1 /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
3 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
4 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
5 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
6 * (at your option) any later version.
10 #include <linux/capability.h>
11 #include <linux/audit.h>
12 #include <linux/module.h>
13 #include <linux/init.h>
14 #include <linux/kernel.h>
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/file.h>
18 #include <linux/mman.h>
19 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
20 #include <linux/swap.h>
21 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
22 #include <linux/netlink.h>
23 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
24 #include <linux/xattr.h>
25 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
26 #include <linux/mount.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/prctl.h>
29 #include <linux/securebits.h>
30 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
33 * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
34 * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
35 * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
36 * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
37 * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
38 * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
39 * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
41 * Warn if that happens, once per boot.
43 static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname
)
47 printk(KERN_INFO
"warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
48 " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
49 " capabilities.\n", fname
);
54 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
59 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int cap
)
61 if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap
))
65 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv
);
68 * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
69 * @tsk: The task to query
70 * @cred: The credentials to use
71 * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
72 * @cap: The capability to check for
73 * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
75 * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
76 * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
78 * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
79 * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
80 * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
81 * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
83 int cap_capable(struct task_struct
*tsk
, const struct cred
*cred
,
84 struct user_namespace
*targ_ns
, int cap
, int audit
)
87 /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
88 if (targ_ns
!= &init_user_ns
&& targ_ns
->creator
== cred
->user
)
91 /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
92 if (targ_ns
== cred
->user
->user_ns
)
93 return cap_raised(cred
->cap_effective
, cap
) ? 0 : -EPERM
;
95 /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
96 if (targ_ns
== &init_user_ns
)
100 *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
101 * it over all children user namespaces as well.
103 targ_ns
= targ_ns
->creator
->user_ns
;
106 /* We never get here */
110 * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
111 * @ts: The time to set
112 * @tz: The timezone to set
114 * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
115 * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
117 int cap_settime(const struct timespec
*ts
, const struct timezone
*tz
)
119 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME
))
125 * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
127 * @child: The process to be accessed
128 * @mode: The mode of attachment.
130 * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
131 * granted, -ve if denied.
133 int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
, unsigned int mode
)
138 if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child
)->cap_permitted
,
139 current_cred()->cap_permitted
) &&
140 !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE
))
147 * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
148 * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
150 * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
151 * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
153 int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
158 if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted
,
159 __task_cred(parent
)->cap_permitted
) &&
160 !has_capability(parent
, CAP_SYS_PTRACE
))
167 * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
168 * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
169 * @effective: The place to record the effective set
170 * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
171 * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
173 * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
174 * them to the caller.
176 int cap_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
177 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
179 const struct cred
*cred
;
181 /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
183 cred
= __task_cred(target
);
184 *effective
= cred
->cap_effective
;
185 *inheritable
= cred
->cap_inheritable
;
186 *permitted
= cred
->cap_permitted
;
192 * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
193 * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
195 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
198 /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
201 if (cap_capable(current
, current_cred(),
202 current_cred()->user
->user_ns
, CAP_SETPCAP
,
203 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) == 0)
209 * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
210 * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
211 * @old: The current task's current credentials
212 * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
213 * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
214 * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
216 * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
217 * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new
218 * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
220 int cap_capset(struct cred
*new,
221 const struct cred
*old
,
222 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
223 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
224 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
226 if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
227 !cap_issubset(*inheritable
,
228 cap_combine(old
->cap_inheritable
,
229 old
->cap_permitted
)))
230 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
233 if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable
,
234 cap_combine(old
->cap_inheritable
,
236 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
239 /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
240 if (!cap_issubset(*permitted
, old
->cap_permitted
))
243 /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
244 if (!cap_issubset(*effective
, *permitted
))
247 new->cap_effective
= *effective
;
248 new->cap_inheritable
= *inheritable
;
249 new->cap_permitted
= *permitted
;
254 * Clear proposed capability sets for execve().
256 static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
258 cap_clear(bprm
->cred
->cap_permitted
);
259 bprm
->cap_effective
= false;
263 * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
264 * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
266 * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
267 * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
268 * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected?
270 * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and
271 * -ve to deny the change.
