectors target
+       ventry \target + 0x000
+       ventry \target + 0x080
+       ventry \target + 0x100
+       ventry \target + 0x180
+
+       ventry \target + 0x200
+       ventry \target + 0x280
+       ventry \target + 0x300
+       ventry \target + 0x380
+
+       ventry \target + 0x400
+       ventry \target + 0x480
+       ventry \target + 0x500
+       ventry \target + 0x580
+
+       ventry \target + 0x600
+       ventry \target + 0x680
+       ventry \target + 0x700
+       ventry \target + 0x780
+.endm
+
+       .align  11
+ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
+       .rept 4
+       vectors __kvm_hyp_vector
+       .endr
+ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end)
index b866df79bb83ce94487f20ae5ca3763d2e71dcf1..3884c43985973562dd734cf80546e997c51335b7 100644 (file)
@@ -46,6 +46,80 @@ static int cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(void *__unused)
        return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
+static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
+                               const char *hyp_vecs_end)
+{
+       void *dst = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start + slot * SZ_2K;
+       int i;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80)
+               memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start);
+
+       flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K);
+}
+
+static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
+                                     const char *hyp_vecs_start,
+                                     const char *hyp_vecs_end)
+{
+       static int last_slot = -1;
+       static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock);
+       int cpu, slot = -1;
+
+       spin_lock(&bp_lock);
+       for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+               if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) {
+                       slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu);
+                       break;
+               }
+       }
+
+       if (slot == -1) {
+               last_slot++;
+               BUG_ON(((__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end - __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
+                       / SZ_2K) <= last_slot);
+               slot = last_slot;
+               __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
+       }
+
+       __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+       __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
+       spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
+}
+#else
+static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
+                                     const char *hyp_vecs_start,
+                                     const char *hyp_vecs_end)
+{
+       __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */
+
+static void  install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
+                                    bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
+                                    const char *hyp_vecs_start,
+                                    const char *hyp_vecs_end)
+{
+       u64 pfr0;
+
+       if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
+               return;
+
+       pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
+       if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT))
+               return;
+
+       __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
+
 #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
        .def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
        .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
index 692f107bb46e07c6e98ef4fd00de84cfade4b9e4..a0ee012025036d89275aeb34bdea1f824f38fa3d 100644 (file)
@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = {
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {
        ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-       ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 32, 28, 0),
+       ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+       ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 32, 24, 0),
        ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 28, 4, 0),
        ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
        S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI),
index c154b1608405770c3bf195c59824092dd3286e4a..fd6879d98bd7cdfbd1c25ac9a56d41f721d9b62f 100644 (file)
@@ -589,13 +589,15 @@ el0_ia:
         * Instruction abort handling
         */
        mrs     x26, far_el1
-       // enable interrupts before calling the main handler
-       enable_dbg_and_irq
+       msr     daifclr, #(8 | 4 | 1)
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
+       bl      trace_hardirqs_off
+#endif
        ct_user_exit
        mov     x0, x26
        mov     x1, x25
        mov     x2, sp
-       bl      do_mem_abort
+       bl      do_el0_ia_bp_hardening
        b       ret_to_user
 el0_fpsimd_acc:
        /*
index b9b087564bace71d5e2e7b5dcac7a8d80bb3da01..accf7ead3945465f2d4ad3623686c5262b8790e0 100644 (file)
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ asmlinkage void post_ttbr_update_workaround(void)
                        "ic iallu; dsb nsh; isb",
                        ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456,
                        CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456));
+
+       arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
 }
 
 static int asids_init(void)
index 4df70c9fd762ba329f9d129adeedfa037f0f0b9b..c95b194d1c6e2900d64a7680389f62445ab043c8 100644 (file)
@@ -590,6 +590,23 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
        arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr);
 }
 
+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
+                                                  unsigned int esr,
+                                                  struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+       /*
+        * We've taken an instruction abort from userspace and not yet
+        * re-enabled IRQs. If the address is a kernel address, apply
+        * BP hardening prior to enabling IRQs and pre-emption.
+        */
+       if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
+               arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
+
+       local_irq_enable();
+       do_mem_abort(addr, esr, regs);
+}
+
+
 /*
  * Handle stack alignment exceptions.
  */