2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version
;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass
, u16 nlmsg_type
, u32
*perm
);
96 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing
;
104 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
106 unsigned long enforcing
;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
108 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
117 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
119 unsigned long enabled
;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
121 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
126 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations
*secondary_ops
;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head
);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock
);
141 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
) > 0);
159 * initialise the security for the init task
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
163 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
164 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
166 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
170 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
171 cred
->security
= tsec
;
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
177 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
179 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
181 tsec
= cred
->security
;
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
188 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
193 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
201 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
203 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_cred()->security
;
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
212 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
213 u32 sid
= current_sid();
215 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
219 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
222 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
223 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
224 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
225 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
232 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
233 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
235 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
237 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
240 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
246 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
247 u32 sid
= current_sid();
249 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
254 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
255 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
260 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
262 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
263 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
269 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
271 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
275 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->list
);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
280 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
281 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
282 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
283 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
290 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->list
))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec
->list
);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
297 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
303 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
305 ssec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec
), priority
);
309 ssec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
310 ssec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
311 sk
->sk_security
= ssec
;
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec
);
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
320 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sk
->sk_security
;
322 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec
);
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized
;
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
333 static char *labeling_behaviors
[6] = {
335 "uses transition SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
355 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
358 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
359 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
370 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
371 const struct cred
*cred
)
373 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
376 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
381 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
387 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
388 const struct cred
*cred
)
390 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
392 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
397 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
404 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
405 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
406 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
409 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
421 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
422 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
423 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
428 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
430 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
435 sbsec
->flags
|= (SE_SBINITIALIZED
| SE_SBLABELSUPP
);
437 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
438 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
443 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
445 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
||
446 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
||
447 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
||
448 sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
449 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
451 /* Initialize the root inode. */
452 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
454 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
455 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
456 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
458 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
460 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
461 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
462 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
463 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
464 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
465 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
466 inode
= igrab(inode
);
468 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
472 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
473 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
476 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
482 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
483 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
484 * mount options, or whatever.
486 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
487 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
490 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
491 char *context
= NULL
;
495 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
497 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
503 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
504 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
505 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
507 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
510 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
511 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
512 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
514 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
515 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
520 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
521 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
527 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
528 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
531 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
532 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
534 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
535 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
538 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
539 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
541 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
542 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
545 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
546 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
548 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
549 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
550 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
552 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
555 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
556 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
558 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
) {
559 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
560 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
563 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
568 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
572 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
573 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
575 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
577 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
578 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
579 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
580 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
583 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
584 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
586 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
587 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
597 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
599 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
601 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
602 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
603 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
604 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
605 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
606 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
607 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
608 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
609 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
611 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
613 if (!ss_initialized
) {
615 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
616 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
617 server is ready to handle calls. */
618 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
619 if (list_empty(&sbsec
->list
))
620 list_add(&sbsec
->list
, &superblock_security_head
);
621 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
625 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
626 "before the security server is initialized\n");
631 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
632 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
633 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
634 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
636 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
637 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
638 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
639 * will be used for both mounts)
641 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
646 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
647 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
648 * than once with different security options.
650 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
653 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
655 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
656 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
658 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
659 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
660 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
669 goto out_double_mount
;
671 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
678 goto out_double_mount
;
680 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
682 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
683 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
685 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
687 goto out_double_mount
;
689 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
693 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
695 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
697 goto out_double_mount
;
699 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
708 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
709 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
710 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
711 goto out_double_mount
;
716 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
717 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
719 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
720 rc
= security_fs_use((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) ? "proc" : sb
->s_type
->name
, &sbsec
->behavior
, &sbsec
->sid
);
722 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
727 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
729 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
733 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
737 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
738 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
739 * the superblock context if not already set.
