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85c8721f | 1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
5 | * All Rights Reserved. | |
6 | * | |
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
9 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
10 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
11 | * | |
12 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
13 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
14 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
15 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
16 | * | |
17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
18 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
19 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
20 | * | |
21 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
24 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
27 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
28 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
29 | * | |
30 | */ | |
31 | ||
32 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
33 | #include <asm/atomic.h> | |
34 | #include <asm/types.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
01116105 | 37 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
3ec3b2fb | 38 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
39 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
40 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
42 | #include <asm/unistd.h> | |
43 | ||
44 | /* 0 = no checking | |
45 | 1 = put_count checking | |
46 | 2 = verbose put_count checking | |
47 | */ | |
48 | #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0 | |
49 | ||
50 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | |
51 | extern int audit_enabled; | |
52 | ||
53 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
54 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
55 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
56 | ||
57 | /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the | |
58 | * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from | |
59 | * path_lookup. */ | |
60 | #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 | |
61 | ||
62 | /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using | |
63 | a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by | |
64 | the syscall filter. */ | |
65 | enum audit_state { | |
66 | AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. | |
67 | * No syscall-specific audit records can | |
68 | * be generated. */ | |
69 | AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
70 | * but don't necessarily fill it in at | |
71 | * syscall entry time (i.e., filter | |
72 | * instead). */ | |
73 | AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
74 | * and always fill it in at syscall | |
75 | * entry time. This makes a full | |
76 | * syscall record available if some | |
77 | * other part of the kernel decides it | |
78 | * should be recorded. */ | |
79 | AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
80 | * always fill it in at syscall entry | |
81 | * time, and always write out the audit | |
82 | * record at syscall exit time. */ | |
83 | }; | |
84 | ||
85 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and | |
86 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
87 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
88 | * | |
89 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
90 | struct audit_names { | |
91 | const char *name; | |
92 | unsigned long ino; | |
93 | dev_t dev; | |
94 | umode_t mode; | |
95 | uid_t uid; | |
96 | gid_t gid; | |
97 | dev_t rdev; | |
98 | }; | |
99 | ||
100 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
101 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
102 | int type; | |
103 | }; | |
104 | ||
105 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
106 | ||
107 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { | |
108 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
109 | struct ipc_perm p; | |
110 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
111 | uid_t uid; | |
112 | gid_t gid; | |
113 | mode_t mode; | |
114 | }; | |
115 | ||
3ec3b2fb DW |
116 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { |
117 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
118 | int nargs; | |
119 | unsigned long args[0]; | |
120 | }; | |
121 | ||
122 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr { | |
123 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
124 | int len; | |
125 | char a[0]; | |
126 | }; | |
127 | ||
01116105 SS |
128 | struct audit_aux_data_path { |
129 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
130 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
131 | struct vfsmount *mnt; | |
132 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
133 | |
134 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
135 | struct audit_context { | |
136 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
137 | enum audit_state state; | |
138 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
139 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
140 | uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */ | |
141 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
142 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
143 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
2fd6f58b | 144 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
1da177e4 LT |
145 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ |
146 | int name_count; | |
147 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
148 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ | |
149 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
150 | ||
151 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
152 | pid_t pid; | |
153 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
154 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
155 | unsigned long personality; | |
2fd6f58b | 156 | int arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
157 | |
158 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
159 | int put_count; | |
160 | int ino_count; | |
161 | #endif | |
162 | }; | |
163 | ||
164 | /* Public API */ | |
165 | /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation | |
166 | * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at | |
167 | * syscall exit time. */ | |
168 | static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist); | |
169 | static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist); | |
170 | static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist); | |
171 | ||
172 | struct audit_entry { | |
173 | struct list_head list; | |
174 | struct rcu_head rcu; | |
175 | struct audit_rule rule; | |
176 | }; | |
177 | ||
7ca00264 DW |
178 | extern int audit_pid; |
179 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
180 | /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from |
181 | * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ | |
182 | static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) | |
183 | { | |
184 | int i; | |
185 | ||
186 | if (a->flags != b->flags) | |
187 | return 1; | |
188 | ||
189 | if (a->action != b->action) | |
190 | return 1; | |
191 | ||
192 | if (a->field_count != b->field_count) | |
193 | return 1; | |
194 | ||
195 | for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { | |
196 | if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] | |
197 | || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) | |
198 | return 1; | |
199 | } | |
200 | ||
201 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) | |
202 | if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) | |
203 | return 1; | |
204 | ||
205 | return 0; | |
206 | } | |
207 | ||
208 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
209 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
210 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
211 | static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, | |
212 | struct list_head *list) | |
213 | { | |
214 | if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) { | |
215 | entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND; | |
216 | list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
217 | } else { | |
218 | list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
219 | } | |
220 | return 0; | |
221 | } | |
222 | ||
223 | static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) | |
224 | { | |
225 | struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); | |
226 | kfree(e); | |
227 | } | |
228 | ||
229 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
230 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
231 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
232 | static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
233 | struct list_head *list) | |
234 | { | |
235 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
236 | ||
237 | /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
238 | * deletion routine. */ | |
239 | list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
240 | if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
241 | list_del_rcu(&e->list); | |
242 | call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
243 | return 0; | |
244 | } | |
245 | } | |
246 | return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */ | |
247 | } | |
248 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
249 | /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during |
250 | * AUDIT_ADD. */ | |
251 | static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) | |
252 | { | |
253 | int i; | |
254 | ||
255 | if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER | |
256 | && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE | |
257 | && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) | |
258 | return -1; | |
259 | if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) | |
260 | return -1; | |
261 | ||
262 | d->flags = s->flags; | |
263 | d->action = s->action; | |
264 | d->field_count = s->field_count; | |
265 | for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { | |
266 | d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; | |
267 | d->values[i] = s->values[i]; | |
268 | } | |
269 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; | |
270 | return 0; | |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
c94c257c SH |
273 | int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, |
274 | uid_t loginuid) | |
1da177e4 LT |
275 | { |
276 | u32 flags; | |
277 | struct audit_entry *entry; | |
278 | int err = 0; | |
279 | ||
280 | switch (type) { | |
281 | case AUDIT_LIST: | |
282 | /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are | |
283 | always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ | |
284 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list) | |
285 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
286 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
287 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list) | |
288 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
289 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
290 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list) | |
291 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
292 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
293 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); | |
294 | break; | |
295 | case AUDIT_ADD: | |
296 | if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
297 | return -ENOMEM; | |
298 | if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) { | |
299 | kfree(entry); | |
300 | return -EINVAL; | |
301 | } | |
302 | flags = entry->rule.flags; | |
303 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK)) | |
304 | err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist); | |
305 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY)) | |
306 | err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist); | |
307 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT)) | |
308 | err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist); | |
c0404993 SG |
309 | audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, |
310 | "auid %u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); | |
1da177e4 LT |
311 | break; |
312 | case AUDIT_DEL: | |
313 | flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags; | |
314 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK)) | |
315 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist); | |
316 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY)) | |
317 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist); | |
318 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT)) | |
319 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist); | |
c0404993 SG |
320 | audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, |
321 | "auid %u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); | |
1da177e4 LT |
322 | break; |
323 | default: | |
324 | return -EINVAL; | |
325 | } | |
326 | ||
327 | return err; | |
328 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
329 | |
330 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
331 | * otherwise. */ | |
332 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
333 | struct audit_rule *rule, | |
334 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
335 | enum audit_state *state) | |
336 | { | |
337 | int i, j; | |
338 | ||
339 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
340 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE; | |
341 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; | |
342 | int result = 0; | |
343 | ||
344 | switch (field) { | |
345 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
346 | result = (tsk->pid == value); | |
347 | break; | |
348 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
349 | result = (tsk->uid == value); | |
350 | break; | |
351 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
352 | result = (tsk->euid == value); | |
353 | break; | |
354 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
355 | result = (tsk->suid == value); | |
356 | break; | |
357 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
358 | result = (tsk->fsuid == value); | |
359 | break; | |
360 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
361 | result = (tsk->gid == value); | |
362 | break; | |
363 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
364 | result = (tsk->egid == value); | |
365 | break; | |
366 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
367 | result = (tsk->sgid == value); | |
368 | break; | |
369 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
370 | result = (tsk->fsgid == value); | |
371 | break; | |
372 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
373 | result = (tsk->personality == value); | |
374 | break; | |
2fd6f58b | 375 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
376 | if (ctx) | |
377 | result = (ctx->arch == value); | |
378 | break; | |
1da177e4 LT |
379 | |
380 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
381 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
382 | result = (ctx->return_code == value); | |
383 | break; | |
384 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
385 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b | 386 | result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
1da177e4 LT |
387 | break; |
388 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
389 | if (ctx) { | |
390 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
391 | if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
392 | ++result; | |
393 | break; | |
394 | } | |
395 | } | |
396 | } | |
397 | break; | |
398 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
399 | if (ctx) { | |
400 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
