Make the taint flags reliable

It's somewhat unlikely that it happens, but right now a race window
between interrupts or machine checks or oopses could corrupt the tainted
bitmap because it is modified in a non atomic fashion.

Convert the taint variable to an unsigned long and use only atomic bit
operations on it.

Unfortunately this means the intvec sysctl functions cannot be used on it
anymore.

It turned out the taint sysctl handler could actually be simplified a bit
(since it only increases capabilities) so this patch actually removes
code.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded include]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 8c3aca7cb343fb4d1cc93bf8e447b04b19839ff7..7ed9e070a6e930d97e2d55c8750a50f57a9baef1 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -282,6 +282,8 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_callin(void)
        cpu_set(cpuid, cpu_callin_map);
 }
 
+static int __cpuinitdata unsafe_smp;
+
 /*
  * Activate a secondary processor.
  */
@@ -397,7 +399,7 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_apply_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
                                goto valid_k7;
 
                /* If we get here, not a certified SMP capable AMD system. */
-               add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP);
+               unsafe_smp = 1;
        }
 
 valid_k7:
@@ -414,12 +416,10 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_checks(void)
         * Don't taint if we are running SMP kernel on a single non-MP
         * approved Athlon
         */
-       if (tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP) {
-               if (num_online_cpus())
-                       printk(KERN_INFO "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
-                               "processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
-               else
-                       tainted &= ~TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP;
+       if (unsafe_smp && num_online_cpus() > 1) {
+               printk(KERN_INFO "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
+                       "processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
+               add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP);
        }
 }
 

diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 75d81f157d2edbd7a8aec39ce3cb7cc3bd69a758..e971c55f45ac1f71a528cf3ca2905169787bfdcd 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -235,9 +235,10 @@ extern int oops_in_progress;               /* If set, an oops, panic(), BUG() or die() is in
 extern int panic_timeout;
 extern int panic_on_oops;
 extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi;
-extern int tainted;
 extern const char *print_tainted(void);
-extern void add_taint(unsigned);
+extern void add_taint(unsigned flag);
+extern int test_taint(unsigned flag);
+extern unsigned long get_taint(void);
 extern int root_mountflags;
 
 /* Values used for system_state */
@@ -250,16 +251,16 @@ extern enum system_states {
        SYSTEM_SUSPEND_DISK,
 } system_state;
 
-#define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE       (1<<0)
-#define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE            (1<<1)
-#define TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP               (1<<2)
-#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD             (1<<3)
-#define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK            (1<<4)
-#define TAINT_BAD_PAGE                 (1<<5)
-#define TAINT_USER                     (1<<6)
-#define TAINT_DIE                      (1<<7)
-#define TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE    (1<<8)
-#define TAINT_WARN                     (1<<9)
+#define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE       0
+#define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE            1
+#define TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP               2
+#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD             3
+#define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK            4
+#define TAINT_BAD_PAGE                 5
+#define TAINT_USER                     6
+#define TAINT_DIE                      7
+#define TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE    8
+#define TAINT_WARN                     9
 
 extern void dump_stack(void) __cold;
 

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 9db11911e04b7b55df05fd9f928f5629fe46430d..dd9ac6ad5cb9575926c2d3e6ce74b27f97ae40cf 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod)
 static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag)
 {
        add_taint(flag);
-       mod->taints |= flag;
+       mod->taints |= (1U << flag);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static const char vermagic[] = VERMAGIC_STRING;
 static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *symname)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD
-       if (!(tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
+       if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
                printk("%s: no version for \"%s\" found: kernel tainted.\n",
                       mod->name, symname);
        add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static unsigned long resolve_symbol(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
        const unsigned long *crc;
 
        ret = find_symbol(name, &owner, &crc,
-                         !(mod->taints & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE), true);
+                         !(mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)), true);
        if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret)) {
                /* use_module can fail due to OOM,
                   or module initialization or unloading */
@@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license)
                license = "unspecified";
 
        if (!license_is_gpl_compatible(license)) {
-               if (!(tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
+               if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
                        printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints "
                                "kernel.\n", mod->name, license);
                add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
@@ -2552,9 +2552,9 @@ static char *module_flags(struct module *mod, char *buf)
            mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING ||
            mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING) {
                buf[bx++] = '(';
-               if (mod->taints & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)
+               if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
                        buf[bx++] = 'P';
-               if (mod->taints & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE)
+               if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
                        buf[bx++] = 'F';
                /*
                 * TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD: could be added.

diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 12c5a0a6c89bee42e44c65ee41eb4695ae180983..028013f7afd4c3b627b93a3dea4ae4ea40044c86 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
 
 int panic_on_oops;
-int tainted;
+static unsigned long tainted_mask;
 static int pause_on_oops;
 static int pause_on_oops_flag;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
@@ -159,31 +159,60 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
  *     The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint().
  */
 
+struct tnt {
+       u8 bit;
+       char true;
+       char false;
+};
+
+static const struct tnt tnts[] = {
+       { TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G' },
+       { TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, 'S', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_USER, 'U', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_DIE, 'D', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, 'A', ' ' },
+       { TAINT_WARN, 'W', ' ' },
+};
+
 const char *print_tainted(void)
 {
-       static char buf[20];
-       if (tainted) {
-               snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c",
-                       tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ? 'P' : 'G',
-                       tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ? 'F' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP ? 'S' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ? 'R' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_BAD_PAGE ? 'B' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_USER ? 'U' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_DIE ? 'D' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE ? 'A' : ' ',
-                       tainted & TAINT_WARN ? 'W' : ' ');
-       }
-       else
+       static char buf[ARRAY_SIZE(tnts) + sizeof("Tainted: ") + 1];
+
+       if (tainted_mask) {
+               char *s;
+               int i;
+
+               s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: ");
+               for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tnts); i++) {
+                       const struct tnt *t = &tnts[i];
+                       *s++ = test_bit(t->bit, &tainted_mask) ?
+                                       t->true : t->false;
+               }
+               *s = 0;
+       } else
                snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted");
        return(buf);
 }
 
+int test_taint(unsigned flag)
+{
+       return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint);
+
+unsigned long get_taint(void)
+{
+       return tainted_mask;
+}
+
 void add_taint(unsigned flag)
 {
        debug_locks = 0; /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore */
-       tainted |= flag;
+       set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
 

diff --git a/kernel/softlockup.c b/kernel/softlockup.c
index cb838ee93a82000bc5b313271487836e9fb5804e..3953e4aed733d32284f48ecfffa1fbff05e234c6 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/softlockup.c
+++ b/kernel/softlockup.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static void check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks(int this_cpu)
         * If the system crashed already then all bets are off,
         * do not report extra hung tasks:
         */
-       if ((tainted & TAINT_DIE) || did_panic)
+       if (test_taint(TAINT_DIE) || did_panic)
                return;
 
        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);

diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index cfc5295f1e82bc10b86b6ec6fc861b9fe4bd5ec1..ec88fcc9a0d2677ab21bd36bf38dc07da6baf0e1 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern int max_lock_depth;
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
 static int proc_do_cad_pid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
                  void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
-static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
                               void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 #endif
 
@@ -379,10 +379,9 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
        {
                .procname       = "tainted",
-               .data           = &tainted,
-               .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+               .maxlen         = sizeof(long),
                .mode           = 0644,
-               .proc_handler   = &proc_dointvec_taint,
+               .proc_handler   = &proc_taint,
        },
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_LATENCYTOP
@@ -2228,49 +2227,39 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
                            NULL,NULL);
 }
 
-#define OP_SET 0
-#define OP_AND 1
-#define OP_OR  2
-
-static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
-                                     int *valp,
-                                     int write, void *data)
-{
-       int op = *(int *)data;
-       if (write) {
-               int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp;
-               switch(op) {
-               case OP_SET:    *valp = val; break;
-               case OP_AND:    *valp &= val; break;
-               case OP_OR:     *valp |= val; break;
-               }
-       } else {
-               int val = *valp;
-               if (val < 0) {
-                       *negp = -1;
-                       *lvalp = (unsigned long)-val;
-               } else {
-                       *negp = 0;
-                       *lvalp = (unsigned long)val;
-               }
-       }
-       return 0;
-}
-
 /*
- *     Taint values can only be increased
+ * Taint values can only be increased
+ * This means we can safely use a temporary.
  */
-static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
                               void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-       int op;
+       struct ctl_table t;
+       unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
+       int err;
 
        if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return -EPERM;
 
-       op = OP_OR;
-       return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,ppos,
-                               do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv,&op);
+       t = *table;
+       t.data = &tmptaint;
+       err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+       if (err < 0)
+               return err;
+
+       if (write) {
+               /*
+                * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
+                * to everyone's atomic.h for this
+                */
+               int i;
+               for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {
+                       if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
+                               add_taint(i);
+               }
+       }
+
+       return err;
 }
 
 struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param {