random: use a tighter cap in credit_entropy_bits_safe()
authorTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Sat, 25 Feb 2017 22:21:33 +0000 (18:21 -0400)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 24 Apr 2018 07:36:29 +0000 (09:36 +0200)
commitb0afd9d1cb5aeb116edaaf967321444b588849cf
tree8d55483e785e8c5b639a70e07e6d9226a440f244
parent439e8b2dcab1963d077af193ebdabb586b8e14be
random: use a tighter cap in credit_entropy_bits_safe()

commit 9f886f4d1d292442b2f22a0a33321eae821bde40 upstream.

This fixes a harmless UBSAN where root could potentially end up
causing an overflow while bumping the entropy_total field (which is
ignored once the entropy pool has been initialized, and this generally
is completed during the boot sequence).

This is marginal for the stable kernel series, but it's a really
trivial patch, and it fixes UBSAN warning that might cause security
folks to get overly excited for no reason.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Chen Feng <puck.chen@hisilicon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/char/random.c