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85c8721f | 1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
5 | * All Rights Reserved. | |
6 | * | |
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
9 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
10 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
11 | * | |
12 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
13 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
14 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
15 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
16 | * | |
17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
18 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
19 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
20 | * | |
21 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
24 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
27 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
28 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
29 | * | |
30 | */ | |
31 | ||
32 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
1da177e4 | 33 | #include <asm/types.h> |
715b49ef | 34 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
35 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
36 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
01116105 | 37 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
3ec3b2fb | 38 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
39 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
40 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
f6a789d1 | 42 | #include <linux/kthread.h> |
5bb289b5 | 43 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
f5561964 | 44 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
45 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
46 | ||
47 | /* 0 = no checking | |
48 | 1 = put_count checking | |
49 | 2 = verbose put_count checking | |
50 | */ | |
51 | #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0 | |
52 | ||
53 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | |
54 | extern int audit_enabled; | |
55 | ||
56 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
57 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
58 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
59 | ||
60 | /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the | |
61 | * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from | |
62 | * path_lookup. */ | |
63 | #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 | |
64 | ||
65 | /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using | |
66 | a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by | |
67 | the syscall filter. */ | |
68 | enum audit_state { | |
69 | AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. | |
70 | * No syscall-specific audit records can | |
71 | * be generated. */ | |
72 | AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
73 | * but don't necessarily fill it in at | |
74 | * syscall entry time (i.e., filter | |
75 | * instead). */ | |
76 | AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
77 | * and always fill it in at syscall | |
78 | * entry time. This makes a full | |
79 | * syscall record available if some | |
80 | * other part of the kernel decides it | |
81 | * should be recorded. */ | |
82 | AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
83 | * always fill it in at syscall entry | |
84 | * time, and always write out the audit | |
85 | * record at syscall exit time. */ | |
86 | }; | |
87 | ||
88 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and | |
89 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
90 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
91 | * | |
92 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
93 | struct audit_names { | |
94 | const char *name; | |
95 | unsigned long ino; | |
96 | dev_t dev; | |
97 | umode_t mode; | |
98 | uid_t uid; | |
99 | gid_t gid; | |
100 | dev_t rdev; | |
ae7b961b | 101 | unsigned flags; |
1da177e4 LT |
102 | }; |
103 | ||
104 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
105 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
106 | int type; | |
107 | }; | |
108 | ||
109 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
110 | ||
111 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { | |
112 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
113 | struct ipc_perm p; | |
114 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
115 | uid_t uid; | |
116 | gid_t gid; | |
117 | mode_t mode; | |
118 | }; | |
119 | ||
3ec3b2fb DW |
120 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { |
121 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
122 | int nargs; | |
123 | unsigned long args[0]; | |
124 | }; | |
125 | ||
126 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr { | |
127 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
128 | int len; | |
129 | char a[0]; | |
130 | }; | |
131 | ||
01116105 SS |
132 | struct audit_aux_data_path { |
133 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
134 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
135 | struct vfsmount *mnt; | |
136 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
137 | |
138 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
139 | struct audit_context { | |
140 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
141 | enum audit_state state; | |
142 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
143 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
144 | uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */ | |
145 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
146 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
147 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
2fd6f58b | 148 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
1da177e4 LT |
149 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ |
150 | int name_count; | |
151 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
8f37d47c DW |
152 | struct dentry * pwd; |
153 | struct vfsmount * pwdmnt; | |
1da177e4 LT |
154 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
155 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
156 | ||
157 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
158 | pid_t pid; | |
159 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
160 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
161 | unsigned long personality; | |
2fd6f58b | 162 | int arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
163 | |
164 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
165 | int put_count; | |
166 | int ino_count; | |
167 | #endif | |
168 | }; | |
169 | ||
170 | /* Public API */ | |
171 | /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation | |
172 | * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at | |
173 | * syscall exit time. */ | |
0f45aa18 DW |
174 | static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { |
175 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), | |
176 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), | |
177 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), | |
178 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), | |
