1 #include <linux/types.h>
2 #include <linux/slab.h>
3 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
4 #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
5 #include <linux/random.h>
6 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
7 #include <asm/scatterlist.h>
8 #include <linux/crypto.h>
11 # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
15 gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize
, int length
)
17 /* Most of the code is block-size independent but currently we
19 BUG_ON(blocksize
!= 8);
20 return 8 - (length
& 7);
24 gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf
*buf
, int offset
, int blocksize
)
26 int padding
= gss_krb5_padding(blocksize
, buf
->len
- offset
);
30 if (buf
->page_len
|| buf
->tail
[0].iov_len
)
34 p
= iov
->iov_base
+ iov
->iov_len
;
35 iov
->iov_len
+= padding
;
37 memset(p
, padding
, padding
);
41 gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf
*buf
, int blocksize
)
47 if (len
<= buf
->head
[0].iov_len
) {
48 pad
= *(u8
*)(buf
->head
[0].iov_base
+ len
- 1);
49 if (pad
> buf
->head
[0].iov_len
)
51 buf
->head
[0].iov_len
-= pad
;
54 len
-= buf
->head
[0].iov_len
;
55 if (len
<= buf
->page_len
) {
56 int last
= (buf
->page_base
+ len
- 1)
58 int offset
= (buf
->page_base
+ len
- 1)
59 & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
- 1);
60 ptr
= kmap_atomic(buf
->pages
[last
], KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA
);
61 pad
= *(ptr
+ offset
);
62 kunmap_atomic(ptr
, KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA
);
66 BUG_ON(len
> buf
->tail
[0].iov_len
);
67 pad
= *(u8
*)(buf
->tail
[0].iov_base
+ len
- 1);
69 /* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent
70 * a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need
71 * to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data.
72 * However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless.
73 * In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server
74 * also uses length and head length together to determine the original
75 * start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's
76 * easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem.
77 * It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and
78 * tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the
79 * server to attempt to parse the padding.
80 * XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism
81 * wrap/unwrap functions. */
92 make_confounder(char *p
, int blocksize
)
97 /* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really
98 * necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in
99 * our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support
100 * rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt
101 * already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets
102 * I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring
103 * uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I
104 * don't care enough. */
106 BUG_ON(blocksize
!= 8);
110 /* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
111 * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace
112 * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */
113 /* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface,
114 * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */
116 /* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */
119 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx
*ctx
, int offset
,
120 struct xdr_buf
*buf
, struct page
**pages
)
122 struct krb5_ctx
*kctx
= ctx
->internal_ctx_id
;
124 struct xdr_netobj md5cksum
= {.len
= 0, .data
= NULL
};
125 int blocksize
= 0, plainlen
;
126 unsigned char *ptr
, *krb5_hdr
, *msg_start
;
129 struct page
**tmp_pages
;
131 dprintk("RPC: gss_wrap_kerberos\n");
135 switch (kctx
->signalg
) {
136 case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5
:
137 checksum_type
= CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5
;
140 dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->signalg %d not"
141 " supported\n", kctx
->signalg
);
144 if (kctx
->sealalg
!= SEAL_ALG_NONE
&& kctx
->sealalg
!= SEAL_ALG_DES
) {
145 dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->sealalg %d not supported\n",
150 blocksize
= crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(kctx
->enc
);
151 gss_krb5_add_padding(buf
, offset
, blocksize
);
152 BUG_ON((buf
->len
- offset
) % blocksize
);
153 plainlen
= blocksize
+ buf
->len
- offset
;
155 headlen
= g_token_size(&kctx
->mech_used
, 22 + plainlen
) -
158 ptr
= buf
->head
[0].iov_base
+ offset
;
159 /* shift data to make room for header. */
160 /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */
161 /* XXX bounds checking, slack, etc. */
162 memmove(ptr
+ headlen
, ptr
, buf
->head
[0].iov_len
- offset
);
163 buf
->head
[0].iov_len
+= headlen
;
165 BUG_ON((buf
->len
- offset
- headlen
) % blocksize
);
167 g_make_token_header(&kctx
->mech_used
, 22 + plainlen
, &ptr
);
170 *ptr
++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
