[GitHub/mt8127/android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git] / include / linux / capability.h

/*
 * This is <linux/capability.h>
 *
 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
 *
 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
 *
 * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
 */

#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H

#include <linux/types.h>

struct task_struct;

/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
   capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
   kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
   it. */

/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
   a set of three capability sets.  The transposition of 3*the
   following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
   library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
   etc.. */

#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1  0x19980330
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1     1

#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2  0x20071026  /* deprecated - use v3 */
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2     2

#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3  0x20080522
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3     2

typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
	__u32 version;
	int pid;
} __user *cap_user_header_t;

typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
        __u32 effective;
        __u32 permitted;
        __u32 inheritable;
} __user *cap_user_data_t;


#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK	0xFF000000
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT	24
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK	~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE	0x000001

#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1	0x01000000
#define VFS_CAP_U32_1           1
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1         (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1))

#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2	0x02000000
#define VFS_CAP_U32_2           2
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2         (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))

#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ           XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
#define VFS_CAP_U32             VFS_CAP_U32_2
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION	VFS_CAP_REVISION_2

struct vfs_cap_data {
	__le32 magic_etc;            /* Little endian */
	struct {
		__le32 permitted;    /* Little endian */
		__le32 inheritable;  /* Little endian */
	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
};

#ifndef __KERNEL__

/*
 * Backwardly compatible definition for source code - trapped in a
 * 32-bit world. If you find you need this, please consider using
 * libcap to untrap yourself...
 */
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S     _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1

#else

#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3

extern int file_caps_enabled;

typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
} kernel_cap_t;

/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
	__u32 magic_etc;
	kernel_cap_t permitted;
	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
};

#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))

#endif


/**
 ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
 **/

/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
   overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
   ownership. */

#define CAP_CHOWN            0

/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
   [_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
   CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */

#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1

/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
   and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
   defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */

#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH  2

/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
   file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
   is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */

#define CAP_FOWNER           3

/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
   shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
   bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
   supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
   the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
   cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */

#define CAP_FSETID           4

/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
   process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
   of the process receiving the signal. */

#define CAP_KILL             5

/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
/* Allows setgroups(2) */
/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */

#define CAP_SETGID           6

/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */
/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */

#define CAP_SETUID           7


/**
 ** Linux-specific capabilities
 **/

/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
 *   Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
 *   remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
 * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
 *   Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
 *       to the current process' inheritable set
 *   Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
 *   Allow modification of the securebits for a process
 */

#define CAP_SETPCAP          8

/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */

#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE  9

/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */

#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10

/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */

#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST    11

/* Allow interface configuration */
/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
/* Allow modification of routing tables */
/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
   sockets */
/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_RAW) */
/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
/* Allow multicasting */
/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */

#define CAP_NET_ADMIN        12

/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_ADMIN) */

#define CAP_NET_RAW          13

/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
   with IPC) */

#define CAP_IPC_LOCK         14

/* Override IPC ownership checks */

#define CAP_IPC_OWNER        15

/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE       16

/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */

#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO        17

/* Allow use of chroot() */

#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT       18

/* Allow ptrace() of any process */

#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE       19

/* Allow configuration of process accounting */

#define CAP_SYS_PACCT        20

/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
/* Allow administration of the random device */
/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
/* Allow setting the domainname */
/* Allow setting the hostname */
/* Allow calling bdflush() */
/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
/* Allow nfsservctl */
/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
/* Allow removing semaphores */
/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
   and shared memory */
/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
/* Allow turning swap on/off */
/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
   extra ioctls) */
/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
/* Allow access to the nvram device */
/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
/* Allow setting up serial ports */
/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
   arbitrary SCSI commands */
/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */

#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN        21

/* Allow use of reboot() */

#define CAP_SYS_BOOT         22

/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
   UID) processes */
/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
   processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
   process. */
/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */

#define CAP_SYS_NICE         23

/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
/* Override quota limits. */
/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
   resources) */
/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
   you can override using fsuid too */
/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
/* Override max number of keymaps */

#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE     24

/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
/* Allow setting the real-time clock */

#define CAP_SYS_TIME         25

/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
/* Allow vhangup() of tty */

#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG   26

/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */

#define CAP_MKNOD            27

/* Allow taking of leases on files */

#define CAP_LEASE            28

#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE      29

#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30

#define CAP_SETFCAP	     31

/* Override MAC access.
   The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
   to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
   the capability it should use to do so. */

#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE     32

/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
   The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
   to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
   policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
   capability it should use to do so. */

#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33

/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */

#define CAP_SYSLOG           34

/* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */

#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM            35

/* Allow preventing system suspends */

#define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND    36

#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND

#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)

