#include "include/match.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
static u32 map_mask_to_chr_mask(u32 mask)
{
/**
* aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
* @op: operation being checked
- * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @label: label being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL)
* @request: requested permissions
*
* Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
*/
-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
u32 request)
{
struct path_cond cond = {
.uid = file_inode(file)->i_uid,
.mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode
};
+ struct aa_file_ctx *fctx;
+ struct aa_label *flabel;
+ u32 denied;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!file);
+
+ fctx = file_ctx(file);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ flabel = rcu_dereference(fctx->label);
+ AA_BUG(!flabel);
+
+ /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
+ * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
+ * was granted.
+ *
+ * Note: the test for !unconfined(flabel) is to handle file
+ * delegation from unconfined tasks
+ */
+ denied = request & ~fctx->allow;
+ if (unconfined(label) || unconfined(flabel) ||
+ (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label)))
+ goto done;
+
+ /* TODO: label cross check */
+
+ if (file->f_path.mnt && path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
+ error = aa_path_perm(op, labels_profile(label), &file->f_path,
+ PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED, request, &cond);
- return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED,
- request, &cond);
+done:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return error;
}
static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
struct tty_file_private, list);
file = file_priv->file;
- if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, labels_profile(label), file,
- MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
+ if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
drop_tty = 1;
}
spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
{
struct aa_label *label = (struct aa_label *)p;
- if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, labels_profile(label), file,
- aa_map_file_to_perms(file)))
+ if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file)))
return fd + 1;
return 0;
}
#ifndef __AA_FILE_H
#define __AA_FILE_H
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
#include "domain.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "perms.h"
#define file_ctx(X) ((struct aa_file_ctx *)(X)->f_security)
/* struct aa_file_ctx - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
+ * @lock: lock to update the ctx
+ * @label: label currently cached on the ctx
* @perms: the permission the file was opened with
- *
- * The file_ctx could currently be directly stored in file->f_security
- * as the profile reference is now stored in the f_cred. However the
- * ctx struct will expand in the future so we keep the struct.
*/
struct aa_file_ctx {
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ struct aa_label __rcu *label;
u32 allow;
};
*
* Returns: file_ctx or NULL on failure
*/
-static inline struct aa_file_ctx *aa_alloc_file_ctx(gfp_t gfp)
+static inline struct aa_file_ctx *aa_alloc_file_ctx(struct aa_label *label,
+ gfp_t gfp)
{
struct aa_file_ctx *ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), gfp);
-
+ if (ctx) {
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+ }
return ctx;
}
*/
static inline void aa_free_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx)
{
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx) {
+ aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
kzfree(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_file_label(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->label);
}
/*
int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
u32 request);
void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files);
/* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
+ file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(label, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!file_ctx(file))
error = -ENOMEM;
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
{
- struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file->f_security;
- struct aa_label *label, *flabel;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
return -EACCES;
- flabel = aa_cred_raw_label(file->f_cred);
- AA_BUG(!flabel);
-
- if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
- !path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
- return 0;
-
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-
- /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
- * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
- * was granted.
- *
- * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
- * delegation from unconfined tasks
- */
- if (!unconfined(label) && !unconfined(flabel) &&
- ((flabel != label) || (mask & ~fctx->allow)))
- error = aa_file_perm(op, labels_profile(label), file, mask);
+ error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;