401 | if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
402 | ++result; | |
403 | break; | |
404 | } | |
405 | } | |
406 | } | |
407 | break; | |
408 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
409 | if (ctx) { | |
410 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
411 | if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) { | |
412 | ++result; | |
413 | break; | |
414 | } | |
415 | } | |
416 | } | |
417 | break; | |
418 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
419 | result = 0; | |
420 | if (ctx) | |
421 | result = (ctx->loginuid == value); | |
422 | break; | |
423 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
424 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
425 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
426 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
427 | if (ctx) | |
428 | result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value); | |
429 | break; | |
430 | } | |
431 | ||
432 | if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) | |
433 | result = !result; | |
434 | if (!result) | |
435 | return 0; | |
436 | } | |
437 | switch (rule->action) { | |
438 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
439 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
440 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
441 | } | |
442 | return 1; | |
443 | } | |
444 | ||
445 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
446 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
447 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
448 | */ | |
449 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
450 | { | |
451 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
452 | enum audit_state state; | |
453 | ||
454 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
455 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) { | |
456 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { | |
457 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
458 | return state; | |
459 | } | |
460 | } | |
461 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
462 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
463 | } | |
464 | ||
465 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
466 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
23f32d18 | 467 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
1da177e4 LT |
468 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
469 | */ | |
470 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
471 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
472 | struct list_head *list) | |
473 | { | |
474 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
475 | enum audit_state state; | |
476 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
477 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
478 | ||
479 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
480 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
481 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit | |
482 | && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { | |
483 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
484 | return state; | |
485 | } | |
486 | } | |
487 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
488 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
489 | } | |
490 | ||
491 | /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ | |
492 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
493 | int return_valid, | |
494 | int return_code) | |
495 | { | |
496 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
497 | ||
498 | if (likely(!context)) | |
499 | return NULL; | |
500 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
501 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
502 | ||
503 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) { | |
504 | enum audit_state state; | |
505 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist); | |
506 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) | |
507 | context->auditable = 1; | |
508 | } | |
509 | ||
510 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
511 | context->uid = tsk->uid; | |
512 | context->gid = tsk->gid; | |
513 | context->euid = tsk->euid; | |
514 | context->suid = tsk->suid; | |
515 | context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; | |
516 | context->egid = tsk->egid; | |
517 | context->sgid = tsk->sgid; | |
518 | context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; | |
519 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
520 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
521 | return context; | |
522 | } | |
523 | ||
524 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
525 | { | |
526 | int i; | |
527 | ||
528 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
529 | if (context->auditable | |
530 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
531 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" | |
532 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" | |
533 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
534 | __LINE__, | |
535 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, | |
536 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
537 | context->ino_count); | |
538 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
539 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
540 | context->names[i].name, | |
541 | context->names[i].name); | |
542 | dump_stack(); | |
543 | return; | |
544 | } | |
545 | #endif | |
546 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
547 | context->put_count = 0; | |
548 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
549 | #endif | |
550 | ||
551 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
552 | if (context->names[i].name) | |
553 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
554 | context->name_count = 0; | |
555 | } | |
556 | ||
557 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
558 | { | |
559 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
560 | ||
561 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
01116105 SS |
562 | if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { |
563 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
564 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
565 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
566 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
567 | context->aux = aux->next; |
568 | kfree(aux); | |
569 | } | |
570 | } | |
571 | ||
572 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
573 | enum audit_state state) | |
574 | { | |
575 | uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid; | |
576 | ||
577 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
578 | context->state = state; | |
579 | context->loginuid = loginuid; | |
580 | } | |
581 | ||
582 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
583 | { | |
584 | struct audit_context *context; | |
585 | ||
586 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
587 | return NULL; | |
588 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
589 | return context; | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
592 | /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
593 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the | |
594 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
595 | * needed. */ | |
596 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
597 | { | |
598 | struct audit_context *context; | |
599 | enum audit_state state; | |
600 | ||
601 | if (likely(!audit_enabled)) | |
602 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
603 | ||
604 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
605 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
606 | return 0; | |
607 | ||
608 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
609 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
610 | return -ENOMEM; | |
611 | } | |
612 | ||
613 | /* Preserve login uid */ | |
614 | context->loginuid = -1; | |
615 | if (current->audit_context) | |
616 | context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid; | |
617 | ||
618 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
619 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
620 | return 0; | |
621 | } | |
622 | ||
623 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
624 | { | |
625 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
626 | int count = 0; | |
627 | ||
628 | do { | |
629 | previous = context->previous; | |
630 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
631 | ++count; | |
632 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
633 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
634 | context->serial, context->major, | |
635 | context->name_count, count); | |
636 | } | |
637 | audit_free_names(context); | |
638 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
639 | kfree(context); | |
640 | context = previous; | |
641 | } while (context); | |
642 | if (count >= 10) | |
643 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
644 | } | |
645 | ||
219f0817 SS |
646 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
647 | { | |
648 | char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; | |
649 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
650 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
651 | ||
652 | get_task_comm(name, current); | |
653 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm=%s", name); | |
654 | ||
655 | if (!mm) | |
656 | return; | |
657 | ||
658 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
659 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
660 | while (vma) { | |
661 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
662 | vma->vm_file) { | |
663 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
664 | vma->vm_file->f_dentry, | |
665 | vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt); | |
666 | break; | |
667 | } | |
668 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
669 | } | |
670 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
671 | } | |
672 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
673 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context) |
674 | { | |
675 | int i; | |
676 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
677 | ||
c0404993 | 678 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1da177e4 LT |
679 | if (!ab) |
680 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
681 | audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major); | |
682 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) | |
683 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
2fd6f58b | 684 | audit_log_format(ab, " arch=%x", context->arch); |
1da177e4 | 685 | if (context->return_valid) |
2fd6f58b | 686 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
687 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
688 | context->return_code); | |
1da177e4 LT |
689 | audit_log_format(ab, |
690 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
326e9c8b SG |
691 | " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
692 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
693 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", | |
1da177e4 LT |
694 | context->argv[0], |
695 | context->argv[1], | |
696 | context->argv[2], | |
697 | context->argv[3], | |
698 | context->name_count, | |
699 | context->pid, | |
700 | context->loginuid, | |
701 | context->uid, | |
702 | context->gid, | |
703 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
704 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); | |
219f0817 | 705 | audit_log_task_info(ab); |
1da177e4 LT |
706 | audit_log_end(ab); |
707 | while (context->aux) { | |
708 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
709 | ||
c0404993 SG |
710 | aux = context->aux; |
711 | ||
712 | ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type); | |
1da177e4 LT |
713 | if (!ab) |
714 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
715 | ||
1da177e4 | 716 | switch (aux->type) { |
c0404993 | 717 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1da177e4 LT |
718 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; |
719 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
326e9c8b | 720 | " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x", |
1da177e4 | 721 | axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode); |
3ec3b2fb DW |
722 | break; } |
723 | ||
724 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
725 | int i; | |
726 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux; | |
727 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs); | |
728 | for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++) | |
729 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]); | |
730 | break; } | |
731 | ||
732 | case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: { | |
733 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux; | |
734 | ||
735 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
736 | audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); | |
737 | break; } | |
01116105 SS |
738 | |
739 | case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { | |
740 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
741 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); | |
742 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
743 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
744 | break; } | |
745 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
746 | } |
747 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
c0404993 SG |
748 | |
749 | context->aux = aux->next; | |
1da177e4 LT |
750 | kfree(aux); |
751 | } | |
752 | ||
753 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { | |
c0404993 | 754 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH); |
1da177e4 LT |
755 | if (!ab) |
756 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
757 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); | |
83c7d091 | 758 | if (context->names[i].name) { |
759 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
760 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); | |
761 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
762 | if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1) |
763 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
326e9c8b | 764 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
1da177e4 LT |
765 | context->names[i].ino, |
766 | MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
767 | MINOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
768 | context->names[i].mode, | |
769 | context->names[i].uid, | |
770 | context->names[i].gid, | |
771 | MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), | |
772 | MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); | |
773 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
774 | } | |
775 | } | |
776 | ||
777 | /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and | |
778 | * __put_task_struct. */ | |
779 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
780 | { | |
781 | struct audit_context *context; | |
782 | ||
783 | task_lock(tsk); | |
784 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); | |
785 | task_unlock(tsk); | |
786 | ||
787 | if (likely(!context)) | |
788 | return; | |
789 | ||
790 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
791 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */ | |
7ca00264 | 792 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid) |
1da177e4 LT |
793 | audit_log_exit(context); |
794 | ||
795 | audit_free_context(context); | |
796 | } | |
797 | ||
798 | /* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are | |
799 | * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete | |
800 | * audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the | |
23f32d18 | 801 | * record and this serial number are used by the user-space tools to |
1da177e4 LT |
802 | * determine which pieces belong to the same audit record. The |
803 | * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from | |
804 | * syscall entry to syscall exit. | |
805 | * | |
806 | * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down. | |
807 | * | |
808 | * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the | |
809 | * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them | |
810 | * all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of | |
811 | * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system | |
812 | * halts). */ | |
813 | static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void) | |
814 | { | |
815 | static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff); | |
816 | unsigned int a, b; | |
817 | ||
818 | do { | |
819 | a = atomic_read(&serial); | |
820 | if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial)) | |
821 | atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff); | |
822 | b = atomic_read(&serial); | |
823 | } while (b != a - 1); | |
824 | ||
825 | return 0xffffff - b; | |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
828 | /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the | |
829 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or | |
830 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
831 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
832 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
833 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
834 | * be written). */ | |
2fd6f58b | 835 | void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, |
1da177e4 LT |
836 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
837 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
838 | { | |
839 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
840 | enum audit_state state; | |
841 | ||
842 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
843 | ||
844 | /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
845 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of | |
846 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
847 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
848 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
849 | * | |
850 | * i386 no | |
851 | * x86_64 no | |
852 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S) | |
853 | * | |
854 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
855 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
856 | */ | |
857 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
858 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
859 | ||
860 | #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old) | |
861 | /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */ | |
862 | if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old) | |
863 | return; | |
864 | #endif | |
865 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
866 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
867 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
868 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
869 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
870 | #endif | |
871 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
872 | if (newctx) { | |
873 | newctx->previous = context; | |
874 | context = newctx; | |
875 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
876 | } else { | |
877 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
878 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
879 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
880 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
881 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
882 | } | |
883 | } | |
884 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
885 | ||
886 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
887 | return; | |
888 | ||
2fd6f58b | 889 | context->arch = arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
890 | context->major = major; |
891 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
892 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
893 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
894 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
895 | ||
896 | state = context->state; | |
897 | if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) | |
898 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist); | |
899 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
900 | return; | |
901 | ||
902 | context->serial = audit_serial(); | |
903 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; | |
904 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
905 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
906 | } | |
907 | ||
908 | /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
909 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from | |
910 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
911 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
912 | * free the names stored from getname(). */ | |
2fd6f58b | 913 | void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) |
1da177e4 LT |
914 | { |
915 | struct audit_context *context; | |
916 | ||
917 | get_task_struct(tsk); | |
918 | task_lock(tsk); | |
2fd6f58b | 919 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1da177e4 LT |
920 | task_unlock(tsk); |
921 | ||
922 | /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have | |
923 | * called __put_task_struct. */ | |
924 | if (likely(!context)) | |
925 | return; | |
926 | ||
7ca00264 | 927 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid) |
1da177e4 LT |
928 | audit_log_exit(context); |
929 | ||
930 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
931 | context->auditable = 0; | |
2fd6f58b | 932 | |
1da177e4 LT |
933 | if (context->previous) { |
934 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
935 | context->previous = NULL; | |
936 | audit_free_context(context); | |
937 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
938 | } else { | |
939 | audit_free_names(context); | |
940 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
941 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
942 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
943 | } | |
944 | put_task_struct(tsk); | |
945 | } | |
946 | ||
947 | /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */ | |
948 | void audit_getname(const char *name) | |
949 | { | |
950 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
951 | ||
952 | if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
953 | return; | |
954 | ||
955 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
956 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
957 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
958 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
959 | dump_stack(); | |
960 | #endif | |
961 | return; | |
962 | } | |
963 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
964 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
965 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
966 | ++context->name_count; | |
967 | } | |
968 | ||
969 | /* Intercept a putname request. Called from | |
970 | * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from | |
971 | * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall | |
972 | * exit. */ | |
973 | void audit_putname(const char *name) | |
974 | { | |
975 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
976 | ||
977 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
978 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
979 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
980 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
981 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
982 | if (context->name_count) { | |
983 | int i; | |
984 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
985 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
986 | context->names[i].name, | |
987 | context->names[i].name); | |
988 | } | |
989 | #endif | |
990 | __putname(name); | |
991 | } | |
992 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
993 | else { | |
994 | ++context->put_count; | |
995 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
996 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
997 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
998 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
999 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
1000 | context->serial, context->major, | |
1001 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
1002 | context->put_count); | |
1003 | dump_stack(); | |
1004 | } | |
1005 | } | |
1006 | #endif | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | ||
1009 | /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from | |
1010 | * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */ | |
1011 | void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode) | |
1012 | { | |
1013 | int idx; | |
1014 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1015 | ||
1016 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1017 | return; | |
1018 | if (context->name_count | |
1019 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
1020 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
1021 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1022 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
1023 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
1024 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
1025 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
1026 | else { | |
1027 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1028 | * associated name? */ | |
1029 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED) | |
1030 | return; | |
1031 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1032 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1033 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1034 | ++context->ino_count; | |
1035 | #endif | |
1036 | } | |
1037 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1038 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1039 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1040 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1041 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1042 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
1043 | } | |
1044 | ||
197c69c6 | 1045 | int audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
d812ddbb | 1046 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) |
1da177e4 LT |
1047 | { |
1048 | if (ctx) { | |
1049 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; | |
1050 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
1051 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
1052 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
197c69c6 | 1053 | return 1; |
1da177e4 | 1054 | } |
197c69c6 | 1055 | return 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
1056 | } |
1057 | ||
456be6cd | 1058 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
1da177e4 | 1059 | { |
456be6cd | 1060 | if (task->audit_context) { |
c0404993 SG |
1061 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1062 | ||
1063 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN); | |
1064 | if (ab) { | |
1065 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
326e9c8b | 1066 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u", |
c0404993 SG |
1067 | task->pid, task->uid, |
1068 | task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); | |
1069 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1070 | } | |
456be6cd | 1071 | task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; |
1da177e4 LT |
1072 | } |
1073 | return 0; | |
1074 | } | |
1075 | ||
1076 | uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
1077 | { | |
1078 | return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | ||
1081 | int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) | |
1082 | { | |
1083 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; | |
1084 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1085 | ||
1086 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1087 | return 0; | |
1088 | ||
1089 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1090 | if (!ax) | |
1091 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | ax->qbytes = qbytes; | |
1094 | ax->uid = uid; | |
1095 | ax->gid = gid; | |
1096 | ax->mode = mode; | |
1097 | ||
c0404993 | 1098 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; |
1da177e4 LT |
1099 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
1100 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1101 | return 0; | |
1102 | } | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1103 | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1104 | int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
1105 | { | |
1106 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; | |
1107 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1108 | ||
1109 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1110 | return 0; | |
1111 | ||
1112 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1113 | if (!ax) | |
1114 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1115 | ||
1116 | ax->nargs = nargs; | |
1117 | memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
1118 | ||
1119 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
1120 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1121 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1122 | return 0; | |
1123 | } | |
1124 | ||
1125 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) | |
1126 | { | |
1127 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; | |
1128 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1129 | ||
1130 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1131 | return 0; | |
1132 | ||
1133 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1134 | if (!ax) | |
1135 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1136 | ||
1137 | ax->len = len; | |
1138 | memcpy(ax->a, a, len); | |
1139 | ||
1140 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR; | |
1141 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1142 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | } | |
1145 | ||
01116105 SS |
1146 | int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) |
1147 | { | |
1148 | struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; | |
1149 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1150 | ||
1151 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1152 | return 0; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1155 | if (!ax) | |
1156 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1157 | ||
1158 | ax->dentry = dget(dentry); | |
1159 | ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); | |
1160 | ||
1161 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; | |
1162 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1163 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1164 | return 0; | |
1165 | } | |
1166 | ||
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1167 | void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
1168 | { | |
1169 | extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; | |
1170 | extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; | |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1171 | |
1172 | if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) { | |
1173 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) { | |
1174 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1175 | audit_sig_pid = current->pid; | |
1176 | if (ctx) | |
1177 | audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; | |
1178 | else | |
1179 | audit_sig_uid = current->uid; | |
1180 | } | |
1181 | } | |
1182 | } | |
1183 |