commit
916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d
These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
int err = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
int err = -ENOENT;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;