Bluetooth: use constant time memory comparison for secret values
authorJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Sat, 10 Jun 2017 02:59:11 +0000 (04:59 +0200)
committerMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Sat, 10 Jun 2017 13:45:40 +0000 (15:45 +0200)
commit329d82309824ff1082dc4a91a5bbed8c3bec1580
tree983c8b86fcb01a137dba822122ad3a082bf49de1
parent4a59d433c98bcd9e1032009abbd43415405cd763
Bluetooth: use constant time memory comparison for secret values

This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
net/bluetooth/smp.c