742 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
743 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
747 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
749 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
754 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
755 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
757 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
758 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
761 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
762 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
767 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
768 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
771 if (defcontext_sid
) {
772 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
774 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
775 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
779 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
780 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
786 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
789 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
791 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
795 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
796 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
800 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
801 struct super_block
*newsb
)
803 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
804 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
806 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
807 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
808 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
811 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
812 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
815 if (!ss_initialized
) {
816 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
817 if (list_empty(&newsbsec
->list
))
818 list_add(&newsbsec
->list
, &superblock_security_head
);
819 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
823 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
824 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
826 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
827 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
830 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
832 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
834 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
835 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
836 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
839 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
843 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
844 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
845 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
848 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
850 if (set_rootcontext
) {
851 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
852 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
853 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
854 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
856 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
859 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
860 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
863 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
864 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
867 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
868 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
869 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
871 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
873 /* Standard string-based options. */
874 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
876 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
881 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
885 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
887 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
890 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
900 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
903 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
910 case Opt_rootcontext
:
913 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
916 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
924 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
926 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
929 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
935 case Opt_labelsupport
:
939 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
946 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
950 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
951 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
952 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
957 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
958 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
961 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
962 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
965 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
966 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
969 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
970 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
973 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
984 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
986 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
989 char *options
= data
;
990 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
992 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
997 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
999 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1004 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1007 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1011 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1012 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1017 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1020 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1021 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1025 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1027 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1030 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1032 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1033 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1035 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1036 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1038 case SE_SBLABELSUPP
:
1040 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1045 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1050 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1056 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1058 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1061 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1063 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1069 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1071 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1076 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1078 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1080 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1082 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1084 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1086 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1088 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1090 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1092 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1096 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1099 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1101 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1104 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1106 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1109 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1115 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1116 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1118 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1125 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1126 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1128 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1130 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1131 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1133 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1135 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1143 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1144 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1145 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1146 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG
:
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1152 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1156 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1158 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1160 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1166 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1168 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1170 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1173 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1176 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1177 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1182 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1184 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1189 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1194 while (de
&& de
!= de
->parent
) {
1195 buflen
-= de
->namelen
+ 1;
1199 memcpy(end
, de
->name
, de
->namelen
);
1204 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1205 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1209 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1217 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1218 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1220 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1221 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1223 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1224 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1225 char *context
= NULL
;
1229 if (isec
->initialized
)
1232 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1233 if (isec
->initialized
)
1236 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1237 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1238 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1239 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1240 server is ready to handle calls. */
1241 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1242 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1243 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1244 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1248 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1249 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1250 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1251 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1255 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1256 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1259 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1261 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1262 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1266 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1267 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1268 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1269 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1270 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1271 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1272 * be used again by userspace.
1277 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1278 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1284 context
[len
] = '\0';
1285 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1287 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1290 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1291 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1298 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1304 context
[len
] = '\0';
1305 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1311 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1312 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1313 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1314 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1318 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1319 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1322 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1326 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1327 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1329 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1330 if (printk_ratelimit())
1331 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1332 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1333 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1335 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1336 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1337 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1340 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1349 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1351 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1352 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1353 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1355 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1356 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1357 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
,
1365 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1366 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1369 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1370 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1372 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1373 struct proc_inode
*proci
= PROC_I(inode
);
1375 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1376 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(proci
->pde
,
1387 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1390 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1392 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1393 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1397 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1398 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1404 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1405 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1408 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1409 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1412 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1413 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1416 /* All other signals. */
1417 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1425 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1426 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1428 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1429 const struct cred
*target
,
1432 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1434 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1438 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1439 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1440 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1441 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1443 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1444 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1447 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1451 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1452 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1454 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1458 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1459 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1460 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1461 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1463 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1468 sid
= current_sid();
1469 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1470 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1473 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1474 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1477 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1478 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1479 const struct cred
*cred
,
1482 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1483 struct av_decision avd
;
1485 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1486 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1489 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
1493 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1495 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1498 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1502 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1506 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1507 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
)
1508 avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
);
1512 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1513 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1516 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1518 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1519 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1522 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1523 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1524 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1525 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1526 struct inode
*inode
,
1528 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1530 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1531 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1534 validate_creds(cred
);
1536 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1539 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1540 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1544 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1545 ad
.u
.fs
.inode
= inode
;
1548 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1551 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1552 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1553 pathname if needed. */
1554 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1555 struct vfsmount
*mnt
,
1556 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1559 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1560 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1562 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1563 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.mnt
= mnt
;
1564 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1565 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1568 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1569 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1570 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1571 check a particular permission to the file.
