netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Wed, 27 Mar 2019 15:21:30 +0000 (08:21 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 17 Apr 2019 06:37:50 +0000 (08:37 +0200)
commitadbb8bdd392db14dc80ad1ac29f8f1d37ab57a62
tree3a97be430b3d390b97e8ec73eb1219e99d19c3c4
parent0349ad0656a3ea2e6ecb55da946a7000f6abdba5
netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()

[ Upstream commit 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ]

net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)

I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.

Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.

Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
include/net/net_namespace.h
include/net/netns/hash.h
net/core/net_namespace.c