Merge branch 'x86-acpi-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git...
[GitHub/mt8127/android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git] / kernel / cred.c
1 /* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.txt
2 *
3 * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
5 *
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
10 */
11 #include <linux/export.h>
12 #include <linux/cred.h>
13 #include <linux/slab.h>
14 #include <linux/sched.h>
15 #include <linux/key.h>
16 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
17 #include <linux/init_task.h>
18 #include <linux/security.h>
19 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
20 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
21
22 #if 0
23 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
24 printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
25 #else
26 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
27 no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
28 #endif
29
30 static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
31
32 /*
33 * The common credentials for the initial task's thread group
34 */
35 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
36 static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
37 .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
38 .tgid = 0,
39 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_cred.tgcred.lock),
40 };
41 #endif
42
43 /*
44 * The initial credentials for the initial task
45 */
46 struct cred init_cred = {
47 .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
48 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
49 .subscribers = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
50 .magic = CRED_MAGIC,
51 #endif
52 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
53 .gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
54 .suid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
55 .sgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
56 .euid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
57 .egid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
58 .fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
59 .fsgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
60 .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
61 .cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET,
62 .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
63 .cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET,
64 .cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET,
65 .user = INIT_USER,
66 .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
67 .group_info = &init_groups,
68 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
69 .tgcred = &init_tgcred,
70 #endif
71 };
72
73 static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
74 {
75 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
76 atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
77 #endif
78 }
79
80 static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
81 {
82 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
83 return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
84 #else
85 return 0;
86 #endif
87 }
88
89 static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
90 {
91 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
92 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
93
94 atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
95 #endif
96 }
97
98 /*
99 * Dispose of the shared task group credentials
100 */
101 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
102 static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
103 {
104 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred =
105 container_of(rcu, struct thread_group_cred, rcu);
106
107 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&tgcred->usage) != 0);
108
109 key_put(tgcred->session_keyring);
110 key_put(tgcred->process_keyring);
111 kfree(tgcred);
112 }
113 #endif
114
115 /*
116 * Release a set of thread group credentials.
117 */
118 static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
119 {
120 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
121 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred;
122
123 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tgcred->usage))
124 call_rcu(&tgcred->rcu, release_tgcred_rcu);
125 #endif
126 }
127
128 /*
129 * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
130 */
131 static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
132 {
133 struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
134
135 kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
136
137 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
138 if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
139 atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
140 read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
141 panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
142 " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
143 cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
144 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
145 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
146 #else
147 if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
148 panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
149 cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
150 #endif
151
152 security_cred_free(cred);
153 key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
154 key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
155 release_tgcred(cred);
156 if (cred->group_info)
157 put_group_info(cred->group_info);
158 free_uid(cred->user);
159 put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
160 kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
161 }
162
163 /**
164 * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
165 * @cred: The record to release
166 *
167 * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
168 */
169 void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
170 {
171 kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
172 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
173 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
174
175 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
176 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
177 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
178 cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
179 cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
180 #endif
181 BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
182 BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
183
184 call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
185 }
186 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
187
188 /*
189 * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
190 */
191 void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
192 {
193 struct cred *cred;
194
195 kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
196 atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
197 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
198
199 cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
200 tsk->real_cred = NULL;
201 validate_creds(cred);
202 alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
203 put_cred(cred);
204
205 cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
206 tsk->cred = NULL;
207 validate_creds(cred);
208 alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
209 put_cred(cred);
210 }
211
212 /**
213 * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
214 * @task: The task to query
215 *
216 * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
217 * away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
218 *
219 * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
220 * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
221 */
222 const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
223 {
224 const struct cred *cred;
225
226 rcu_read_lock();
227
228 do {
229 cred = __task_cred((task));
230 BUG_ON(!cred);
231 } while (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&((struct cred *)cred)->usage));
232
233 rcu_read_unlock();
234 return cred;
235 }
236
237 /*
238 * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
239 * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
240 */
241 struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
242 {
243 struct cred *new;
244
245 new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
246 if (!new)
247 return NULL;
248
249 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
250 new->tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
251 if (!new->tgcred) {
252 kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new);
253 return NULL;
254 }
255 atomic_set(&new->tgcred->usage, 1);
256 #endif
257
258 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
259 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
260 new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
261 #endif
262
263 if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
264 goto error;
265
266 return new;
267
268 error:
269 abort_creds(new);
270 return NULL;
271 }
272
273 /**
274 * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
275 *
276 * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds
277 * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
278 * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
279 * calling commit_creds().
280 *
281 * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
282 *
283 * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
284 *
285 * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
286 */
287 struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
288 {
289 struct task_struct *task = current;
290 const struct cred *old;
291 struct cred *new;
292
293 validate_process_creds();
294
295 new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
296 if (!new)
297 return NULL;
298
299 kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
300
301 old = task->cred;
302 memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
303
304 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
305 set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
306 get_group_info(new->group_info);
307 get_uid(new->user);
308 get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
309
310 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
311 key_get(new->thread_keyring);
312 key_get(new->request_key_auth);
313 atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage);
314 #endif
315
316 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
317 new->security = NULL;
318 #endif
319
320 if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
321 goto error;
322 validate_creds(new);
323 return new;
324
325 error:
326 abort_creds(new);
327 return NULL;
328 }
329 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
330
331 /*
332 * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
333 * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
334 */
335 struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
336 {
337 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
338 struct cred *new;
339
340 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
341 tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
342 if (!tgcred)
343 return NULL;
344 #endif
345
346 new = prepare_creds();
347 if (!new) {
348 kfree(tgcred);
349 return new;
350 }
351
352 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
353 /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
354 key_put(new->thread_keyring);
355 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
356
357 /* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to
358 * share */
359 memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred));
360
361 atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
362 spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
363
364 /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
365 key_get(tgcred->session_keyring);
366 tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
367
368 release_tgcred(new);
369 new->tgcred = tgcred;
370 #endif
371
372 return new;
373 }
374
375 /*
376 * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
377 *
378 * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
379 * set.
380 *
381 * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
382 * objective and subjective credentials
383 */
384 int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
385 {
386 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
387 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
388 #endif
389 struct cred *new;
390 int ret;
391
392 if (
393 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
394 !p->cred->thread_keyring &&
395 #endif
396 clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
397 ) {
398 p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
399 get_cred(p->cred);
400 alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
401 kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
402 p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
403 read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
404 atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
405 return 0;
406 }
407
408 new = prepare_creds();
409 if (!new)
410 return -ENOMEM;
411
412 if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
413 ret = create_user_ns(new);
414 if (ret < 0)
415 goto error_put;
416 }
417
418 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
419 /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
420 * had one */
421 if (new->thread_keyring) {
422 key_put(new->thread_keyring);
423 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
424 if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
425 install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
426 }
427
428 /* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
429 * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
430 * bit */
431 if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
432 tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
433 if (!tgcred) {
434 ret = -ENOMEM;
435 goto error_put;
436 }
437 atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
438 spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
439 tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
440 tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
441
442 release_tgcred(new);
443 new->tgcred = tgcred;
444 }
445 #endif
446
447 atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
448 p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
449 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
450 validate_creds(new);
451 return 0;
452
453 error_put:
454 put_cred(new);
455 return ret;
456 }
457
458 /**
459 * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
460 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
461 *
462 * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
463 * the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
464 * updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
465 * in an overridden state.
466 *
467 * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
468 *
469 * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
470 * of, say, sys_setgid().
471 */
472 int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
473 {
474 struct task_struct *task = current;
475 const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
476
477 kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
478 atomic_read(&new->usage),
479 read_cred_subscribers(new));
480
481 BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
482 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
483 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
484 validate_creds(old);
485 validate_creds(new);
486 #endif
487 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
488
489 get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
490
491 /* dumpability changes */
492 if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
493 !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
494 !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
495 !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
496 !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
497 if (task->mm)
498 set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
499 task->pdeath_signal = 0;
500 smp_wmb();
501 }
502
503 /* alter the thread keyring */
504 if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
505 key_fsuid_changed(task);
506 if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
507 key_fsgid_changed(task);
508
509 /* do it
510 * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
511 * in set_user().
512 */
513 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
514 if (new->user != old->user)
515 atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
516 rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
517 rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
518 if (new->user != old->user)
519 atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
520 alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
521
522 /* send notifications */
523 if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) ||
524 !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) ||
525 !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid) ||
526 !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
527 proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
528
529 if (!gid_eq(new->gid, old->gid) ||
530 !gid_eq(new->egid, old->egid) ||
531 !gid_eq(new->sgid, old->sgid) ||
532 !gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
533 proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
534
535 /* release the old obj and subj refs both */
536 put_cred(old);
537 put_cred(old);
538 return 0;
539 }
540 EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
541
542 /**
543 * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
544 * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
545 *
546 * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
547 * current task.
548 */
549 void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
550 {
551 kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
552 atomic_read(&new->usage),
553 read_cred_subscribers(new));
554
555 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
556 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
557 #endif
558 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
559 put_cred(new);
560 }
561 EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
562
563 /**
564 * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
565 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
566 *
567 * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
568 * process, returning the old set for later reversion.
569 */
570 const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
571 {
572 const struct cred *old = current->cred;
573
574 kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
575 atomic_read(&new->usage),
576 read_cred_subscribers(new));
577
578 validate_creds(old);
579 validate_creds(new);
580 get_cred(new);
581 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
582 rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
583 alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
584
585 kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
586 atomic_read(&old->usage),
587 read_cred_subscribers(old));
588 return old;
589 }
590 EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
591
592 /**
593 * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
594 * @old: The credentials to be restored
595 *
596 * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
597 * discarding the override set.
598 */
599 void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
600 {
601 const struct cred *override = current->cred;
602
603 kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
604 atomic_read(&old->usage),
605 read_cred_subscribers(old));
606
607 validate_creds(old);
608 validate_creds(override);
609 alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
610 rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
611 alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
612 put_cred(override);
613 }
614 EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
615
616 /*
617 * initialise the credentials stuff
618 */
619 void __init cred_init(void)
620 {
621 /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
622 cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred),
623 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
624 }
625
626 /**
627 * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
628 * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
629 *
630 * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to
631 * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
632 * task that requires a different subjective context.
633 *
634 * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
635 * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
636 * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
637 *
638 * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
639 *
640 * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
641 *
642 * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
643 */
644 struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
645 {
646 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
647 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
648 #endif
649 const struct cred *old;
650 struct cred *new;
651
652 new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
653 if (!new)
654 return NULL;
655
656 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
657 tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
658 if (!tgcred) {
659 kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new);
660 return NULL;
661 }
662 #endif
663
664 kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
665
666 if (daemon)
667 old = get_task_cred(daemon);
668 else
669 old = get_cred(&init_cred);
670
671 validate_creds(old);
672
673 *new = *old;
674 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
675 set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
676 get_uid(new->user);
677 get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
678 get_group_info(new->group_info);
679
680 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
681 atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
682 spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
683 tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
684 tgcred->session_keyring = NULL;
685 new->tgcred = tgcred;
686 new->request_key_auth = NULL;
687 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
688 new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
689 #endif
690
691 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
692 new->security = NULL;
693 #endif
694 if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
695 goto error;
696
697 put_cred(old);
698 validate_creds(new);
699 return new;
700
701 error:
702 put_cred(new);
703 put_cred(old);
704 return NULL;
705 }
706 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
707
708 /**
709 * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
710 * @new: The credentials to alter
711 * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
712 *
713 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
714 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
715 */
716 int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
717 {
718 return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
719 }
720 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
721
722 /**
723 * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
724 * @new: The credentials to alter
725 * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
726 *
727 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
728 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The
729 * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
730 * interpreted by the LSM.
731 */
732 int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
733 {
734 u32 secid;
735 int ret;
736
737 ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
738 if (ret < 0)
739 return ret;
740
741 return set_security_override(new, secid);
742 }
743 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
744
745 /**
746 * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
747 * @new: The credentials to alter
748 * @inode: The inode to take the context from
749 *
750 * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
751 * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
752 * the same MAC context as that inode.
753 */
754 int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
755 {
756 new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
757 new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
758 return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
759 }
760 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
761
762 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
763
764 bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
765 {
766 if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
767 return true;
768 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
769 /*
770 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
771 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
772 */
773 if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
774 if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
775 return true;
776 if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
777 (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
778 return true;
779 }
780 #endif
781 return false;
782 }
783 EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
784
785 /*
786 * dump invalid credentials
787 */
788 static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
789 const struct task_struct *tsk)
790 {
791 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
792 label, cred,
793 cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
794 cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
795 cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
796 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
797 cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
798 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
799 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
800 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
801 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
802 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
803 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
804 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
805 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
806 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
807 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
808 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
809 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
810 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
811 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
812 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
813 if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
814 (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
815 (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
816 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
817 ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
818 ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
819 #endif
820 }
821
822 /*
823 * report use of invalid credentials
824 */
825 void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
826 {
827 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
828 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
829 dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
830 BUG();
831 }
832 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
833
834 /*
835 * check the credentials on a process
836 */
837 void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
838 const char *file, unsigned line)
839 {
840 if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
841 if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
842 creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
843 goto invalid_creds;
844 } else {
845 if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
846 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
847 creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
848 creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
849 goto invalid_creds;
850 }
851 return;
852
853 invalid_creds:
854 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
855 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
856
857 dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
858 if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
859 dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
860 else
861 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
862 BUG();
863 }
864 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
865
866 /*
867 * check creds for do_exit()
868 */
869 void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
870 {
871 kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
872 tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
873 atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
874 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
875
876 __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
877 }
878
879 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */