random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store
authorTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Thu, 22 Dec 2011 21:28:01 +0000 (16:28 -0500)
committerH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Mon, 16 Jan 2012 19:18:21 +0000 (11:18 -0800)
commit3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785
tree2d01752cdd8a5b3f1cbcad3e0ef55d6f02696efd
parentcf833d0b9937874b50ef2867c4e8badfd64948ce
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores.  Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
drivers/char/random.c