/*
 * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
 */

#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x)     ((x) >> 5)        /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
#define CAP_TO_MASK(x)      (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */

#ifdef __KERNEL__

struct inode;
struct dentry;
struct user_namespace;

struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);

extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;

/*
 * Internal kernel functions only
 */

#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)

/*
 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
 *
 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
 *
 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
 *
 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
 *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
 *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
 */

# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))

# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))

#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */

# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })

#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */

# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)

#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))

#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
do {                                                                \
	unsigned __capi;                                            \
	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
		c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
	}                                                           \
} while (0)

#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
do {                                                                \
	unsigned __capi;                                            \
	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
		c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
	}                                                           \
} while (0)

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
				       const kernel_cap_t b)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
	return dest;
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
					 const kernel_cap_t b)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
	return dest;
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
				    const kernel_cap_t drop)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
	return dest;
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
	return dest;
}

static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
	unsigned __capi;
	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
			return 0;
	}
	return 1;
}

/*
 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
 * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
 *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
 * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
 *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
 */
static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
	return cap_isclear(dest);
}

/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */

static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
					    const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	return cap_combine(a,
			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
					      const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
	return cap_combine(a,
			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
}

extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);

/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);

#endif /* __KERNEL__ */

#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
Commit	Line	Data
1da177e4 LT	1	/*
	2	* This is <linux/capability.h>
	3	*
b5376771	4	* Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
1da177e4 LT	5	* Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
	6	* with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
	7	*
	8	* See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
	9	*
bcf56442	10	* ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
b5376771	11	*/
1da177e4 LT	12
	13	#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
	14	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
	15
	16	#include <linux/types.h>
1da177e4	17
b7add02d AM	18	struct task_struct;
b7add02d AM	19
1da177e4 LT	20	/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
	21	capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
	22	kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
	23	it. */
	24
e338d263	25	/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
1da177e4 LT	26	a set of three capability sets. The transposition of 3*the
	27	following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
	28	library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
	29	etc.. */
b5376771	30
e338d263 AM	31	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330
	32	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1
	33
ca05a99a	34	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026 /* deprecated - use v3 */
e338d263 AM	35	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2
e338d263 AM	36
ca05a99a AM	37	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 0x20080522
ca05a99a AM	38	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 2
1da177e4 LT	39
	40	typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
	41	__u32 version;
	42	int pid;
	43	} __user *cap_user_header_t;
b5376771	44
1da177e4 LT	45	typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
	46	__u32 effective;
	47	__u32 permitted;
	48	__u32 inheritable;
	49	} __user *cap_user_data_t;
1da177e4	50
e338d263	51
b5376771	52	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000
851f7ff5	53	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24
e338d263 AM	54	#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
	55	#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001
	56
b5376771	57	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000
e338d263 AM	58	#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1
e338d263 AM	59	#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)(1 + 2VFS_CAP_U32_1))
b5376771	60
e338d263 AM	61	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000
	62	#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
	63	#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)(1 + 2VFS_CAP_U32_2))
	64
	65	#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
	66	#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
	67	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
b5376771	68
b5376771	69	struct vfs_cap_data {
e338d263	70	__le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
8f6936f4	71	struct {
e338d263 AM	72	__le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
	73	__le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
	74	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
b5376771 SH	75	};
b5376771 SH	76
ca05a99a AM	77	#ifndef __KERNEL__
	78
	79	/*
	80	* Backwardly compatible definition for source code - trapped in a
	81	* 32-bit world. If you find you need this, please consider using
	82	* libcap to untrap yourself...
	83	*/
	84	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
	85	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1
	86
	87	#else
	88
	89	#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
	90	#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
1da177e4	91
9fa91d99	92	extern int file_caps_enabled;
9fa91d99	93
1da177e4	94	typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
ca05a99a	95	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
1da177e4 LT	96	} kernel_cap_t;
1da177e4 LT	97
c0b00441 EP	98	/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
	99	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
	100	__u32 magic_etc;
	101	kernel_cap_t permitted;
	102	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
	103	};
	104
e338d263	105	#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
1da177e4 LT	106	#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
	107
	108	#endif
	109
	110
	111	/**
b5376771	112	** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
1da177e4 LT	113	**/
	114
	115	/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
	116	overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
	117	ownership. */
	118
	119	#define CAP_CHOWN 0
	120
	121	/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
	122	[_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
	123	CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
	124
