perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying
authorKan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Mon, 14 Jul 2014 19:25:56 +0000 (12:25 -0700)
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Wed, 16 Jul 2014 11:18:43 +0000 (13:18 +0200)
With -cpu host, KVM reports LBR and extra_regs support, if the host has
support.

When the guest perf driver tries to access LBR or extra_regs MSR,
it #GPs all MSR accesses,since KVM doesn't handle LBR and extra_regs support.
So check the related MSRs access right once at initialization time to avoid
the error access at runtime.

For reproducing the issue, please build the kernel with CONFIG_KVM_INTEL = y
(for host kernel).
And CONFIG_PARAVIRT = n and CONFIG_KVM_GUEST = n (for guest kernel).
Start the guest with -cpu host.
Run perf record with --branch-any or --branch-filter in guest to trigger LBR
Run perf stat offcore events (E.g. LLC-loads/LLC-load-misses ...) in guest to
trigger offcore_rsp #GP

Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maria Dimakopoulou <maria.n.dimakopoulou@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Davies <junk@eslaf.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Yan, Zheng <zheng.z.yan@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1405365957-20202-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c

index 2bdfbff8a4f6165afb1e9931edcfb250c7113a34..2879ecdaac430c62710db3c90b326e6e25f60acf 100644 (file)
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int x86_pmu_extra_regs(u64 config, struct perf_event *event)
                        continue;
                if (event->attr.config1 & ~er->valid_mask)
                        return -EINVAL;
+               /* Check if the extra msrs can be safely accessed*/
+               if (!er->extra_msr_access)
+                       return -ENXIO;
 
                reg->idx = er->idx;
                reg->config = event->attr.config1;
index 3b2f9bdd974be198d0622e306ddbba427add2d25..8ade93111e0379fd79e0b421d29256b6c9b1b206 100644 (file)
@@ -295,14 +295,16 @@ struct extra_reg {
        u64                     config_mask;
        u64                     valid_mask;
        int                     idx;  /* per_xxx->regs[] reg index */
+       bool                    extra_msr_access;
 };
 
 #define EVENT_EXTRA_REG(e, ms, m, vm, i) {     \
-       .event = (e),           \
-       .msr = (ms),            \
-       .config_mask = (m),     \
-       .valid_mask = (vm),     \
-       .idx = EXTRA_REG_##i,   \
+       .event = (e),                   \
+       .msr = (ms),                    \
+       .config_mask = (m),             \
+       .valid_mask = (vm),             \
+       .idx = EXTRA_REG_##i,           \
+       .extra_msr_access = true,       \
        }
 
 #define INTEL_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx)     \
index c206815b9556108d5ec4ac78cb86b532629bb5e1..2502d0d9d246a1fe63c57070176b2bcc04cad3bb 100644 (file)
@@ -2182,6 +2182,41 @@ static void intel_snb_check_microcode(void)
        }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Under certain circumstances, access certain MSR may cause #GP.
+ * The function tests if the input MSR can be safely accessed.
+ */
+static bool check_msr(unsigned long msr, u64 mask)
+{
+       u64 val_old, val_new, val_tmp;
+
+       /*
+        * Read the current value, change it and read it back to see if it
+        * matches, this is needed to detect certain hardware emulators
+        * (qemu/kvm) that don't trap on the MSR access and always return 0s.
+        */
+       if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_old))
+               return false;
+
+       /*
+        * Only change the bits which can be updated by wrmsrl.
+        */
+       val_tmp = val_old ^ mask;
+       if (wrmsrl_safe(msr, val_tmp) ||
+           rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_new))
+               return false;
+
+       if (val_new != val_tmp)
+               return false;
+
+       /* Here it's sure that the MSR can be safely accessed.
+        * Restore the old value and return.
+        */
+       wrmsrl(msr, val_old);
+
+       return true;
+}
+
 static __init void intel_sandybridge_quirk(void)
 {
        x86_pmu.check_microcode = intel_snb_check_microcode;
@@ -2271,7 +2306,8 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
        union cpuid10_ebx ebx;
        struct event_constraint *c;
        unsigned int unused;
-       int version;
+       struct extra_reg *er;
+       int version, i;
 
        if (!cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
                switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
@@ -2577,6 +2613,34 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
                }
        }
 
+       /*
+        * Access LBR MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
+        * E.g. KVM doesn't support LBR MSR
+        * Check all LBT MSR here.
+        * Disable LBR access if any LBR MSRs can not be accessed.
+        */
+       if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr && !check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos, 0x3UL))
+               x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+       for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) {
+               if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i, 0xffffUL) &&
+                     check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i, 0xffffUL)))
+                       x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+       }
+
+       /*
+        * Access extra MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
+        * E.g. KVM doesn't support offcore event
+        * Check all extra_regs here.
+        */
+       if (x86_pmu.extra_regs) {
+               for (er = x86_pmu.extra_regs; er->msr; er++) {
+                       er->extra_msr_access = check_msr(er->msr, 0x1ffUL);
+                       /* Disable LBR select mapping */
+                       if ((er->idx == EXTRA_REG_LBR) && !er->extra_msr_access)
+                               x86_pmu.lbr_sel_map = NULL;
+               }
+       }
+
        /* Support full width counters using alternative MSR range */
        if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.full_width_write) {
                x86_pmu.max_period = x86_pmu.cntval_mask;