dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call
authorAdrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Thu, 27 Apr 2017 17:32:55 +0000 (10:32 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Mon, 8 May 2017 05:46:02 +0000 (07:46 +0200)
commit 4617f564c06117c7d1b611be49521a4430042287 upstream.

When calling a dm ioctl that doesn't process any data
(IOCTL_FLAGS_NO_PARAMS), the contents of the data field in struct
dm_ioctl are left initialized.  Current code is incorrectly extending
the size of data copied back to user, causing the contents of kernel
stack to be leaked to user.  Fix by only copying contents before data
and allow the functions processing the ioctl to override.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c

index 80a43954325966a872cf8ebc95fb23c92c0b8819..e503279c34fcaf573bf21df93dbc2d539596b5bd 100644 (file)
@@ -1843,7 +1843,7 @@ static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
        if (r)
                goto out;
 
-       param->data_size = sizeof(*param);
+       param->data_size = offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data);
        r = fn(param, input_param_size);
 
        if (unlikely(param->flags & DM_BUFFER_FULL_FLAG) &&