UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux
[GitHub/mt8127/android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git] / include / linux / capability.h
CommitLineData
1da177e4
LT
1/*
2 * This is <linux/capability.h>
3 *
b5376771 4 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
1da177e4
LT
5 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
6 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
7 *
8 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
9 *
bcf56442 10 * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
b5376771 11 */
1da177e4
LT
12#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
13#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
14
607ca46e 15#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
e338d263 16
ca05a99a
AM
17
18#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
19#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
1da177e4 20
9fa91d99 21extern int file_caps_enabled;
9fa91d99 22
1da177e4 23typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
ca05a99a 24 __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
1da177e4
LT
25} kernel_cap_t;
26
c0b00441
EP
27/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
28struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
29 __u32 magic_etc;
30 kernel_cap_t permitted;
31 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
32};
33
e338d263 34#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
1da177e4
LT
35#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
36
1da177e4 37
1a48e2ac 38struct inode;
3486740a
SH
39struct dentry;
40struct user_namespace;
41
3486740a
SH
42struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
43
44extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
3486740a
SH
45extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
46
1da177e4
LT
47/*
48 * Internal kernel functions only
49 */
b5376771 50
e338d263 51#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
ca05a99a 52 for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
e338d263 53
0ad30b8f
SH
54/*
55 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
56 *
57 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
58 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
59 *
60 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
61 *
62 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
63 * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
64 * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
65 */
66
e338d263 67# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
0ad30b8f 68 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
e338d263
AM
69 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
70 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
71 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
72 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
73
e114e473
CS
74# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
75
ca05a99a 76#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
e338d263
AM
77# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
78#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
79
25f2ea9f
DH
80# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
81# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
0ad30b8f
SH
82# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
83 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
84 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
76a67ec6 85# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
0ad30b8f
SH
86 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
87 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
e338d263 88
ca05a99a 89#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
e338d263 90
e338d263 91# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
e338d263
AM
92
93#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
94#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
95#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
96
97#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
98do { \
99 unsigned __capi; \
100 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
101 c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
102 } \
103} while (0)
104
105#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
106do { \
107 unsigned __capi; \
108 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
109 c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
110 } \
111} while (0)
112
113static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
114 const kernel_cap_t b)
115{
116 kernel_cap_t dest;
117 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
118 return dest;
119}
1da177e4 120
e338d263
AM
121static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
122 const kernel_cap_t b)
123{
124 kernel_cap_t dest;
125 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
126 return dest;
127}
1da177e4 128
e338d263
AM
129static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
130 const kernel_cap_t drop)
131{
132 kernel_cap_t dest;
133 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
134 return dest;
135}
1da177e4 136
e338d263
AM
137static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
138{
139 kernel_cap_t dest;
140 CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
141 return dest;
142}
1da177e4 143
e338d263
AM
144static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
145{
146 unsigned __capi;
147 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
148 if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
149 return 0;
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
1da177e4 153
9d36be76
EP
154/*
155 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
156 * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
157 * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
158 * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
159 * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
160 */
e338d263
AM
161static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
162{
163 kernel_cap_t dest;
164 dest = cap_drop(a, set);
165 return cap_isclear(dest);
166}
1da177e4 167
e338d263 168/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
1da177e4 169
e338d263 170static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
1da177e4 171{
e338d263
AM
172 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
173 return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
1da177e4
LT
174}
175
e338d263 176static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4 177{
e338d263
AM
178 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
179 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4
LT
180}
181
e338d263
AM
182static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
183 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
1da177e4 184{
e338d263
AM
185 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
186 return cap_combine(a,
187 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
1da177e4
LT
188}
189
e338d263 190static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4 191{
e338d263
AM
192 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
193 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4
LT
194}
195
e338d263
AM
196static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
197 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
198{
199 const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
200 return cap_combine(a,
201 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
202}
1da177e4 203
3263245d
SH
204extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
205extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
206 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
207extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
7b61d648
EP
208extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
209 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
3486740a
SH
210extern bool capable(int cap);
211extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
47a150ed 212extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
1a48e2ac 213extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
c59ede7b 214
851f7ff5 215/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
851f7ff5
EP
216extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
217
1da177e4 218#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */