random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function

random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function

Patch series "stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary", v2.

Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems, in
order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows.

The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.

Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.

Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's
linux-hardened tree.

Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/

This patch (of 5):

Introduce get_random_canary(), which provides a random unsigned long
canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64 bit architectures, in
order to mitigate non-terminated C string overflows.

The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.

Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.

Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches, and
Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-2-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>