slub: improve bit diffusion for freelist ptr obfuscation
commit
1ad53d9fa3f6168ebcf48a50e08b170432da2257 upstream.
Under CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y, the obfuscation was relatively weak
in that the ptr and ptr address were usually so close that the first XOR
would result in an almost entirely 0-byte value[1], leaving most of the
"secret" number ultimately being stored after the third XOR. A single
blind memory content exposure of the freelist was generally sufficient to
learn the secret.
Add a swab() call to mix bits a little more. This is a cheap way (1
cycle) to make attacks need more than a single exposure to learn the
secret (or to know _where_ the exposure is in memory).
kmalloc-32 freelist walk, before:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff90c22e019020@
ffff90c22e019000 is
86528eb656b3b5bd (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019040@
ffff90c22e019020 is
86528eb656b3b5fd (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019060@
ffff90c22e019040 is
86528eb656b3b5bd (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019080@
ffff90c22e019060 is
86528eb656b3b57d (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e0190a0@
ffff90c22e019080 is
86528eb656b3b5bd (
86528eb656b3b59d)
...
after:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff9eed6e019020@
ffff9eed6e019000 is
793d1135d52cda42 (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019040@
ffff9eed6e019020 is
593d1135d52cda22 (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019060@
ffff9eed6e019040 is
393d1135d52cda02 (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019080@
ffff9eed6e019060 is
193d1135d52cdae2 (
86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e0190a0@
ffff9eed6e019080 is
f93d1135d52cdac2 (
86528eb656b3b59d)
[1] https://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2020/03/weaknesses-in-linux-kernel-heap.html
Fixes:
2482ddec670f ("mm: add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation")
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/202003051623.AF4F8CB@keescook
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[kees: Backport to v4.19 which doesn't call kasan_reset_untag()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>