1572 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1573 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1574 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1575 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1576 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1580 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1581 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
1582 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1583 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1586 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1587 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1589 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1590 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1598 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1601 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1607 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1608 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1609 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1612 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1613 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
1614 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1615 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1617 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1620 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1621 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1624 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1626 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1627 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1629 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1630 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1635 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
1636 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
, &newsid
);
1641 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1645 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1646 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1647 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1650 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1651 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1652 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1654 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1656 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1660 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1663 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1664 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1665 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1669 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1670 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1671 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1675 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1676 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1678 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1679 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1682 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1683 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1698 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1703 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1707 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1708 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1709 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1710 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1712 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1713 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1714 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1716 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1719 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1720 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1721 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1722 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1724 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1726 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1727 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1728 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1731 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1732 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1735 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1736 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1737 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1742 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1743 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1744 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1745 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1746 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1749 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1750 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1751 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1752 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1754 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1762 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1763 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1764 struct super_block
*sb
,
1766 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1768 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1769 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1771 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1772 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1775 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1776 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1780 if ((mode
& S_IFMT
) != S_IFDIR
) {
1781 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1782 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1783 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1786 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1788 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1792 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1794 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1796 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1803 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1804 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1808 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1810 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1811 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1818 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1827 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1830 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1832 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1834 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
) {
1835 mode_t mode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
;
1837 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1841 else if (S_ISCHR(mode
))
1842 av
|= CHR_FILE__OPEN
;
1843 else if (S_ISBLK(mode
))
1844 av
|= BLK_FILE__OPEN
;
1845 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode
))
1846 av
|= FIFO_FILE__OPEN
;
1847 else if (S_ISDIR(mode
))
1849 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode
))
1850 av
|= SOCK_FILE__OPEN
;
1852 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1853 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__
, mode
);
1858 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1860 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1865 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1869 if (mode
== PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1870 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1871 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1872 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1875 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1878 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1882 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1886 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1889 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1890 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1894 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1898 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1901 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1902 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1903 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1904 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1908 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1909 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1913 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1917 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1918 * which was removed).
1920 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1921 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1922 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1923 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1926 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct
*tsk
, const struct cred
*cred
,
1931 rc
= cap_capable(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1935 return task_has_capability(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1938 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table
*table
, u16 tclass
, u32
*sid
)
1941 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1944 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1949 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1955 const char *name
= table
->procname
;
1956 size_t namelen
= strlen(name
);
1957 buflen
-= namelen
+ 1;
1961 memcpy(end
, name
, namelen
);
1964 table
= table
->parent
;
1970 memcpy(end
, "/sys", 4);
1972 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1974 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1979 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table
*table
, int op
)
1986 sid
= current_sid();
1988 rc
= selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table
, (op
== 0001) ?
1989 SECCLASS_DIR
: SECCLASS_FILE
, &tsid
);
1991 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1992 tsid
= SECINITSID_SYSCTL
;
1995 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1996 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1998 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
1999 SECCLASS_DIR
, DIR__SEARCH
, NULL
);
2007 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
2008 SECCLASS_FILE
, av
, NULL
);
2014 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2016 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2028 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2033 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2036 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2042 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2044 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2046 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2049 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2053 rc
= cap_syslog(type
);
2058 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2059 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2060 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2062 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2063 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2064 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2065 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2067 case 0: /* Close log */
2068 case 1: /* Open log */
2069 case 2: /* Read from log */
2070 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2071 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2073 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2080 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2081 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2082 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2084 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2085 * processes that allocate mappings.
2087 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2089 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2091 rc
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2092 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2096 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
2099 /* binprm security operations */
2101 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2103 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2104 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2105 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2106 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2107 struct inode
*inode
= bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2110 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
2114 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2115 * the script interpreter */
2116 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2119 old_tsec
= current_security();
2120 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2121 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2123 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2124 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2125 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2127 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2128 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2129 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2130 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2132 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2133 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2134 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2135 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2137 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2138 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2139 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, &new_tsec
->sid
);
2144 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2145 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2147 if (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
)
2148 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2150 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2151 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2152 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2156 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2157 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2158 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2162 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2163 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2167 /* Check for shared state */
2168 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2169 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2170 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2176 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2177 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2179 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2180 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2181 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2185 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(current
);
2186 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2187 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2193 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2195 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2201 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2202 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2208 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2210 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2211 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
2219 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2220 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2221 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2222 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2224 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2227 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2230 extern struct vfsmount
*selinuxfs_mount
;
2231 extern struct dentry
*selinux_null
;
2233 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2234 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2235 struct files_struct
*files
)
2237 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2238 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2239 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2240 struct fdtable
*fdt
;
2244 tty
= get_current_tty();
2247 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2248 struct inode
*inode
;
2250 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2251 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2252 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2253 file may belong to another process and we are only
2254 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2255 file
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
, struct file
, f_u
.fu_list
);
2256 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2257 if (inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
,
2258 FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
, NULL
)) {
2265 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2269 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2271 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2273 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2275 unsigned long set
, i
;
2280 fdt
= files_fdtable(files
);
2281 if (i
>= fdt
->max_fds
)
2283 set
= fdt
->open_fds
->fds_bits
[j
];
2286 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2287 for ( ; set
; i
++, set
>>= 1) {
2292 if (file_has_perm(cred
,
2294 file_to_av(file
))) {
2296 fd
= get_unused_fd();
2306 devnull
= dentry_open(
2308 mntget(selinuxfs_mount
),
2310 if (IS_ERR(devnull
)) {
2317 fd_install(fd
, devnull
);
2322 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2325 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2329 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2331 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2333 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2334 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2337 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2338 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2341 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2342 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2344 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2345 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2347 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2348 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2349 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2351 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2352 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2353 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2354 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2355 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2357 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2358 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2360 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2361 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2362 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2363 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2365 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim
->rlim_cur
);
2370 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2373 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2375 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2376 struct itimerval itimer
;
2386 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2387 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2388 * flush and unblock signals.
2390 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2391 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2393 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2395 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2396 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2397 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2398 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2399 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2400 __flush_signals(current
);
2401 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2402 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2404 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2407 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2408 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2409 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2410 wake_up_interruptible(¤t
->real_parent
->signal
->wait_chldexit
);
2411 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2414 /* superblock security operations */
2416 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2418 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2421 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2423 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2426 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2431 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2434 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2436 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2437 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2438 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2439 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2440 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2443 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2450 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2454 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2457 int current_size
= 0;
2465 while (current_size
< len
) {
2475 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2477 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2478 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2479 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2485 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2493 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2497 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2498 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2500 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2502 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2503 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2505 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2507 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2509 } while (*in_end
++);
2511 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2512 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2517 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2519 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2520 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2523 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2527 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2528 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2531 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2532 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2533 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2536 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2538 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2539 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2541 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2542 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2543 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2546 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name
,
2549 unsigned long flags
,
2552 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2554 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2555 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2556 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2558 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
, path
->dentry
,
2562 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2564 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2566 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2567 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2570 /* inode security operations */
2572 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2574 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2577 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2579 inode_free_security(inode
);
2582 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2583 char **name
, void **value
,
2586 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2587 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
2588 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2589 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2590 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2592 char *namep
= NULL
, *context
;
2594 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2595 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2598 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2600 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
2601 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2602 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2605 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2606 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2609 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2614 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2615 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2616 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2617 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2619 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2622 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2626 namep
= kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, GFP_NOFS
);
2633 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2645 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2647 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2650 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2652 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2655 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2657 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2660 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2662 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2665 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2667 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2670 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2672 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2675 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
, dev_t dev
)
2677 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2680 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2681 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2683 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2686 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2688 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2690 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2693 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2695 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2697 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2700 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2702 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2705 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2709 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
,
2710 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
), NULL
);
2713 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2715 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2716 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2718 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2719 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2720 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2726 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2727 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2728 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2730 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__WRITE
);
2733 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2735 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2737 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, mnt
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2740 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2742 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2744 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2745 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2746 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2747 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2749 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2750 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2751 Restrict to administrator. */
2756 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2757 ordinary setattr permission. */
2758 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2761 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2762 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2764 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2765 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2766 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2767 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2768 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2771 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2772 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2774 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2775 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2778 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode
))
2781 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2782 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2784 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2785 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2789 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2790 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2791 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
2793 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2798 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2799 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2803 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2808 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2810 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2811 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2815 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2816 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2819 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2820 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2824 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2825 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2829 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2831 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2832 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2833 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2841 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2843 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2845 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2848 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2850 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2852 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2855 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2857 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2858 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2860 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2861 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2866 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2868 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2870 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2874 char *context
= NULL
;
2875 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2877 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2881 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2882 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2883 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2884 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2885 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2886 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2887 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2889 error
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
2890 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2892 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
2895 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
2908 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
2909 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2911 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2915 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2918 if (!value
|| !size
)
2921 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
2929 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
2931 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
2932 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
2933 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
2937 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
2939 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2943 /* file security operations */
2945 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2947 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2948 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2950 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2951 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
2954 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
2955 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
2958 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2960 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2961 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2962 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2963 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2966 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2969 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
2970 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
2971 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2974 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
2977 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
2979 return file_alloc_security(file
);
2982 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
2984 file_free_security(file
);
2987 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
2990 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2993 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_WRITE
)
2995 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_READ
)
3000 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3003 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3005 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3008 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3009 if ((prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3011 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3012 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3013 * This has an additional check.