>>8)&0xff);
171 *ptr
++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
&0xff);
173 /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
175 msg_start
= krb5_hdr
+ 24;
176 /* XXXJBF: */ BUG_ON(buf
->head
[0].iov_base
+ offset
+ headlen
!= msg_start
+ blocksize
);
178 *(u16
*)(krb5_hdr
+ 2) = htons(kctx
->signalg
);
179 memset(krb5_hdr
+ 4, 0xff, 4);
180 *(u16
*)(krb5_hdr
+ 4) = htons(kctx
->sealalg
);
182 make_confounder(msg_start
, blocksize
);
185 tmp_pages
= buf
->pages
;
187 if (make_checksum(checksum_type
, krb5_hdr
, 8, buf
,
188 offset
+ headlen
- blocksize
, &md5cksum
))
190 buf
->pages
= tmp_pages
;
192 switch (kctx
->signalg
) {
193 case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5
:
194 if (krb5_encrypt(kctx
->seq
, NULL
, md5cksum
.data
,
195 md5cksum
.data
, md5cksum
.len
))
197 memcpy(krb5_hdr
+ 16,
198 md5cksum
.data
+ md5cksum
.len
- KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH
,
201 dprintk("RPC: make_seal_token: cksum data: \n");
202 print_hexl((u32
*) (krb5_hdr
+ 16), KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH
, 0);
208 kfree(md5cksum
.data
);
210 /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
211 * and encrypt at the same time: */
212 if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx
->seq
, kctx
->initiate
? 0 : 0xff,
213 kctx
->seq_send
, krb5_hdr
+ 16, krb5_hdr
+ 8)))
216 if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx
->enc
, buf
, offset
+ headlen
- blocksize
,
222 return ((kctx
->endtime
< now
) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED
: GSS_S_COMPLETE
);
224 if (md5cksum
.data
) kfree(md5cksum
.data
);
225 return GSS_S_FAILURE
;
229 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx
*ctx
, int offset
, struct xdr_buf
*buf
)
231 struct krb5_ctx
*kctx
= ctx
->internal_ctx_id
;
235 struct xdr_netobj md5cksum
= {.len
= 0, .data
= NULL
};
241 u32 ret
= GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
;
242 void *data_start
, *orig_start
;
246 dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
248 ptr
= (u8
*)buf
->head
[0].iov_base
+ offset
;
249 if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx
->mech_used
, &bodysize
, &ptr
,
253 if ((*ptr
++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
>>8)&0xff)) ||
254 (*ptr
++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
&0xff)) )
257 /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
259 /* get the sign and seal algorithms */
261 signalg
= ptr
[0] + (ptr
[1] << 8);
262 sealalg
= ptr
[2] + (ptr
[3] << 8);
266 if ((ptr
[4] != 0xff) || (ptr
[5] != 0xff))
269 if (sealalg
== 0xffff)
272 /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
273 key type, so a simple comparison is ok */
275 if (sealalg
!= kctx
->sealalg
)
278 /* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms,
279 but few enough that we can try them all. */
281 if ((kctx
->sealalg
== SEAL_ALG_NONE
&& signalg
> 1) ||
282 (kctx
->sealalg
== SEAL_ALG_1
&& signalg
!= SGN_ALG_3
) ||
283 (kctx
->sealalg
== SEAL_ALG_DES3KD
&&
284 signalg
!= SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD
))
287 if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx
->enc
, buf
,
288 ptr
+ 22 - (unsigned char *)buf
->head
[0].iov_base
))
291 /* compute the checksum of the message */
293 /* initialize the the cksum */
295 case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5
:
296 checksum_type
= CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5
;
299 ret
= GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
;
304 case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5
:
305 ret
= make_checksum(checksum_type
, ptr
- 2, 8, buf
,
306 ptr
+ 22 - (unsigned char *)buf
->head
[0].iov_base
, &md5cksum
);
310 ret
= krb5_encrypt(kctx
->seq
, NULL
, md5cksum
.data
,
311 md5cksum
.data
, md5cksum
.len
);
315 if (memcmp(md5cksum
.data
+ 8, ptr
+ 14, 8)) {
321 ret
= GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
;
325 /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
329 ret
= GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED
;
330 if (now
> kctx
->endtime
)
333 /* do sequencing checks */
336 if ((ret
= krb5_get_seq_num(kctx
->seq
, ptr
+ 14, ptr
+ 6, &direction
,
340 if ((kctx
->initiate
&& direction
!= 0xff) ||
341 (!kctx
->initiate
&& direction
!= 0))
344 /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
345 * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
347 blocksize
= crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(kctx
->enc
);
348 data_start
= ptr
+ 22 + blocksize
;
349 orig_start
= buf
->head
[0].iov_base
+ offset
;
350 data_len
= (buf
->head
[0].iov_base
+ buf
->head
[0].iov_len
) - data_start
;
351 memmove(orig_start
, data_start
, data_len
);
352 buf
->head
[0].iov_len
-= (data_start
- orig_start
);
353 buf
->len
-= (data_start
- orig_start
);
355 ret
= GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
;
356 if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf
, blocksize
))
359 ret
= GSS_S_COMPLETE
;
361 if (md5cksum
.data
) kfree(md5cksum
.data
);