179 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), | |
180 | #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5 | |
181 | #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser | |
182 | #endif | |
183 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
184 | |
185 | struct audit_entry { | |
186 | struct list_head list; | |
187 | struct rcu_head rcu; | |
188 | struct audit_rule rule; | |
189 | }; | |
190 | ||
7ca00264 DW |
191 | extern int audit_pid; |
192 | ||
3c789a19 AG |
193 | /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from |
194 | * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */ | |
195 | static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) | |
196 | { | |
197 | int i; | |
198 | ||
199 | if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER | |
200 | && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE | |
201 | && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) | |
202 | return -1; | |
203 | if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) | |
204 | return -1; | |
205 | if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) | |
206 | return -1; | |
207 | ||
208 | d->flags = s->flags; | |
209 | d->action = s->action; | |
210 | d->field_count = s->field_count; | |
211 | for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { | |
212 | d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; | |
213 | d->values[i] = s->values[i]; | |
214 | } | |
215 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; | |
216 | return 0; | |
217 | } | |
218 | ||
1da177e4 | 219 | /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from |
3c789a19 | 220 | * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and |
1da177e4 | 221 | * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ |
3c789a19 | 222 | static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) |
1da177e4 LT |
223 | { |
224 | int i; | |
225 | ||
226 | if (a->flags != b->flags) | |
227 | return 1; | |
228 | ||
229 | if (a->action != b->action) | |
230 | return 1; | |
231 | ||
232 | if (a->field_count != b->field_count) | |
233 | return 1; | |
234 | ||
235 | for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { | |
236 | if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] | |
237 | || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) | |
238 | return 1; | |
239 | } | |
240 | ||
241 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) | |
242 | if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) | |
243 | return 1; | |
244 | ||
245 | return 0; | |
246 | } | |
247 | ||
248 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
249 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
250 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
3c789a19 | 251 | static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, |
0f45aa18 | 252 | struct list_head *list) |
1da177e4 | 253 | { |
3c789a19 AG |
254 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
255 | ||
256 | /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
257 | * addition routine. */ | |
258 | list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) { | |
259 | if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) { | |
260 | return -EEXIST; | |
261 | } | |
262 | } | |
263 | ||
264 | if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
265 | return -ENOMEM; | |
266 | if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) { | |
267 | kfree(entry); | |
268 | return -EINVAL; | |
269 | } | |
270 | ||
0f45aa18 DW |
271 | if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) { |
272 | entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; | |
1da177e4 LT |
273 | list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); |
274 | } else { | |
275 | list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
276 | } | |
3c789a19 AG |
277 | |
278 | return 0; | |
1da177e4 LT |
279 | } |
280 | ||
3c789a19 | 281 | static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) |
1da177e4 LT |
282 | { |
283 | struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); | |
284 | kfree(e); | |
285 | } | |
286 | ||
287 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
288 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
289 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
290 | static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
291 | struct list_head *list) | |
292 | { | |
293 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
294 | ||
295 | /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
296 | * deletion routine. */ | |
297 | list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
298 | if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
299 | list_del_rcu(&e->list); | |
300 | call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
301 | return 0; | |
302 | } | |
303 | } | |
0f45aa18 | 304 | return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */ |
1da177e4 LT |
305 | } |
306 | ||
f6a789d1 DW |
307 | static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) |
308 | { | |
309 | int pid, seq; | |
310 | int *dest = _dest; | |
311 | struct audit_entry *entry; | |
312 | int i; | |
313 | ||
314 | pid = dest[0]; | |
315 | seq = dest[1]; | |
316 | kfree(dest); | |
317 | ||
318 | down(&audit_netlink_sem); | |
319 | ||
320 | /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are | |
321 | always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ | |
322 | for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { | |
323 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list) | |
324 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
325 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
326 | } | |
327 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); | |
328 | ||
329 | up(&audit_netlink_sem); | |
330 | return 0; | |
331 | } | |
332 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
333 | /** |
334 | * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type | |
335 | * @type: audit message type | |
336 | * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages | |
337 | * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages | |
338 | * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number | |
339 | * @data: payload data | |
340 | * @loginuid: loginuid of sender | |
341 | */ | |
c94c257c SH |
342 | int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, |
343 | uid_t loginuid) | |
1da177e4 | 344 | { |
f6a789d1 DW |
345 | struct task_struct *tsk; |
346 | int *dest; | |
1da177e4 | 347 | int err = 0; |
0f45aa18 | 348 | unsigned listnr; |
1da177e4 LT |
349 | |
350 | switch (type) { | |
351 | case AUDIT_LIST: | |
f6a789d1 DW |
352 | /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill |
353 | * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for | |
354 | * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to | |
355 | * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl | |
356 | * trying to _send_ the stuff */ | |
357 | ||
358 | dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); | |
359 | if (!dest) | |
360 | return -ENOMEM; | |
361 | dest[0] = pid; | |
362 | dest[1] = seq; | |
363 | ||
364 | tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules"); | |
365 | if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { | |
366 | kfree(dest); | |
367 | err = PTR_ERR(tsk); | |
0f45aa18 | 368 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
369 | break; |
370 | case AUDIT_ADD: | |
3c789a19 AG |
371 | listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
372 | if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) | |
1da177e4 | 373 | return -EINVAL; |
3c789a19 AG |
374 | |
375 | err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); | |
376 | if (!err) | |
377 | audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, | |
378 | "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); | |
1da177e4 LT |
379 | break; |
380 | case AUDIT_DEL: | |
0f45aa18 DW |
381 | listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
382 | if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) | |
383 | return -EINVAL; | |
384 | ||
385 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); | |
386 | if (!err) | |
9ad9ad38 | 387 | audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, |
0f45aa18 | 388 | "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); |
1da177e4 LT |
389 | break; |
390 | default: | |
391 | return -EINVAL; | |
392 | } | |
393 | ||
394 | return err; | |
395 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
396 | |
397 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
398 | * otherwise. */ | |
399 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
400 | struct audit_rule *rule, | |
401 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
402 | enum audit_state *state) | |
403 | { | |
404 | int i, j; | |
405 | ||
406 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
407 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE; | |
408 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; | |
409 | int result = 0; | |
410 | ||
411 | switch (field) { | |
412 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
413 | result = (tsk->pid == value); | |
414 | break; | |
415 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
416 | result = (tsk->uid == value); | |
417 | break; | |
418 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
419 | result = (tsk->euid == value); | |
420 | break; | |
421 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
422 | result = (tsk->suid == value); | |
423 | break; | |
424 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
425 | result = (tsk->fsuid == value); | |
426 | break; | |
427 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
428 | result = (tsk->gid == value); | |
429 | break; | |
430 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
431 | result = (tsk->egid == value); | |
432 | break; | |
433 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
434 | result = (tsk->sgid == value); | |
435 | break; | |
436 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
437 | result = (tsk->fsgid == value); | |
438 | break; | |
439 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
440 | result = (tsk->personality == value); | |
441 | break; | |
2fd6f58b | 442 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
443 | if (ctx) | |
444 | result = (ctx->arch == value); | |
445 | break; | |
1da177e4 LT |
446 | |
447 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
448 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
449 | result = (ctx->return_code == value); | |
450 | break; | |
451 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
b01f2cc1 DW |
452 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
453 | if (value) | |
454 | result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS); | |
455 | else | |
456 | result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE); | |
457 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
458 | break; |
459 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
460 | if (ctx) { | |
461 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
462 | if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
463 | ++result; | |
464 | break; | |
465 | } | |
466 | } | |
467 | } | |
468 | break; | |
469 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
470 | if (ctx) { | |
471 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
472 | if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
473 | ++result; | |
474 | break; | |
475 | } | |
476 | } | |
477 | } | |
478 | break; | |
479 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
480 | if (ctx) { | |
481 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
482 | if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) { | |
483 | ++result; | |
484 | break; | |
485 | } | |
486 | } | |
487 | } | |
488 | break; | |
489 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
490 | result = 0; | |
491 | if (ctx) | |
492 | result = (ctx->loginuid == value); | |
493 | break; | |
494 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
495 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
496 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
497 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
498 | if (ctx) | |
499 | result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value); | |
500 | break; | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
503 | if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) | |
504 | result = !result; | |
505 | if (!result) | |
506 | return 0; | |
507 | } | |
508 | switch (rule->action) { | |
509 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
510 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
511 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
512 | } | |
513 | return 1; | |
514 | } | |
515 | ||
516 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
517 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
518 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
519 | */ | |
520 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
521 | { | |
522 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
523 | enum audit_state state; | |
524 | ||
525 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
0f45aa18 | 526 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
1da177e4 LT |
527 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { |
528 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
529 | return state; | |
530 | } | |
531 | } | |
532 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
533 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
534 | } | |
535 | ||
536 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
537 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
23f32d18 | 538 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
b0dd25a8 | 539 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
1da177e4 LT |
540 | */ |
541 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
542 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
543 | struct list_head *list) | |
544 | { | |
545 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
c3896495 | 546 | enum audit_state state; |
1da177e4 | 547 | |
351bb722 | 548 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
f7056d64 DW |
549 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
550 | ||
1da177e4 | 551 | rcu_read_lock(); |
c3896495 DW |
552 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
553 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
554 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
555 | ||
556 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
557 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit | |
558 | && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { | |
559 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
560 | return state; | |
561 | } | |
562 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
563 | } |
564 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
565 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
566 | } | |
567 | ||
5bb289b5 DW |
568 | static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, |
569 | struct audit_rule *rule, | |
570 | enum audit_state *state) | |
571 | { | |
572 | int i; | |
573 | ||
574 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
575 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE; | |
576 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; | |
577 | int result = 0; | |
578 | ||
579 | switch (field) { | |
580 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
581 | result = (cb->creds.pid == value); | |
582 | break; | |
583 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
584 | result = (cb->creds.uid == value); | |
585 | break; | |
586 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
587 | result = (cb->creds.gid == value); | |
588 | break; | |
589 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
590 | result = (cb->loginuid == value); | |
591 | break; | |
592 | } | |
593 | ||
594 | if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) | |
595 | result = !result; | |
596 | if (!result) | |
597 | return 0; | |
598 | } | |
599 | switch (rule->action) { | |
600 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
601 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
602 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
603 | } | |
604 | return 1; | |
605 | } | |
606 | ||
607 | int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type) | |
0f45aa18 DW |
608 | { |
609 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
610 | enum audit_state state; | |
4a4cd633 | 611 | int ret = 1; |
0f45aa18 DW |
612 | |
613 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
614 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) { | |
5bb289b5 | 615 | if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) { |
4a4cd633 DW |
616 | if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) |
617 | ret = 0; | |
618 | break; | |
0f45aa18 DW |
619 | } |
620 | } | |
621 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
4a4cd633 | 622 | |
993e2d41 | 623 | return ret; /* Audit by default */ |
0f45aa18 DW |
624 | } |
625 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
626 | /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ |
627 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
628 | int return_valid, | |
629 | int return_code) | |
630 | { | |
631 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
632 | ||
633 | if (likely(!context)) | |
634 | return NULL; | |
635 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
636 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
637 | ||
21af6c4f | 638 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) { |
1da177e4 | 639 | enum audit_state state; |
0f45aa18 | 640 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
1da177e4 LT |
641 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
642 | context->auditable = 1; | |
643 | } | |
644 | ||
645 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
646 | context->uid = tsk->uid; | |
647 | context->gid = tsk->gid; | |
648 | context->euid = tsk->euid; | |
649 | context->suid = tsk->suid; | |
650 | context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; | |
651 | context->egid = tsk->egid; | |
652 | context->sgid = tsk->sgid; | |
653 | context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; | |
654 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
655 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
656 | return context; | |
657 | } | |
658 | ||
659 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
660 | { | |
661 | int i; | |
662 | ||
663 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
664 | if (context->auditable | |
665 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
666 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" | |
667 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" | |
668 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
669 | __LINE__, | |
670 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, | |
671 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
672 | context->ino_count); | |
673 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
674 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
675 | context->names[i].name, | |
676 | context->names[i].name); | |
677 | dump_stack(); | |
678 | return; | |
679 | } | |
680 | #endif | |
681 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
682 | context->put_count = 0; | |
683 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
684 | #endif | |
685 | ||
686 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
687 | if (context->names[i].name) | |
688 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
689 | context->name_count = 0; | |
8f37d47c DW |
690 | if (context->pwd) |
691 | dput(context->pwd); | |
692 | if (context->pwdmnt) | |
693 | mntput(context->pwdmnt); | |
694 | context->pwd = NULL; | |
695 | context->pwdmnt = NULL; | |
1da177e4 LT |
696 | } |
697 | ||
698 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
699 | { | |
700 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
701 | ||
702 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
01116105 SS |
703 | if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { |
704 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
705 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
706 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
707 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
708 | context->aux = aux->next; |
709 | kfree(aux); | |
710 | } | |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
713 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
714 | enum audit_state state) | |
715 | { | |
716 | uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid; | |
717 | ||
718 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
719 | context->state = state; | |
720 | context->loginuid = loginuid; | |
721 | } | |
722 | ||
723 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
724 | { | |
725 | struct audit_context *context; | |
726 | ||
727 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
728 | return NULL; | |
729 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
730 | return context; | |
731 | } | |
732 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
733 | /** |
734 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task | |
735 | * @tsk: task | |
736 | * | |
737 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
1da177e4 LT |
738 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
739 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
740 | * needed. |
741 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
742 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
743 | { | |
744 | struct audit_context *context; | |
745 | enum audit_state state; | |
746 | ||
747 | if (likely(!audit_enabled)) | |
748 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
749 | ||
750 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
751 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
752 | return 0; | |
753 | ||
754 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
755 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
756 | return -ENOMEM; | |
757 | } | |
758 | ||
759 | /* Preserve login uid */ | |
760 | context->loginuid = -1; | |
761 | if (current->audit_context) | |
762 | context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid; | |
763 | ||
764 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
765 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
766 | return 0; | |
767 | } | |
768 | ||
769 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
770 | { | |
771 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
772 | int count = 0; | |
773 | ||
774 | do { | |
775 | previous = context->previous; | |
776 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
777 | ++count; | |
778 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
779 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
780 | context->serial, context->major, | |
781 | context->name_count, count); | |
782 | } | |
783 | audit_free_names(context); | |
784 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
785 | kfree(context); | |
786 | context = previous; | |
787 | } while (context); | |
788 | if (count >= 10) | |
789 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
790 | } | |
791 | ||
219f0817 SS |
792 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
793 | { | |
794 | char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; | |
795 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
796 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
797 | ||
798 | get_task_comm(name, current); | |
99e45eea DW |
799 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
800 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
219f0817 SS |
801 | |
802 | if (!mm) | |
803 | return; | |
804 | ||
805 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
806 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
807 | while (vma) { | |
808 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
809 | vma->vm_file) { | |
810 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
811 | vma->vm_file->f_dentry, | |
812 | vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt); | |
813 | break; | |
814 | } | |
815 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
816 | } | |
817 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
818 | } | |
819 | ||
9796fdd8 | 820 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) |
1da177e4 LT |
821 | { |
822 | int i; | |
823 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
7551ced3 | 824 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1da177e4 | 825 | |
f5561964 | 826 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1da177e4 LT |
827 | if (!ab) |
828 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
bccf6ae0 DW |
829 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
830 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1da177e4 LT |
831 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
832 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
833 | if (context->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b | 834 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
835 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
836 | context->return_code); | |
1da177e4 LT |
837 | audit_log_format(ab, |
838 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
326e9c8b SG |
839 | " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
840 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
841 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", | |
1da177e4 LT |
842 | context->argv[0], |
843 | context->argv[1], | |
844 | context->argv[2], | |
845 | context->argv[3], | |
846 | context->name_count, | |
847 | context->pid, | |
848 | context->loginuid, | |
849 | context->uid, | |
850 | context->gid, | |
851 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
852 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); | |
219f0817 | 853 | audit_log_task_info(ab); |
1da177e4 | 854 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1da177e4 | 855 | |
7551ced3 | 856 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
c0404993 | 857 | |
ef20c8c1 | 858 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type); |
1da177e4 LT |
859 | if (!ab) |
860 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
861 | ||
1da177e4 | 862 | switch (aux->type) { |
c0404993 | 863 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1da177e4 LT |
864 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; |
865 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
326e9c8b | 866 | " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x", |
1da177e4 | 867 | axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode); |
3ec3b2fb DW |
868 | break; } |
869 | ||
870 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
871 | int i; | |
872 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux; | |
873 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs); | |
874 | for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++) | |
875 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]); | |
876 | break; } | |
877 | ||
878 | case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: { | |
879 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux; | |
880 | ||
881 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
882 | audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); | |
883 | break; } | |
01116105 SS |
884 | |
885 | case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { | |
886 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
887 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); | |
01116105 SS |
888 | break; } |
889 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
890 | } |
891 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1da177e4 LT |
892 | } |
893 | ||
8f37d47c | 894 | if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) { |
ef20c8c1 | 895 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD); |
8f37d47c DW |
896 | if (ab) { |
897 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt); | |
898 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
899 | } | |
900 | } | |
1da177e4 | 901 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
ef20c8c1 | 902 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH); |
1da177e4 LT |
903 | if (!ab) |
904 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
8f37d47c | 905 | |
1da177e4 | 906 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
83c7d091 | 907 | if (context->names[i].name) { |
908 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
909 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); | |
910 | } | |
ae7b961b DW |
911 | audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags); |
912 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
913 | if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1) |
914 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
326e9c8b | 915 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
1da177e4 LT |
916 | context->names[i].ino, |
917 | MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
918 | MINOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
919 | context->names[i].mode, | |
920 | context->names[i].uid, | |
921 | context->names[i].gid, | |
922 | MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), | |
923 | MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); | |
924 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
925 | } | |
926 | } | |
927 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
928 | /** |
929 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context | |
930 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free | |
931 | * | |
932 | * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct. | |
933 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
934 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
935 | { | |
936 | struct audit_context *context; | |
937 | ||
938 | task_lock(tsk); | |
939 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); | |
940 | task_unlock(tsk); | |
941 | ||
942 | if (likely(!context)) | |
943 | return; | |
944 | ||
945 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
f5561964 DW |
946 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
947 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this | |
948 | * in the context of the idle thread */ | |
f7056d64 | 949 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
f5561964 | 950 | audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC); |
1da177e4 LT |
951 | |
952 | audit_free_context(context); | |
953 | } | |
954 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
955 | /** |
956 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry | |
957 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
958 | * @arch: architecture type | |
959 | * @major: major syscall type (function) | |
960 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 | |
961 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 | |
962 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 | |
963 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 | |
964 | * | |
965 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the | |
1da177e4 LT |
966 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
967 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
968 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
969 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
970 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
971 | * be written). |
972 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 973 | void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, |
1da177e4 LT |
974 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
975 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
976 | { | |
977 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
978 | enum audit_state state; | |
979 | ||
980 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
981 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
982 | /* |
983 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
1da177e4 LT |
984 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of |
985 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
986 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
987 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
988 | * | |
989 | * i386 no | |
990 | * x86_64 no | |
991 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S) | |
992 | * | |
993 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
994 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
995 | */ | |
996 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
997 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
998 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
999 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1000 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
1001 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
1002 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
1003 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
1004 | #endif | |
1005 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
1006 | if (newctx) { | |
1007 | newctx->previous = context; | |
1008 | context = newctx; | |
1009 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
1010 | } else { | |
1011 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
1012 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
1013 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
1014 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
1015 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
1016 | } | |
1017 | } | |
1018 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
1019 | ||
1020 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
1021 | return; | |
1022 | ||
2fd6f58b | 1023 | context->arch = arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
1024 | context->major = major; |
1025 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
1026 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
1027 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
1028 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
1029 | ||
1030 | state = context->state; | |
1031 | if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) | |
0f45aa18 | 1032 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1da177e4 LT |
1033 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
1034 | return; | |
1035 | ||
ce625a80 | 1036 | context->serial = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
1037 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
1038 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
1039 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
1040 | } | |
1041 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1042 | /** |
1043 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call | |
1044 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
1045 | * @valid: success/failure flag | |
1046 | * @return_code: syscall return value | |
1047 | * | |
1048 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
1da177e4 LT |
1049 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
1050 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
1051 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
1052 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
1053 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 1054 | void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) |
1da177e4 LT |
1055 | { |
1056 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1057 | ||
1058 | get_task_struct(tsk); | |
1059 | task_lock(tsk); | |
2fd6f58b | 1060 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1da177e4 LT |
1061 | task_unlock(tsk); |
1062 | ||
1063 | /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have | |
1064 | * called __put_task_struct. */ | |
1065 | if (likely(!context)) | |
413a1c75 | 1066 | goto out; |
1da177e4 | 1067 | |
f7056d64 | 1068 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
f5561964 | 1069 | audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
1070 | |
1071 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
1072 | context->auditable = 0; | |
2fd6f58b | 1073 | |
1da177e4 LT |
1074 | if (context->previous) { |
1075 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
1076 | context->previous = NULL; | |
1077 | audit_free_context(context); | |
1078 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
1079 | } else { | |
1080 | audit_free_names(context); | |
1081 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1082 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
1083 | } | |
413a1c75 | 1084 | out: |
1da177e4 LT |
1085 | put_task_struct(tsk); |
1086 | } | |
1087 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1088 | /** |
1089 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list | |
1090 | * @name: name to add | |
1091 | * | |
1092 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. | |
1093 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). | |
1094 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1095 | void audit_getname(const char *name) |
1096 | { | |
1097 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1098 | ||
1099 | if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
1100 | return; | |
1101 | ||
1102 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1103 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1104 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
1105 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1106 | dump_stack(); | |
1107 | #endif | |
1108 | return; | |
1109 | } | |
1110 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
1111 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
1112 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1113 | ++context->name_count; | |
8f37d47c DW |
1114 | if (!context->pwd) { |
1115 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
1116 | context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd); | |
1117 | context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt); | |
1118 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
1119 | } | |
1120 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1121 | } |
1122 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1123 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
1124 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname | |
1125 | * | |
1126 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, | |
1127 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. | |
1128 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). | |
1129 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1130 | void audit_putname(const char *name) |
1131 | { | |
1132 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1133 | ||
1134 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
1135 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1136 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1137 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
1138 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1139 | if (context->name_count) { | |
1140 | int i; | |
1141 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
1142 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
1143 | context->names[i].name, | |
1144 | context->names[i].name); | |
1145 | } | |
1146 | #endif | |
1147 | __putname(name); | |
1148 | } | |
1149 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1150 | else { | |
1151 | ++context->put_count; | |
1152 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
1153 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
1154 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
1155 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
1156 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
1157 | context->serial, context->major, | |
1158 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
1159 | context->put_count); | |
1160 | dump_stack(); | |
1161 | } | |
1162 | } | |
1163 | #endif | |
1164 | } | |
1165 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1166 | /** |
1167 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup | |
1168 | * @name: name being audited | |
1169 | * @inode: inode being audited | |
1170 | * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup()) | |
1171 | * | |
1172 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). | |
1173 | */ | |
ae7b961b | 1174 | void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) |
1da177e4 LT |
1175 | { |
1176 | int idx; | |
1177 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1178 | ||
1179 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1180 | return; | |
1181 | if (context->name_count | |
1182 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
1183 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
1184 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1185 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
1186 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
1187 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
1188 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
1189 | else { | |
1190 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1191 | * associated name? */ | |
1192 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED) | |
1193 | return; | |
1194 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1195 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1196 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1197 | ++context->ino_count; | |
1198 | #endif | |
1199 | } | |
ae7b961b DW |
1200 | context->names[idx].flags = flags; |
1201 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1202 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1203 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1204 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1205 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1206 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
1da177e4 LT |
1207 | } |
1208 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1209 | /** |
1210 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values | |
1211 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task | |
1212 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context | |
1213 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context | |
1214 | * | |
1215 | * Also sets the context as auditable. | |
1216 | */ | |
bfb4496e DW |
1217 | void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
1218 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
1da177e4 | 1219 | { |
ce625a80 DW |
1220 | if (!ctx->serial) |
1221 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); | |
bfb4496e DW |
1222 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
1223 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
1224 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
1225 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
1226 | } |
1227 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1228 | /** |
1229 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid | |
1230 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified | |
1231 | * @loginuid: loginuid value | |
1232 | * | |
1233 | * Returns 0. | |
1234 | * | |
1235 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). | |
1236 | */ | |
456be6cd | 1237 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
1da177e4 | 1238 | { |
456be6cd | 1239 | if (task->audit_context) { |
c0404993 SG |
1240 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1241 | ||
9ad9ad38 | 1242 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
c0404993 SG |
1243 | if (ab) { |
1244 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
326e9c8b | 1245 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u", |
c0404993 SG |
1246 | task->pid, task->uid, |
1247 | task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); | |
1248 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1249 | } | |
456be6cd | 1250 | task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; |
1da177e4 LT |
1251 | } |
1252 | return 0; | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1255 | /** |
1256 | * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context | |
1257 | * @ctx: the audit_context | |
1258 | * | |
1259 | * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL. | |
1260 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1261 | uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) |
1262 | { | |
1263 | return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; | |
1264 | } | |
1265 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1266 | /** |
1267 | * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc | |
1268 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes | |
1269 | * @uid: msgq user id | |
1270 | * @gid: msgq group id | |
1271 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) | |
1272 | * | |
1273 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1274 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1275 | int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) |
1276 | { | |
1277 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; | |
1278 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1279 | ||
1280 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1281 | return 0; | |
1282 | ||
1283 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1284 | if (!ax) | |
1285 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1286 | ||
1287 | ax->qbytes = qbytes; | |
1288 | ax->uid = uid; | |
1289 | ax->gid = gid; | |
1290 | ax->mode = mode; | |
1291 | ||
c0404993 | 1292 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; |
1da177e4 LT |
1293 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
1294 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1295 | return 0; | |
1296 | } | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1297 | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
1298 | /** |
1299 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall | |
1300 | * @nargs: number of args | |
1301 | * @args: args array | |
1302 | * | |
1303 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1304 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1305 | int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
1306 | { | |
1307 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; | |
1308 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1309 | ||
1310 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1311 | return 0; | |
1312 | ||
1313 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1314 | if (!ax) | |
1315 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1316 | ||
1317 | ax->nargs = nargs; | |
1318 | memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
1319 | ||
1320 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
1321 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1322 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1323 | return 0; | |
1324 | } | |
1325 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1326 | /** |
1327 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto | |
1328 | * @len: data length in user space | |
1329 | * @a: data address in kernel space | |
1330 | * | |
1331 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1332 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1333 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
1334 | { | |
1335 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; | |
1336 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1337 | ||
1338 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1339 | return 0; | |
1340 | ||
1341 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1342 | if (!ax) | |
1343 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1344 | ||
1345 | ax->len = len; | |
1346 | memcpy(ax->a, a, len); | |
1347 | ||
1348 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR; | |
1349 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1350 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1351 | return 0; | |
1352 | } | |
1353 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1354 | /** |
1355 | * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions | |
1356 | * @dentry: dentry to record | |
1357 | * @mnt: mnt to record | |
1358 | * | |
1359 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1360 | * | |
1361 | * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit() | |
1362 | */ | |
01116105 SS |
1363 | int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) |
1364 | { | |
1365 | struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; | |
1366 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1367 | ||
1368 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1369 | return 0; | |
1370 | ||
1371 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1372 | if (!ax) | |
1373 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1374 | ||
1375 | ax->dentry = dget(dentry); | |
1376 | ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); | |
1377 | ||
1378 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; | |
1379 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1380 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1381 | return 0; | |
1382 | } | |
1383 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1384 | /** |
1385 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem | |
1386 | * @sig: signal value | |
1387 | * @t: task being signaled | |
1388 | * | |
1389 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) | |
1390 | * and uid that is doing that. | |
1391 | */ | |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1392 | void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
1393 | { | |
1394 | extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; | |
1395 | extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1396 | |
582edda5 | 1397 | if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) { |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1398 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) { |
1399 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1400 | audit_sig_pid = current->pid; | |
1401 | if (ctx) | |
1402 | audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; | |
1403 | else | |
1404 | audit_sig_uid = current->uid; | |
1405 | } | |
1406 | } | |
1407 | } |