3015 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3022 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3023 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3025 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3026 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3029 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3030 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3032 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3039 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3040 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
,
3041 unsigned long addr
, unsigned long addr_only
)
3044 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3047 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3048 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3049 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3050 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3052 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3053 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3054 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3059 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3060 rc
= cap_file_mmap(file
, reqprot
, prot
, flags
, addr
, addr_only
);
3061 if (rc
|| addr_only
)
3064 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3067 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3068 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3071 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3072 unsigned long reqprot
,
3075 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3077 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3080 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3081 if ((prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3083 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3084 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3085 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3086 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3087 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3088 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3089 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3090 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3092 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3093 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3094 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3095 * modified content. This typically should only
3096 * occur for text relocations.
3098 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3105 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3108 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3110 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3112 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3115 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3118 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3123 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3128 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3129 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3138 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3139 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3144 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3149 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3153 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3160 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3162 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3164 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3165 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3170 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3171 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3174 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3176 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3178 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3179 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3181 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3184 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3186 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3188 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3189 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3192 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3194 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3196 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3199 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3201 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3202 struct inode
*inode
;
3203 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3205 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
3206 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3207 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3209 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3210 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3211 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3212 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3213 * struct as its SID.
3215 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3216 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3218 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3219 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3220 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3221 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3222 * new inode label or new policy.
3223 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3225 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, open_file_to_av(file
), NULL
);
3228 /* task security operations */
3230 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3232 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3236 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3238 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3240 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3242 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3246 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3251 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3253 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3255 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3257 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3258 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3263 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3265 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3268 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3269 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3271 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3273 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3277 new->security
= tsec
;
3282 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3284 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3286 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3287 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3293 * set the security data for a kernel service
3294 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3296 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3298 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3299 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3302 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3303 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3304 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3308 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3309 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3310 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3316 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3317 * objective context of the specified inode
3319 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3321 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3322 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3323 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3326 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3327 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3328 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3332 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3336 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
3338 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
);
3341 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3343 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3346 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3348 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3351 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3353 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3356 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3358 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3361 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3365 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3369 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3372 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3376 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3380 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3383 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3385 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3388 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource
, struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3390 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3392 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3393 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3394 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3395 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3396 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3397 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3402 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
, int policy
, struct sched_param
*lp
)
3406 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
, policy
, lp
);
3410 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3413 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3415 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3418 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3420 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3423 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3430 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3432 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3434 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3435 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3437 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3441 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3443 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3446 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3447 struct inode
*inode
)
3449 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3450 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3453 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3456 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3457 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3458 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3460 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3461 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3463 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3464 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3468 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3469 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3472 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3473 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3477 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3479 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3481 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3483 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3487 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3491 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3492 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3497 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3499 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3503 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3507 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3508 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3512 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3513 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3515 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3519 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3523 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3524 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3535 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3537 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3538 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3539 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3542 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3543 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3545 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3546 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3550 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &ip6
->saddr
);
3551 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
, &ip6
->daddr
);
3554 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3555 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3556 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
);
3565 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3567 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3571 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3572 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3577 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3579 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3583 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3584 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3588 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3589 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3591 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3595 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3596 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3600 /* includes fragments */
3610 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3611 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3616 switch (ad
->u
.net
.family
) {
3618 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3621 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
:
3622 &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
);
3625 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3627 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3630 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
:
3631 &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
);
3641 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3642 " unable to parse packet\n");
3652 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3654 * @family: protocol family
3655 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3658 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3659 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3660 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3661 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3662 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3666 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3673 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3674 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3676 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3677 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3679 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3680 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3687 /* socket security operations */
3688 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct socket
*sock
,
3691 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3692 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3696 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3698 if (isec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3700 sid
= task_sid(task
);
3702 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3703 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= sock
->sk
;
3704 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3710 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3711 int protocol
, int kern
)
3713 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3714 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3723 newsid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
?: sid
;
3725 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3726 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3732 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3733 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3735 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3736 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3737 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3738 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3743 newsid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3745 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3748 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3754 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3755 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3758 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3759 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3760 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3761 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3767 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3768 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3769 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3771 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3776 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3781 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3782 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3783 * check the first address now.
3785 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
3786 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3788 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3789 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3790 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3791 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3792 unsigned short snum
;
3793 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3796 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3798 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3799 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3800 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3801 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3803 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3804 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3805 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3811 inet_get_local_port_range(&low
, &high
);
3813 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3814 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3818 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3819 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3820 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3821 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
,
3823 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3829 switch (isec
->sclass
) {
3830 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3831 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3834 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3835 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3838 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3839 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3843 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3847 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
3851 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3852 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3853 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3855 if (family
== PF_INET
)
3856 ad
.u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3858 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
.u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &addr6
->sin6_addr
);
3860 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
,
3861 isec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
3869 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3871 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3872 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3875 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
3880 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3882 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3883 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
3884 isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
3885 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3886 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3887 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3888 unsigned short snum
;
3891 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
3892 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3893 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
3895 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3897 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3898 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
3900 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3903 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
3907 perm
= (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
3908 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
3910 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3911 ad
.u
.net
.dport
= htons(snum
);
3912 ad
.u
.net
.family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3913 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
, isec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
3918 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
3924 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
3926 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
3929 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
3932 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3933 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
3935 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
3939 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
3941 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3942 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3943 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3944 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
3949 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3952 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
3955 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3956 int size
, int flags
)
3958 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__READ
);
3961 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
3963 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3966 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
3968 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3971 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
3975 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
3979 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
3982 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
3985 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
3988 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
3990 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
3993 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket
*sock
,
3994 struct socket
*other
,
3997 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
3998 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3999 struct inode_security_struct
*other_isec
;
4000 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4003 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4004 other_isec
= SOCK_INODE(other
)->i_security
;
4006 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4007 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
4009 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, other_isec
->sid
,
4011 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4015 /* connecting socket */
4016 ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4017 ssec
->peer_sid
= other_isec
->sid
;
4019 /* server child socket */
4020 ssec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4021 ssec
->peer_sid
= isec
->sid
;
4022 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec
->sid
, ssec
->peer_sid
, &ssec
->sid
);
4027 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4028 struct socket
*other
)
4030 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4031 struct inode_security_struct
*other_isec
;
4032 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4035 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4036 other_isec
= SOCK_INODE(other
)->i_security
;
4038 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4039 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
4041 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, other_isec
->sid
,
4042 isec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
, &ad
);
4049 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
4051 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4057 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4060 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4061 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4065 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4068 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4069 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4072 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4076 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4078 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4079 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4082 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4083 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->iif
;
4084 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4085 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4089 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4090 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4096 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
) {
4097 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4100 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
,
4101 SECCLASS_PEER
, PEER__RECV
, &ad
);
4103 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4105 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4108 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4114 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4117 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4118 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4119 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4120 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4125 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4128 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4129 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4132 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4133 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4134 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4135 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4136 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4137 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4139 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4140 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4141 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4144 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4145 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->iif
;
4146 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4147 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4151 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4154 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4157 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->iif
, addrp
, family
,
4160 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4163 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4166 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4169 if (secmark_active
) {
4170 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4179 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4180 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4185 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
4186 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4187 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4189 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4191 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4192 isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) {
4193 ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4194 peer_sid
= ssec
->peer_sid
;
4196 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4201 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4206 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4211 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4215 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4223 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4225 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4228 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4230 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4233 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4237 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4238 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4240 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4243 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4244 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4249 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4251 return sk_alloc_security(sk
, family
, priority
);
4254 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4256 sk_free_security(sk
);
4259 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4261 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4262 struct sk_security_struct
*newssec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4264 newssec
->sid
= ssec
->sid
;
4265 newssec
->peer_sid
= ssec
->peer_sid
;
4266 newssec
->sclass
= ssec
->sclass
;
4268 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec
);
4271 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4274 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4276 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4278 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4282 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4284 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4285 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4287 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4288 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4289 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4290 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4293 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4294 struct request_sock
*req
)
4296 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4298 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4302 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4303 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4306 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4309 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4310 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4311 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4313 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4316 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4317 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4320 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4323 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4324 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4326 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4328 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4329 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4330 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4331 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4332 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4333 time it will have been created and available. */
4335 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4336 * thread with access to newsksec */
4337 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4340 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4342 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4343 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4345 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4346 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4349 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4352 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4355 fl
->secid
= req
->secid
;
4358 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4360 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4362 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4363 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4364 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4365 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4366 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4367 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4369 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4373 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock
*sk
)
4375 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4377 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4378 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4379 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4380 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4381 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4382 * protocols were being used */
4384 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4385 * the sockcreate SID here */
4387 sksec
->sid
= current_sid();
4388 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4391 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
)
4393 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4394 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4397 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4398 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4401 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4402 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4411 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4415 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4416 struct socket
*sock
= sk
->sk_socket
;
4417 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4419 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4423 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4425 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4427 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4428 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4429 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4430 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4431 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, isec
->sclass
);
4432 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4442 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, perm
);
4447 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4449 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4455 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4460 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4463 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4464 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4465 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_active
|| selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4466 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4469 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4472 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4473 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4474 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4475 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4478 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4479 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4482 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4488 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4489 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4493 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4494 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4495 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4497 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4503 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4504 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4505 const struct net_device
*in
,
4506 const struct net_device
*out
,
4507 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4509 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4512 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4513 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4514 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4515 const struct net_device
*in
,
4516 const struct net_device
*out
,
4517 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4519 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4523 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4528 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4531 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4532 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4533 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4535 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= skb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4538 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4539 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4545 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum
,
4546 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4547 const struct net_device
*in
,
4548 const struct net_device
*out
,
4549 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4551 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4554 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4558 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4559 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4560 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4566 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4568 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4569 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4570 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4571 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4574 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4575 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4576 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4579 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4580 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4586 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4592 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4597 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4598 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4599 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4600 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4601 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4602 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4604 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4605 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4606 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4607 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4608 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4609 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4610 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4613 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4614 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4615 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4618 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4619 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4620 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4621 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4626 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_FORWARDED
)
4627 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4629 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4632 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_FORWARDED
)
4633 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4635 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4640 if (secmark_perm
== PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
) {
4641 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4644 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4646 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4647 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4648 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4651 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4652 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4653 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4654 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4658 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4659 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4662 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4666 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4668 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4669 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4672 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4674 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4675 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4682 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4683 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4684 const struct net_device
*in
,
4685 const struct net_device
*out
,
4686 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4688 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4691 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4692 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4693 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4694 const struct net_device
*in
,
4695 const struct net_device
*out
,
4696 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4698 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4702 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4704 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4708 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4712 if (policydb_loaded_version
>= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS
)
4713 err
= selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4718 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int capability
)
4721 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4723 err
= cap_netlink_recv(skb
, capability
);
4727 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
4728 ad
.u
.cap
= capability
;
4730 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
, NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
,
4731 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
, CAP_TO_MASK(capability
), &ad
);
4734 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4735 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4738 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4741 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4745 sid
= task_sid(task
);
4746 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4748 perm
->security
= isec
;
4753 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4755 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4756 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4760 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4762 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4764 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4768 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4769 msg
->security
= msec
;
4774 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4776 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4778 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4782 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4785 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4786 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4787 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4789 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4791 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4792 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4794 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4797 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4799 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4802 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4804 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4807 /* message queue security operations */
4808 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4810 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4811 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4812 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4815 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4819 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4821 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4822 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4824 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4827 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4833 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4835 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4838 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
4840 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4841 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4842 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4844 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4846 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4847 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4849 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4850 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4853 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
4861 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4862 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4865 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
4868 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
4871 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
4877 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
4881 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
4883 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4884 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4885 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4886 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4889 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4890 msec
= msg
->security
;
4893 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4895 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
4897 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4898 * message queue this message will be stored in
4900 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4906 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4907 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4909 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4910 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4913 /* Can this process send the message */
4914 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4917 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4918 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4919 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
4924 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
4925 struct task_struct
*target
,
4926 long type
, int mode
)
4928 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4929 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4930 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4931 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
4934 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4935 msec
= msg
->security
;
4937 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4938 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4940 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
4941 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
4943 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
4944 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
4948 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4949 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4951 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4952 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4953 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4956 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
4960 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4962 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4963 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4965 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4968 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4974 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4976 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4979 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
4981 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4982 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4983 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4985 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4987 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4988 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4990 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4991 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4994 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4995 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5003 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5004 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5007 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5010 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5017 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5023 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5027 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5028 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5032 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5035 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5037 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5040 /* Semaphore security operations */
5041 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5043 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5044 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5045 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5048 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5052 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5054 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5055 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5057 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5060 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5066 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5068 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5071 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5073 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5074 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5075 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5077 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5079 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5080 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5082 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5083 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5086 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5087 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5095 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5096 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5100 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5111 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5114 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5118 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5124 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5128 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5129 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5134 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5138 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5141 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5147 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5149 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5154 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5157 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5159 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5163 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5166 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5169 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5170 char *name
, char **value
)
5172 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5178 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5184 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5186 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5188 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5190 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5191 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5192 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5193 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5194 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5195 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5196 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5197 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5205 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5215 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5216 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5218 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5219 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5226 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5227 security attributes. */
5232 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5233 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5234 * above restriction is ever removed.
