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[PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants
authorDarrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Thu, 29 Jun 2006 21:56:39 +0000 (16:56 -0500)
committerAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Sat, 1 Jul 2006 09:44:08 +0000 (05:44 -0400)
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch.  The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
 include/linux/audit.h          |   15 ++++++++----
 kernel/auditfilter.c           |   50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 kernel/auditsc.c               |   10 ++++----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   32 +++++++++++++-------------
 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
include/linux/audit.h patch | blob | blame | history
kernel/auditfilter.c patch | blob | blame | history
kernel/auditsc.c patch | blob | blame | history
security/selinux/ss/services.c patch | blob | blame | history

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index a489104ae3a42dc9afeeb661b5ba0e5a913912ab..c211f0a2abb421a331de6094ae1c1d8bda6a3061 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -151,12 +151,17 @@
 #define AUDIT_PERS     10
 #define AUDIT_ARCH     11
 #define AUDIT_MSGTYPE  12
-#define AUDIT_SE_USER  13      /* security label user */
-#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE  14      /* security label role */
-#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE  15      /* security label type */
-#define AUDIT_SE_SEN   16      /* security label sensitivity label */
-#define AUDIT_SE_CLR   17      /* security label clearance label */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER        13      /* security label user */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE        14      /* security label role */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE        15      /* security label type */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN 16      /* security label sensitivity label */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 17      /* security label clearance label */
 #define AUDIT_PPID     18
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER 19
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE 20
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW      22
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH     23
 
                                /* These are ONLY useful when checking
                                 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index e98db08fc6dfa51f0f4e5941a22126993c5de5c4..40a9931a13e2859eaaf256ed2740acacd7ba5048 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -470,11 +470,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
                case AUDIT_ARG2:
                case AUDIT_ARG3:
                        break;
-               case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-               case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-               case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                        str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
                        if (IS_ERR(str))
                                goto exit_free;
@@ -611,11 +611,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
                data->fields[i] = f->type;
                data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
                switch(f->type) {
-               case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-               case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-               case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                        data->buflen += data->values[i] =
                                audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
                        break;
@@ -654,11 +654,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
                        return 1;
 
                switch(a->fields[i].type) {
-               case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-               case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-               case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                        if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
                                return 1;
                        break;
@@ -774,11 +774,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
         * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
        for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
                switch (new->fields[i].type) {
-               case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-               case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-               case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                        err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
                                                       &old->fields[i]);
                        break;
@@ -1537,11 +1537,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
        for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
                struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
                switch (f->type) {
-               case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-               case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-               case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                        return 1;
                }
        }
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 316657855165d8e7c38104c3bc2f62e436d942c4..1d24fade17e62addb00c8869848040b7dff72db6 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -321,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                        if (ctx)
                                result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
                        break;
-               case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-               case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-               case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-               case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+               case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                        /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
                           a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
                           match for now to avoid losing information that
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e9548bc049e1d9020161b92fb362743ee7261957..92e80b99d1839ca5b455266b29c2c08d0fbd8c08 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1845,15 +1845,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
                return -ENOTSUPP;
 
        switch (field) {
-       case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-       case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-       case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
                /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
                if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
                        return -EINVAL;
                break;
-       case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-       case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
                if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
                        return -EINVAL;
@@ -1874,29 +1874,29 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
        tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
 
        switch (field) {
-       case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
                userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
                if (!userdatum)
                        rc = -EINVAL;
                else
                        tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
                break;
-       case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
                roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
                if (!roledatum)
                        rc = -EINVAL;
                else
                        tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
                break;
-       case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
                typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
                if (!typedatum)
                        rc = -EINVAL;
                else
                        tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
                break;
-       case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-       case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
                break;
        }
@@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
        /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
           without a match */
        switch (field) {
-       case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                        match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                        break;
                }
                break;
-       case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                        match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                        break;
                }
                break;
-       case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                        match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1978,9 +1978,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                        break;
                }
                break;
-       case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-       case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
-               level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+       case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+               level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
                         &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL:
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