arm64: Revert support for execute-only user mappings
authorCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Mon, 6 Jan 2020 14:35:39 +0000 (14:35 +0000)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sun, 12 Jan 2020 10:24:15 +0000 (11:24 +0100)
commit68f9032e77373ab64d257699e9976f341a571b07
treedcd3249b1bcdc5e4199fee72e78c9510a4f9880d
parent1a2985af2a20b816a5cc41a2ddc1c4109ef6b9c6
arm64: Revert support for execute-only user mappings

commit 24cecc37746393432d994c0dbc251fb9ac7c5d72 upstream.

The ARMv8 64-bit architecture supports execute-only user permissions by
clearing the PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits, practically making it a mostly
privileged mapping but from which user running at EL0 can still execute.

The downside, however, is that the kernel at EL1 inadvertently reading
such mapping would not trip over the PAN (privileged access never)
protection.

Revert the relevant bits from commit cab15ce604e5 ("arm64: Introduce
execute-only page access permissions") so that PROT_EXEC implies
PROT_READ (and therefore PTE_USER) until the architecture gains proper
support for execute-only user mappings.

Fixes: cab15ce604e5 ("arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9.x-
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
mm/mmap.c