273 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry
*dentry
)
275 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
278 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
)
281 error
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
, NULL
, 0);
288 * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
289 * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
291 * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
293 * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
295 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry
*dentry
)
297 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
299 if (!inode
->i_op
->removexattr
)
302 return inode
->i_op
->removexattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
);
306 * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
309 static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
*caps
,
310 struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
313 struct cred
*new = bprm
->cred
;
317 if (caps
->magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
)
320 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i
) {
321 __u32 permitted
= caps
->permitted
.cap
[i
];
322 __u32 inheritable
= caps
->inheritable
.cap
[i
];
325 * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
327 new->cap_permitted
.cap
[i
] =
328 (new->cap_bset
.cap
[i
] & permitted
) |
329 (new->cap_inheritable
.cap
[i
] & inheritable
);
331 if (permitted
& ~new->cap_permitted
.cap
[i
])
332 /* insufficient to execute correctly */
337 * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
338 * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
339 * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
341 return *effective
? ret
: 0;
345 * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
347 int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry
*dentry
, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
*cpu_caps
)
349 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
353 struct vfs_cap_data caps
;
355 memset(cpu_caps
, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
));
357 if (!inode
|| !inode
->i_op
->getxattr
)
360 size
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr((struct dentry
*)dentry
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
, &caps
,
362 if (size
== -ENODATA
|| size
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
363 /* no data, that's ok */
368 if (size
< sizeof(magic_etc
))
371 cpu_caps
->magic_etc
= magic_etc
= le32_to_cpu(caps
.magic_etc
);
373 switch (magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) {
374 case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1
:
375 if (size
!= XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1
)
377 tocopy
= VFS_CAP_U32_1
;
379 case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
:
380 if (size
!= XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
)
382 tocopy
= VFS_CAP_U32_2
;
388 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i
) {
391 cpu_caps
->permitted
.cap
[i
] = le32_to_cpu(caps
.data
[i
].permitted
);
392 cpu_caps
->inheritable
.cap
[i
] = le32_to_cpu(caps
.data
[i
].inheritable
);
399 * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
400 * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
401 * constructed by execve().
403 static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
, bool *effective
)
405 struct dentry
*dentry
;
407 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
409 bprm_clear_caps(bprm
);
411 if (!file_caps_enabled
)
414 if (bprm
->file
->f_vfsmnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
)
417 dentry
= dget(bprm
->file
->f_dentry
);
419 rc
= get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &vcaps
);
422 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
423 __func__
, rc
, bprm
->filename
);
424 else if (rc
== -ENODATA
)
429 rc
= bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps
, bprm
, effective
);
431 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
432 __func__
, rc
, bprm
->filename
);
437 bprm_clear_caps(bprm
);
443 * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
444 * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
446 * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
447 * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
448 * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
450 int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
452 const struct cred
*old
= current_cred();
453 struct cred
*new = bprm
->cred
;
458 ret
= get_file_caps(bprm
, &effective
);
462 if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT
)) {
464 * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
465 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
466 * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
468 if (effective
&& new->uid
!= 0 && new->euid
== 0) {
469 warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm
->filename
);
473 * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
474 * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
475 * capability sets for the file.
477 * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
479 if (new->euid
== 0 || new->uid
== 0) {
480 /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
481 new->cap_permitted
= cap_combine(old
->cap_bset
,
482 old
->cap_inheritable
);
489 /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
490 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
492 if ((new->euid
!= old
->uid
||
493 new->egid
!= old
->gid
||
494 !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted
, old
->cap_permitted
)) &&
495 bprm
->unsafe
& ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
) {
496 /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
497 if (!capable(CAP_SETUID
)) {
498 new->euid
= new->uid
;
499 new->egid
= new->gid
;
501 new->cap_permitted
= cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted
,
505 new->suid
= new->fsuid
= new->euid
;
506 new->sgid
= new->fsgid
= new->egid
;
508 /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set in the initial
509 * task. Thus we skip the usual capability rules
511 if (!is_global_init(current
)) {
513 new->cap_effective
= new->cap_permitted
;
515 cap_clear(new->cap_effective
);
517 bprm
->cap_effective
= effective
;
520 * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
522 * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
523 * 1) cap_effective has all caps
525 * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
526 * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
528 * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
529 * that is interesting information to audit.
531 if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective
)) {
532 if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET
, new->cap_effective
) ||
533 new->euid
!= 0 || new->uid
!= 0 ||
534 issecure(SECURE_NOROOT
)) {
535 ret
= audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm
, new, old
);
541 new->securebits
&= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
);
546 * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required
547 * @bprm: The execution parameters
549 * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0
552 * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer
553 * available through @bprm->cred.
555 int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
557 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
559 if (cred
->uid
!= 0) {
560 if (bprm
->cap_effective
)
562 if (!cap_isclear(cred
->cap_permitted
))
566 return (cred
->euid
!= cred
->uid
||
567 cred
->egid
!= cred
->gid
);
571 * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
572 * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
573 * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
574 * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
575 * @size: The size of value
576 * @flags: The replacement flag
578 * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
579 * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
581 * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
582 * who aren't privileged to do so.
584 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
585 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
587 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
588 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
593 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
594 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
) - 1) &&
595 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
601 * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
602 * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
603 * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
605 * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
606 * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
608 * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
609 * aren't privileged to remove them.