5236 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5237 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5238 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5239 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5240 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5241 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5242 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5243 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5244 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5245 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5251 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5252 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5253 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5257 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5258 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5259 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
5261 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5268 new = prepare_creds();
5272 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5273 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5274 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5275 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5276 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5277 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5278 tsec
= new->security
;
5279 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5280 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5281 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5282 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5283 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5284 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5287 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5288 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5289 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5290 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5295 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5297 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5298 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5303 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5304 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5305 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5309 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5310 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5313 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(p
);
5315 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5319 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5320 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5339 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5341 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5344 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5346 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5349 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5355 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5357 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5359 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5363 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5365 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5367 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5370 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5373 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5382 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5383 unsigned long flags
)
5385 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5386 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5388 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5392 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5393 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5394 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5396 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5402 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5404 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5410 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5411 const struct cred
*cred
,
5415 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5418 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5419 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5420 appear to be created. */
5424 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5426 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5427 ksec
= key
->security
;
5429 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5432 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5434 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5435 char *context
= NULL
;
5439 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5448 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5451 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5452 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5453 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5454 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5455 .sysctl
= selinux_sysctl
,
5456 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5457 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5458 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5459 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5460 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5462 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5463 .netlink_recv
= selinux_netlink_recv
,
5465 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5466 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5467 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5468 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5470 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5471 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5472 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5473 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5474 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5475 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5476 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5477 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5478 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5479 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5480 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5483 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5484 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5485 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5486 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5487 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5488 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5489 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5490 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5491 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5492 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5493 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5494 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5495 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5496 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5497 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5498 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5499 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5500 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5501 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5502 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5503 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5504 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5505 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5506 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5507 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5509 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5510 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5511 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5512 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5513 .file_mmap
= selinux_file_mmap
,
5514 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5515 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5516 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5517 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5518 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5519 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5521 .dentry_open
= selinux_dentry_open
,
5523 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5524 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5525 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5526 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5527 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5528 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5529 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5530 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5531 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5532 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5533 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5534 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5535 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5536 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5537 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5538 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5539 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5540 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5541 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5542 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5543 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5544 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5546 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5547 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5549 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5550 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5552 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5553 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5554 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5555 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5556 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5557 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5559 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5560 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5561 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5562 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5563 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5565 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5566 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5567 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5568 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5569 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5571 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5573 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5574 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5576 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5577 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5578 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5579 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5580 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5581 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5583 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5584 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5586 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5587 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5588 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5589 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5590 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5591 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5592 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5593 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5594 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5595 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5596 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5597 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5598 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5599 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5600 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5601 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5602 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5603 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5604 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5605 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5606 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5607 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5608 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5609 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5610 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5611 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5612 .tun_dev_post_create
= selinux_tun_dev_post_create
,
5613 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5615 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5616 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5617 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5618 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5619 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5620 .xfrm_state_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5621 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5622 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5623 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5624 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5625 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5629 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5630 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5631 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5632 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5636 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5637 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5638 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5639 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5643 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5645 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5646 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5650 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5651 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5655 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5657 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5658 cred_init_security();
5660 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5661 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5662 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5665 secondary_ops
= security_ops
;
5667 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5668 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5669 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5671 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5672 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5674 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5679 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5681 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5683 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5684 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5685 spin_lock(&sb_lock
);
5686 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
5688 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head
)) {
5689 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
=
5690 list_entry(superblock_security_head
.next
,
5691 struct superblock_security_struct
,
5693 struct super_block
*sb
= sbsec
->sb
;
5695 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
5696 spin_unlock(&sb_lock
);
5697 down_read(&sb
->s_umount
);
5699 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5701 spin_lock(&sb_lock
);
5702 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
5703 list_del_init(&sbsec
->list
);
5706 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
5707 spin_unlock(&sb_lock
);
5710 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5711 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5712 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5714 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5716 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5718 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5719 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5721 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5722 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5725 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5726 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5728 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5729 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5732 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
5733 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5735 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
5736 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5740 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5742 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5744 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5745 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5747 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5748 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5751 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5752 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5754 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5755 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5761 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5765 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5768 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5770 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5772 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5774 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5775 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5777 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5784 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5786 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5787 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5789 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5791 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5792 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5793 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5798 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5800 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5801 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5804 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5806 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5807 static int selinux_disabled
;
5809 int selinux_disable(void)
5811 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5813 if (ss_initialized
) {
5814 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5818 if (selinux_disabled
) {
5819 /* Only do this once. */
5823 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5825 selinux_disabled
= 1;
5826 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5828 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5831 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5832 security_ops
= secondary_ops
;
5834 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5835 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5837 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */