Map the permission gating RTM_GETNEIGH/RTM_GETNEIGHTBL messages to a
new permission so that it can be distinguished from the other netlink
route permissions in selinux policy. The new permission is triggered by
a flag set in system images T and up.
This change is intended to be backported to all kernels that a T system
image can run on top of.
Bug:
171572148
Test: atest NetworkInterfaceTest
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Test: atest bionic-unit-tests-static
Test: On Cuttlefish, run combinations of:
- Policy bit set or omitted (see https://r.android.com/
1701847)
- This patch applied or omitted
- App having nlmsg_readneigh permission or not
Verify that only the combination of this patch + the policy bit being
set + the app not having the nlmsg_readneigh permission prevents the
app from sending RTM_GETNEIGH messages.
Change-Id: I4bcfce4decb34ea9388eeedfc4be67403de8a980
Signed-off-by: Bram Bonné <brambonne@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit
fac07550bdac9adea0dbe3edbdbec7a9a690a178)
(cherry picked from commit
32d7afd1472c3cce509a3455b40a575540eac780)
{ COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "netlink_route_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
- "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_readpriv", NULL } },
+ "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_readpriv", "nlmsg_getneigh",
+ NULL } },
{ "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
"nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
extern int selinux_android_netlink_route;
+extern int selinux_android_netlink_getneigh;
extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
return err;
}
-static void nlmsg_set_getlink_perm(u32 perm)
+static void nlmsg_set_perm_for_type(u32 perm, u16 type)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(nlmsg_route_perms); i++) {
- if (nlmsg_route_perms[i].nlmsg_type == RTM_GETLINK) {
+ if (nlmsg_route_perms[i].nlmsg_type == type) {
nlmsg_route_perms[i].perm = perm;
break;
}
/**
* Use nlmsg_readpriv as the permission for RTM_GETLINK messages if the
* netlink_route_getlink policy capability is set. Otherwise use nlmsg_read.
+ * Similarly, use nlmsg_getneigh for RTM_GETNEIGH and RTM_GETNEIGHTBL if the
+ * netlink_route_getneigh policy capability is set. Otherwise use nlmsg_read.
*/
void selinux_nlmsg_init(void)
{
if (selinux_android_netlink_route)
- nlmsg_set_getlink_perm(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV);
+ nlmsg_set_perm_for_type(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV,
+ RTM_GETLINK);
else
- nlmsg_set_getlink_perm(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ);
+ nlmsg_set_perm_for_type(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ,
+ RTM_GETLINK);
+
+ if (selinux_android_netlink_getneigh) {
+ nlmsg_set_perm_for_type(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_GETNEIGH,
+ RTM_GETNEIGH);
+ nlmsg_set_perm_for_type(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_GETNEIGH,
+ RTM_GETNEIGHTBL);
+ } else {
+ nlmsg_set_perm_for_type(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ,
+ RTM_GETNEIGH);
+ nlmsg_set_perm_for_type(NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ,
+ RTM_GETNEIGHTBL);
+ }
}
p->android_netlink_route = 1;
}
+ if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_ANDROID_NETLINK_GETNEIGH)) {
+ p->android_netlink_getneigh = 1;
+ }
+
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
rc = ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp);
if (rc)
struct policydb {
int mls_enabled;
int android_netlink_route;
+ int android_netlink_getneigh;
/* symbol tables */
struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_ANDROID_NETLINK_ROUTE (1 << 31)
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_ANDROID_NETLINK_GETNEIGH (1 << 30)
/* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
#define REJECT_UNKNOWN 0x00000002
};
int selinux_android_netlink_route;
+int selinux_android_netlink_getneigh;
int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
int selinux_policycap_openperm;
int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
}
selinux_android_netlink_route = policydb.android_netlink_route;
+ selinux_android_netlink_getneigh = policydb.android_netlink_getneigh;
selinux_nlmsg_init();
}