611 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
613 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
614 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
619 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
620 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
) - 1) &&
621 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
627 * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
628 * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
630 * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
631 * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
634 * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
635 * capabilities of the process are cleared.
637 * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
638 * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
640 * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
645 * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
646 * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
647 * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
648 * effective sets will be retained.
649 * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
650 * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
651 * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
653 * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
655 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
657 if ((old
->uid
== 0 || old
->euid
== 0 || old
->suid
== 0) &&
658 (new->uid
!= 0 && new->euid
!= 0 && new->suid
!= 0) &&
659 !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
)) {
660 cap_clear(new->cap_permitted
);
661 cap_clear(new->cap_effective
);
663 if (old
->euid
== 0 && new->euid
!= 0)
664 cap_clear(new->cap_effective
);
665 if (old
->euid
!= 0 && new->euid
== 0)
666 new->cap_effective
= new->cap_permitted
;
670 * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call
671 * @new: The proposed credentials
672 * @old: The current task's current credentials
673 * @flags: Indications of what has changed
675 * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
676 * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
678 int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
, int flags
)
684 /* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless
685 * otherwise suppressed */
686 if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
))
687 cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old
);
691 /* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless
692 * otherwise suppressed
694 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
695 * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
697 if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
)) {
698 if (old
->fsuid
== 0 && new->fsuid
!= 0)
700 cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective
);
702 if (old
->fsuid
!= 0 && new->fsuid
== 0)
704 cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective
,
717 * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
718 * task_setnice, assumes that
719 * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
720 * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
721 * then those actions should be allowed
722 * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
723 * yet with increased caps.
724 * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
726 static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct
*p
)
731 is_subset
= cap_issubset(__task_cred(p
)->cap_permitted
,
732 current_cred()->cap_permitted
);
735 if (!is_subset
&& !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE
))
741 * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
742 * @p: The task to affect
744 * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
745 * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
747 int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
749 return cap_safe_nice(p
);
753 * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
754 * @p: The task to affect
755 * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
757 * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
758 * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
760 int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
762 return cap_safe_nice(p
);
766 * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
767 * @p: The task to affect
768 * @nice: The nice value to set
770 * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
771 * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
773 int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
775 return cap_safe_nice(p
);
779 * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from
780 * the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
782 static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred
*new, unsigned long cap
)
784 if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP
))
789 cap_lower(new->cap_bset
, cap
);
794 * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
795 * @option: The process control function requested
796 * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
798 * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
799 * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
801 * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
802 * here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
803 * modules will consider performing the function.
805 int cap_task_prctl(int option
, unsigned long arg2
, unsigned long arg3
,
806 unsigned long arg4
, unsigned long arg5
)
811 new = prepare_creds();
816 case PR_CAPBSET_READ
:
818 if (!cap_valid(arg2
))
820 error
= !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset
, arg2
);
823 case PR_CAPBSET_DROP
:
824 error
= cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2
);
830 * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
831 * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
832 * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
833 * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
837 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
838 * issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
839 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
840 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
841 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
842 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
844 * will ensure that the current process and all of its
845 * children will be locked into a pure
846 * capability-based-privilege environment.
848 case PR_SET_SECUREBITS
:
850 if ((((new->securebits
& SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
) >> 1)
851 & (new->securebits
^ arg2
)) /*[1]*/
852 || ((new->securebits
& SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
& ~arg2
)) /*[2]*/
853 || (arg2
& ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
| SECURE_ALL_BITS
)) /*[3]*/
854 || (cap_capable(current
, current_cred(),
855 current_cred()->user
->user_ns
, CAP_SETPCAP
,
856 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) != 0) /*[4]*/
858 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
859 * [2] no unlocking of locks
860 * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
861 * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
862 * the "sendmail capabilities bug")
865 /* cannot change a locked bit */
867 new->securebits
= arg2
;
870 case PR_GET_SECUREBITS
:
871 error
= new->securebits
;
874 case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS
:
875 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
))
879 case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS
:
881 if (arg2
> 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
884 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED
))
887 new->securebits
|= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
);
889 new->securebits
&= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
);
893 /* No functionality available - continue with default */
898 /* Functionality provided */
900 return commit_creds(new);
909 * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
910 * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
911 * @pages: The size of the mapping
913 * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
914 * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
916 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
918 int cap_sys_admin
= 0;
920 if (cap_capable(current
, current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
921 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
) == 0)
923 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
927 * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
932 * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
935 * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
936 * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
937 * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
940 int cap_file_mmap(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
941 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
,
942 unsigned long addr
, unsigned long addr_only
)
946 if (addr
< dac_mmap_min_addr
) {
947 ret
= cap_capable(current
, current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_SYS_RAWIO
,
949 /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
951 current
->flags
|= PF_SUPERPRIV
;