x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
authorKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Mon, 28 Feb 2022 17:23:16 +0000 (11:23 -0600)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 11 Mar 2022 09:03:31 +0000 (10:03 +0100)
commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.

Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

index 758a9ee3b39d1b766f9930dd12acee96be21a751..c6c43ac2ba43d18941e25fc1dc14a252dc6c4807 100644 (file)
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
 execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
 
 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
 ---------------------------------------
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers:
 
 .. _spec_ref6:
 
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
 
 ARM white papers: