eCryptfs: fix Tag 1 parsing code

Fix up the Tag 1 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly.  Initialize the new auth_tok's flags.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 8eb0746313d02abd4f8ae77e40dde90a70367d44..f7debe6961d10058a608245bc46ee8fed99003cd 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -512,72 +512,64 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
 
        (*packet_size) = 0;
        (*new_auth_tok) = NULL;
-
-       /* we check that:
-        *   one byte for the Tag 1 ID flag
-        *   two bytes for the body size
-        * do not exceed the maximum_packet_size
+       /**
+        * This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
+        * packet tag 1
+        *
+        * Tag 1 identifier (1 byte)
+        * Max Tag 1 packet size (max 3 bytes)
+        * Version (1 byte)
+        * Key identifier (8 bytes; ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE)
+        * Cipher identifier (1 byte)
+        * Encrypted key size (arbitrary)
+        *
+        * 12 bytes minimum packet size
         */
-       if (unlikely((*packet_size) + 3 > max_packet_size)) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n");
+       if (unlikely(max_packet_size < 12)) {
+               printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid max packet size; must be >=12\n");
                rc = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }
-       /* check for Tag 1 identifier - one byte */
        if (data[(*packet_size)++] != ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n",
-                               ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE);
+               printk(KERN_ERR "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n",
+                      ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE);
                rc = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }
        /* Released: wipe_auth_tok_list called in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set or
         * at end of function upon failure */
        auth_tok_list_item =
-               kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
-                                GFP_KERNEL);
+               kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
+                                 GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!auth_tok_list_item) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Unable to allocate memory\n");
+               printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate memory\n");
                rc = -ENOMEM;
                goto out;
        }
-       memset(auth_tok_list_item, 0,
-              sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item));
        (*new_auth_tok) = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok;
-       /* check for body size - one to two bytes
-        *
-        *              ***** TAG 1 Packet Format *****
-        *    | version number                     | 1 byte       |
-        *    | key ID                             | 8 bytes      |
-        *    | public key algorithm               | 1 byte       |
-        *    | encrypted session key              | arbitrary    |
-        */
-       rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size,
-                                &length_size);
-       if (rc) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error parsing packet length; "
-                               "rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+       if ((rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size,
+                                     &length_size))) {
+               printk(KERN_WARNING "Error parsing packet length; "
+                      "rc = [%d]\n", rc);
                goto out_free;
        }
-       if (unlikely(body_size < (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE))) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Invalid body size ([%d])\n",
-                               body_size);
+       if (unlikely(body_size < (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2))) {
+               printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", body_size);
                rc = -EINVAL;
                goto out_free;
        }
        (*packet_size) += length_size;
        if (unlikely((*packet_size) + body_size > max_packet_size)) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n");
+               printk(KERN_WARNING "Packet size exceeds max\n");
                rc = -EINVAL;
                goto out_free;
        }
-       /* Version 3 (from RFC2440) - one byte */
        if (unlikely(data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x03)) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Unknown version number "
-                               "[%d]\n", data[(*packet_size) - 1]);
+               printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown version number [%d]\n",
+                      data[(*packet_size) - 1]);
                rc = -EINVAL;
                goto out_free;
        }
-       /* Read Signature */
        ecryptfs_to_hex((*new_auth_tok)->token.private_key.signature,
                        &data[(*packet_size)], ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE);
        *packet_size += ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE;
@@ -585,27 +577,23 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
         * know which public key encryption algorithm was used */
        (*packet_size)++;
        (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size =
-               body_size - (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE);
+               body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2);
        if ((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size
            > ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES) {
-               ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Tag 1 packet contains key larger "
-                               "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES");
+               printk(KERN_WARNING "Tag 1 packet contains key larger "
+                      "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES");
                rc = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }
-       ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypted key size = [%d]\n",
-                       (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
        memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key,
-              &data[(*packet_size)], (body_size - 0x02 - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE));
+              &data[(*packet_size)], (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2)));
        (*packet_size) += (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
        (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &=
                ~ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY;
        (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags |=
                ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY;
        (*new_auth_tok)->token_type = ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY;
-       (*new_auth_tok)->flags |= ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY;
-       /* TODO: Why are we setting this flag here? Don't we want the
-        * userspace to decrypt the session key? */
+       (*new_auth_tok)->flags = 0;
        (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &=
                ~(ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT);
        (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &=