USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
authorIgnat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000 (18:00 +0000)
committerDanny Wood <danwood76@gmail.com>
Tue, 29 Jan 2019 13:12:55 +0000 (13:12 +0000)
commitd668ce7ecbdbdbba1d1cc1aaa43dec24988bbe36
treee273b30b378f150d2eef7fbb088c5936d26d4998
parent9a9850c7682a61bde303ea78c323ce2effafd0d1
USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write

commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb upstream.

Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.

Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c