Merge branch 'for-3.9/drivers' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
[GitHub/mt8127/android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
9
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
26
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 {
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
37
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
42
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
46
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
53 }
54
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 }
62
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
66
67 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
69 return TX_DROP;
70
71 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
72 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
73 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
74 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
75 mic[0]++;
76
77 return TX_CONTINUE;
78 }
79
80
81 ieee80211_rx_result
82 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
83 {
84 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
85 size_t data_len;
86 unsigned int hdrlen;
87 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
88 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
89 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
90 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
91
92 /*
93 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
94 * than data frames.
95 */
96 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
97 return RX_CONTINUE;
98
99 /*
100 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
101 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
102 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
103 * MIC failure report.
104 */
105 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
106 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
107 goto mic_fail_no_key;
108
109 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
110 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
111 goto update_iv;
112
113 return RX_CONTINUE;
114 }
115
116 /*
117 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
118 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
119 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
120 */
121 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
122 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
123 return RX_CONTINUE;
124
125 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
126 /*
127 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
128 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
129 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
130 * frames in the BSS. (
131 */
132 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
133 }
134
135 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
136 goto mic_fail;
137
138 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
139 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
140 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
141
142 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
143 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
144 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
145
146 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
147 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
148 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
149 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
150 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
151 goto mic_fail;
152
153 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
154 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
155
156 update_iv:
157 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
158 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
159 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
160
161 return RX_CONTINUE;
162
163 mic_fail:
164 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
165
166 mic_fail_no_key:
167 /*
168 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
169 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
170 * the key is set.
171 */
172 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
173 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
174 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
175 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
176 }
177
178
179 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
180 {
181 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
182 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
183 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
184 unsigned int hdrlen;
185 int len, tail;
186 u8 *pos;
187
188 if (info->control.hw_key &&
189 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
190 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
191 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
192 return 0;
193 }
194
195 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
196 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
197
198 if (info->control.hw_key)
199 tail = 0;
200 else
201 tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
202
203 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
204 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
205 return -1;
206
207 pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
208 memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
209 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + TKIP_IV_LEN);
210 pos += hdrlen;
211
212 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
213 if (info->control.hw_key &&
214 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
215 return 0;
216
217 /* Increase IV for the frame */
218 spin_lock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
219 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
220 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
221 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
222 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
223 spin_unlock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
224
225 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
226 if (info->control.hw_key)
227 return 0;
228
229 /* Add room for ICV */
230 skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
231
232 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
233 key, skb, pos, len);
234 }
235
236
237 ieee80211_tx_result
238 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
239 {
240 struct sk_buff *skb;
241
242 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
243
244 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
245 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
246 return TX_DROP;
247 }
248
249 return TX_CONTINUE;
250 }
251
252
253 ieee80211_rx_result
254 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
255 {
256 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
257 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
258 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
259 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
260 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
261
262 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
263
264 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
265 return RX_CONTINUE;
266
267 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
268 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
269
270 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
271 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
272 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
273 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
274
275 /*
276 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
277 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
278 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
279 */
280 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
281 hwaccel = 1;
282
283 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
284 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
285 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
286 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
287 &rx->tkip_iv32,
288 &rx->tkip_iv16);
289 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
290 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
291
292 /* Trim ICV */
293 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
294
295 /* Remove IV */
296 memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
297 skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
298
299 return RX_CONTINUE;
300 }
301
302
303 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
304 int encrypted)
305 {
306 __le16 mask_fc;
307 int a4_included, mgmt;
308 u8 qos_tid;
309 u8 *b_0, *aad;
310 u16 data_len, len_a;
311 unsigned int hdrlen;
312 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
313
314 memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
315
316 b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
317 aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
318
319 /*
320 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
321 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
322 */
323 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
324 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
325 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
326 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
327 if (!mgmt)
328 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
329 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
330
331 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
332 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
333 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
334
335 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
336 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
337 else
338 qos_tid = 0;
339
340 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
341 if (encrypted)
342 data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
343
344 /* First block, b_0 */
345 b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
346 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
347 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
348 */
349 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
350 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
351 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
352 /* l(m) */
353 put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
354
355 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
356 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
357 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
358 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
359 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
360
361 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
362 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
363 aad[23] = 0;
364
365 if (a4_included) {
366 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
367 aad[30] = qos_tid;
368 aad[31] = 0;
369 } else {
370 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
371 aad[24] = qos_tid;
372 }
373 }
374
375
376 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
377 {
378 hdr[0] = pn[5];
379 hdr[1] = pn[4];
380 hdr[2] = 0;
381 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
382 hdr[4] = pn[3];
383 hdr[5] = pn[2];
384 hdr[6] = pn[1];
385 hdr[7] = pn[0];
386 }
387
388
389 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
390 {
391 pn[0] = hdr[7];
392 pn[1] = hdr[6];
393 pn[2] = hdr[5];
394 pn[3] = hdr[4];
395 pn[4] = hdr[1];
396 pn[5] = hdr[0];
397 }
398
399
400 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
401 {
402 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
403 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
404 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
405 int hdrlen, len, tail;
406 u8 *pos;
407 u8 pn[6];
408 u64 pn64;
409 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
410
411 if (info->control.hw_key &&
412 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
413 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
414 /*
415 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
416 * header or MIC fields
417 */
418 return 0;
419 }
420
421 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
422 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
423
424 if (info->control.hw_key)
425 tail = 0;
426 else
427 tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
428
429 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
430 skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
431 return -1;
432
433 pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
434 memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
435 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + CCMP_HDR_LEN);
436
437 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
438 if (info->control.hw_key &&
439 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
440 return 0;
441
442 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
443 pos += hdrlen;
444
445 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
446
447 pn[5] = pn64;
448 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
449 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
450 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
451 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
452 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
453
454 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
455
456 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
457 if (info->control.hw_key)
458 return 0;
459
460 pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
461 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
462 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
463 pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
464
465 return 0;
466 }
467
468
469 ieee80211_tx_result
470 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
471 {
472 struct sk_buff *skb;
473
474 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
475
476 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
477 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
478 return TX_DROP;
479 }
480
481 return TX_CONTINUE;
482 }
483
484
485 ieee80211_rx_result
486 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
487 {
488 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
489 int hdrlen;
490 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
491 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
492 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
493 u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
494 int data_len;
495 int queue;
496
497 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
498
499 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
500 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
501 return RX_CONTINUE;
502
503 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
504 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
505 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
506
507 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
508 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
509 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
510 } else {
511 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
512 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
513 }
514
515 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
516
517 queue = rx->security_idx;
518
519 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
520 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
521 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
522 }
523
524 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
525 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
526 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
527 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
528
529 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
530 key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
531 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
532 skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
533 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
534 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
535 }
536
537 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
538
539 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
540 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN))
541 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
542 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
543 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
544
545 return RX_CONTINUE;
546 }
547
548
549 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
550 {
551 __le16 mask_fc;
552 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
553
554 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
555
556 /* FC type/subtype */
557 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
558 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
559 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
560 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
561 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
562 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
563 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
564 }
565
566
567 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
568 {
569 *d++ = pn;
570 *d++ = pn >> 8;
571 *d++ = pn >> 16;
572 *d++ = pn >> 24;
573 *d++ = pn >> 32;
574 *d = pn >> 40;
575 }
576
577 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
578 {
579 *d++ = s[5];
580 *d++ = s[4];
581 *d++ = s[3];
582 *d++ = s[2];
583 *d++ = s[1];
584 *d = s[0];
585 }
586
587
588 ieee80211_tx_result
589 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
590 {
591 struct sk_buff *skb;
592 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
593 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
594 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
595 u8 aad[20];
596 u64 pn64;
597
598 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
599 return TX_DROP;
600
601 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
602
603 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
604
605 if (info->control.hw_key)
606 return TX_CONTINUE;
607
608 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
609 return TX_DROP;
610
611 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
612 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
613 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
614 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
615
616 /* PN = PN + 1 */
617 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
618
619 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
620
621 bip_aad(skb, aad);
622
623 /*
624 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
625 */
626 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
627 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
628
629 return TX_CONTINUE;
630 }
631
632
633 ieee80211_rx_result
634 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
635 {
636 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
637 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
638 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
639 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
640 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
641 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
642
643 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
644 return RX_CONTINUE;
645
646 /* management frames are already linear */
647
648 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
649 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
650
651 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
652 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
653 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
654 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
655 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
656
657 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
658
659 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
660 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
661 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
662 }
663
664 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
665 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
666 bip_aad(skb, aad);
667 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
668 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
669 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
670 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
671 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
672 }
673 }
674
675 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
676
677 /* Remove MMIE */
678 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
679
680 return RX_CONTINUE;
681 }
682
683 ieee80211_tx_result
684 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
685 {
686 struct sk_buff *skb;
687 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
688
689 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
690 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
691
692 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
693 if (!info->control.hw_key)
694 return TX_DROP;
695 }
696
697 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
698
699 return TX_CONTINUE;
700 }