tty: Fix out-of-bound vmalloc access in imageblit
authorIgor Matheus Andrade Torrente <igormtorrente@gmail.com>
Mon, 28 Jun 2021 13:45:09 +0000 (10:45 -0300)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 6 Oct 2021 13:05:08 +0000 (15:05 +0200)
[ Upstream commit 3b0c406124719b625b1aba431659f5cdc24a982c ]

This issue happens when a userspace program does an ioctl
FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO passing the fb_var_screeninfo struct
containing only the fields xres, yres, and bits_per_pixel
with values.

If this struct is the same as the previous ioctl, the
vc_resize() detects it and doesn't call the resize_screen(),
leaving the fb_var_screeninfo incomplete. And this leads to
the updatescrollmode() calculates a wrong value to
fbcon_display->vrows, which makes the real_y() return a
wrong value of y, and that value, eventually, causes
the imageblit to access an out-of-bound address value.

To solve this issue I made the resize_screen() be called
even if the screen does not need any resizing, so it will
"fix and fill" the fb_var_screeninfo independently.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # after 5.15-rc2 is out, give it time to bake
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+858dc7a2f7ef07c2c219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Igor Matheus Andrade Torrente <igormtorrente@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628134509.15895-1-igormtorrente@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c

index d497208b43f42cbb09bee83361ac6d0b1d6a9296..f4ac5ec5dc022b38f64ae0c533e10ecb658bb8b9 100644 (file)
@@ -883,8 +883,25 @@ static int vc_do_resize(struct tty_struct *tty, struct vc_data *vc,
        new_row_size = new_cols << 1;
        new_screen_size = new_row_size * new_rows;
 
-       if (new_cols == vc->vc_cols && new_rows == vc->vc_rows)
-               return 0;
+       if (new_cols == vc->vc_cols && new_rows == vc->vc_rows) {
+               /*
+                * This function is being called here to cover the case
+                * where the userspace calls the FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO twice,
+                * passing the same fb_var_screeninfo containing the fields
+                * yres/xres equal to a number non-multiple of vc_font.height
+                * and yres_virtual/xres_virtual equal to number lesser than the
+                * vc_font.height and yres/xres.
+                * In the second call, the struct fb_var_screeninfo isn't
+                * being modified by the underlying driver because of the
+                * if above, and this causes the fbcon_display->vrows to become
+                * negative and it eventually leads to out-of-bound
+                * access by the imageblit function.
+                * To give the correct values to the struct and to not have
+                * to deal with possible errors from the code below, we call
+                * the resize_screen here as well.
+                */
+               return resize_screen(vc, new_cols, new_rows, user);
+       }
 
        if (new_screen_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE || !new_screen_size)
                return -EINVAL;