	125	#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1
	126
	127	/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
	128	and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
	129	defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
	130
	131	#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 2
b5376771	132
1da177e4 LT	133	/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
	134	file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
	135	is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
	136
	137	#define CAP_FOWNER 3
	138
	139	/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
	140	shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
	141	bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
	142	supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
	143	the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
	144	cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
	145
	146	#define CAP_FSETID 4
	147
1da177e4 LT	148	/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
	149	process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
	150	of the process receiving the signal. */
	151
	152	#define CAP_KILL 5
	153
	154	/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
	155	/* Allows setgroups(2) */
	156	/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
	157
	158	#define CAP_SETGID 6
	159
	160	/* Allows setuid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). /
	161	/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
	162
	163	#define CAP_SETUID 7
	164
	165
	166	/**
	167	** Linux-specific capabilities
	168	**/
	169
e338d263 AM	170	/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
	171	* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
	172	* remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
	173	* With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
3b7391de SH	174	* Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
	175	* to the current process' inheritable set
	176	* Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
3898b1b4	177	* Allow modification of the securebits for a process
e338d263	178	*/
1da177e4 LT	179
	180	#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
	181
	182	/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
	183
	184	#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE 9
	185
	186	/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
	187	/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
	188
	189	#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10
	190
	191	/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
	192
	193	#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST 11
	194
	195	/* Allow interface configuration */
	196	/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
	197	/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
	198	/* Allow modification of routing tables */
	199	/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
	200	sockets */
6cc7a765	201	/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_RAW) */
1da177e4 LT	202	/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
	203	/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
	204	/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
	205	/* Allow multicasting */
	206	/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
	207	/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
	208
	209	#define CAP_NET_ADMIN 12
	210
	211	/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
	212	/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
6cc7a765	213	/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_ADMIN) */
1da177e4 LT	214
	215	#define CAP_NET_RAW 13
	216
	217	/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
	218	/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
	219	with IPC) */
	220
	221	#define CAP_IPC_LOCK 14
	222
	223	/* Override IPC ownership checks */
	224
	225	#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15
	226
	227	/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
1da177e4 LT	228	#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16
	229
	230	/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
	231	/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */
	232
	233	#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO 17
	234
	235	/* Allow use of chroot() */
	236
	237	#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT 18
	238
	239	/* Allow ptrace() of any process */
	240
	241	#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE 19
	242
	243	/* Allow configuration of process accounting */
	244
	245	#define CAP_SYS_PACCT 20
	246
	247	/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
	248	/* Allow administration of the random device */
	249	/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
1da177e4 LT	250	/* Allow setting the domainname */
	251	/* Allow setting the hostname */
	252	/* Allow calling bdflush() */
	253	/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
	254	/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
	255	/* Allow nfsservctl */
	256	/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
	257	/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
	258	/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
	259	/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
	260	/* Allow removing semaphores */
	261	/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
	262	and shared memory */
	263	/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
	264	/* Allow turning swap on/off */
	265	/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
	266	/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
	267	/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
	268	/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
	269	/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
	270	extra ioctls) */
	271	/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
	272	/* Allow access to the nvram device */
	273	/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
	274	/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
	275	/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
	276	/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
	277	/* Allow setting up serial ports */
	278	/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
	279	/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
	280	arbitrary SCSI commands */
	281	/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
bce5f6ba	282	/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
1da177e4 LT	283
	284	#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21
	285
	286	/* Allow use of reboot() */
	287
	288	#define CAP_SYS_BOOT 22
	289
	290	/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
	291	UID) processes */
	292	/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
	293	processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
	294	process. */
	295	/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */
	296
	297	#define CAP_SYS_NICE 23
	298
	299	/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
	300	/* Override quota limits. */
	301	/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
	302	/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
	303	resources) */
b5376771	304	/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
1da177e4 LT	305	you can override using fsuid too */
	306	/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
	307	/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
	308	/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
	309	/* Override max number of keymaps */
	310
	311	#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE 24
	312
	313	/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
	314	/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
	315	/* Allow setting the real-time clock */
	316
	317	#define CAP_SYS_TIME 25
	318
	319	/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
	320	/* Allow vhangup() of tty */
	321
	322	#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG 26
	323
	324	/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
	325
	326	#define CAP_MKNOD 27
	327
	328	/* Allow taking of leases on files */
	329
	330	#define CAP_LEASE 28
	331
	332	#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE 29
	333
	334	#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
	335
b5376771 SH	336	#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
b5376771 SH	337
e114e473 CS	338	/* Override MAC access.
	339	The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
	340	An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
	341	to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
	342	the capability it should use to do so. */
	343
	344	#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE 32
	345
	346	/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
	347	The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
	348	An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
	349	to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
	350	policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
	351	capability it should use to do so. */
	352
	353	#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
	354
ce6ada35 SH	355	/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
	356
	357	#define CAP_SYSLOG 34
	358
9a7adcf5 JS	359	/* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */
	360
	361	#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM 35
	362
d9914cf6	363	/* Allow preventing system suspends */
9a7adcf5	364
d9914cf6	365	#define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36
4d7e30d9	366
d9914cf6	367	#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
3b7391de SH	368
	369	#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
	370
e338d263 AM	371	/*
	372	* Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
	373	*/
	374
	375	#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
	376	#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
	377
1da177e4	378	#ifdef __KERNEL__
1da177e4	379
1a48e2ac	380	struct inode;
3486740a SH	381	struct dentry;
	382	struct user_namespace;
	383
3486740a SH	384	struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
	385
	386	extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
3486740a SH	387	extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
3486740a SH	388
1da177e4 LT	389	/*
	390	* Internal kernel functions only
	391	*/
b5376771	392
e338d263	393	#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
ca05a99a	394	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
e338d263	395
0ad30b8f SH	396	/*
	397	* CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
	398	*
	399	* The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
	400	* At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
	401	*
	402	* It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
	403	*
	404	* We could also define fsmask as follows:
	405	* 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
	406	* 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
	407	*/
	408
e338d263	409	# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
0ad30b8f	410	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
e338d263 AM	411	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
	412	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
	413	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
	414	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
	415
e114e473 CS	416	# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
e114e473 CS	417
ca05a99a	418	#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
e338d263 AM	419	# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
	420	#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
	421
25f2ea9f DH	422	# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
25f2ea9f DH	423	# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
0ad30b8f SH	424	# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
	425	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
	426	CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
76a67ec6	427	# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
0ad30b8f SH	428	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
0ad30b8f SH	429	CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
e338d263	430
ca05a99a	431	#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
e338d263	432
e338d263	433	# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
e338d263 AM	434
	435	#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] \|= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
	436	#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
	437	#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
	438
	439	#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
	440	do { \
	441	unsigned __capi; \
	442	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
	443	c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
	444	} \
	445	} while (0)
	446
	447	#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
	448	do { \
	449	unsigned __capi; \
	450	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
	451	c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
	452	} \
	453	} while (0)
	454
	455	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
	456	const kernel_cap_t b)
	457	{
	458	kernel_cap_t dest;
	459	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, \|);
	460	return dest;
	461	}
1da177e4	462
e338d263 AM	463	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
	464	const kernel_cap_t b)
	465	{
	466	kernel_cap_t dest;
	467	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
	468	return dest;
	469	}
1da177e4	470
e338d263 AM	471	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
	472	const kernel_cap_t drop)
	473	{
	474	kernel_cap_t dest;
	475	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
	476	return dest;
	477	}
1da177e4	478
e338d263 AM	479	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
	480	{
	481	kernel_cap_t dest;
	482	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
	483	return dest;
	484	}
1da177e4	485
e338d263 AM	486	static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
	487	{
	488	unsigned __capi;
	489	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
	490	if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
	491	return 0;
	492	}
	493	return 1;
	494	}
1da177e4	495
9d36be76 EP	496	/*
	497	* Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
	498	* return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
	499	* cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
	500	* return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
	501	* cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
	502	*/
e338d263 AM	503	static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
	504	{
	505	kernel_cap_t dest;
	506	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
	507	return cap_isclear(dest);
	508	}
1da177e4	509
e338d263	510	/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
1da177e4	511
e338d263	512	static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
1da177e4	513	{
e338d263 AM	514	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
e338d263 AM	515	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
1da177e4 LT	516	}
1da177e4 LT	517
e338d263	518	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4	519	{
e338d263 AM	520	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
e338d263 AM	521	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4 LT	522	}
1da177e4 LT	523
e338d263 AM	524	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
e338d263 AM	525	const kernel_cap_t permitted)
1da177e4	526	{
e338d263 AM	527	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	528	return cap_combine(a,
	529	cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
1da177e4 LT	530	}
1da177e4 LT	531
e338d263	532	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4	533	{
e338d263 AM	534	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
e338d263 AM	535	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4 LT	536	}
1da177e4 LT	537
e338d263 AM	538	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
	539	const kernel_cap_t permitted)
	540	{
	541	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
	542	return cap_combine(a,
	543	cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
	544	}
1da177e4	545
3263245d SH	546	extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
	547	extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
	548	struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
	549	extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
7b61d648 EP	550	extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
7b61d648 EP	551	struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
3486740a SH	552	extern bool capable(int cap);
3486740a SH	553	extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
47a150ed	554	extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
1a48e2ac	555	extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
c59ede7b	556
851f7ff5	557	/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
851f7ff5 EP	558	extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data cpu_caps);
851f7ff5 EP	559
1da177e4 LT	560	#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
	561
	562	#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */